Welcome

Welcome to the DCSA Intelligence Oversight Awareness course.

In a 2013 testimony to Congress on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, former Director of National Intelligence, retired Lieutenant General (LT GEN) James Clapper spoke about limitations to intelligence activities as pertaining to U.S. Persons.

LT GEN James Clapper (Retired) stated, “This public discussion should be based on an accurate understanding of the Intelligence Community; who we are, what we do, and how we are overseeing it. In the last few months the manner in which our activities have been characterized has often been incomplete, inaccurate, or misleading, or some combination thereof. I believe that most Americans realize the Intelligence Community exists to collect the vital intelligence that helps protect our nation from foreign threats. We focus on uncovering the secret plans and intentions of our foreign adversaries. But what we do not do is spy unlawfully on Americans, or for that matter spy indiscriminately on the citizens of any country. We only ‘spy’ for valid foreign intelligence purposes as authorized by law with multiple layers of oversight to ensure we do not abuse our authorities."

Introduction

All DCSA employees, both government and contractors, both Counterintelligence (CI), and non-counterintelligence (Non-CI), are required by DCSA regulations to complete Intelligence Oversight training within thirty calendar days of their entry on duty and annually thereafter. This course has been developed to meet those requirements.

This course has two versions. Version 1, CI, is intended for those DCSA employees who have an intelligence mission primarily in the Counterintelligence Directorate. Version 2, Non-CI, is intended for the remaining DCSA employees who do not have an intelligence mission.

DCSA Mission

The DCSA mission is to support national security and the warfighter, secure the nation's technological base, and oversee the protection of United States and foreign classified information in the hands of industry.
In support of this mission within DCSA there are multiple groups with their own special charter. One of these groups is the DCSA Counterintelligence (CI) Directorate, an Intelligence Component embedded within DCSA, whose mission is to identify unlawful penetrators of cleared U.S. defense industry and articulate the threat for industry and U.S. government leaders.

In order to accomplish this mission it is imperative all DCSA personnel are aware of the Intelligence Oversight policy that governs the procedures involved in the collection, retention, and dissemination of U.S. Persons information.

Course Purpose

The purpose of this training is to ensure those involved at any point in activities involving information about U.S. Persons are aware of the following:

1) Under the mission and authority of DoD Manual 5240.01, there are specific restrictions placed on DoD Intelligence Components with regard to collecting, retaining, and disseminating U.S. Persons information.

2) There are differences in how the DoD Intelligence Components can collect U.S. Persons information and how someone acting in an industrial security or personnel security capacity under the mission and authority of the NISPOM can collect U.S. Persons information.

The information in this course also includes how to report questionable activities to the proper authorities.

Course Objectives

By the end of this course, all DCSA employees should be able to:

- Define Intelligence Oversight
- Explain the purpose of Intelligence Oversight
- Describe who or what is included in the term "U.S. Person"
- Define Intelligence Activity
- Recognize prohibited activities
- Know how to report questionable activities

EO 12333

Though not everyone within DCSA is directly involved with intelligence information, everyone is responsible to report questionable activities as defined in the course and to treat any intelligence information according to regulations set forth in EO 12333 and DoD Manual 5240.01 that protects intelligence information regarding U.S. Persons.
It is important to note that personnel outside of CI cannot be tasked with conducting intelligence activities.

**What is Intelligence Oversight?**

Intelligence Oversight is the process of ensuring all DoD intelligence, and counterintelligence activities are conducted in accordance with applicable U.S. law, Presidential Executive Orders, and DoD issuances.

The DoD Intelligence Oversight program is designed to ensure that DoD can conduct its foreign intelligence and counterintelligence missions while protecting the statutory and constitutional rights of U.S. Persons. It also provides for the reporting of questionable activities.

If someone other than an intelligence professional is acting in that capacity, whether they take it upon themselves or are given a task by someone who cannot perform the requested task, they will fall under the purview of DoD Manual 5240.01 as it pertains to U.S. Person information.

For example, an Industrial Security Rep is allowed to retain a copy of a suspicious contact report that they have received from industry even if it contains U.S. Person information because they are functioning in a security capacity and not as an intelligence professional.

**DSCA CI Collection Activities**

The National Industrial Security Program Manual (NISPOM) requires cleared industry to report suspicious activities to the FBI and DCSA. Those suspicious contact reports (SCRs) may be passed from industry through the industrial security representatives to the CI Directorate. Once in the possession of the Counterintelligence Directorate, the information contained within the SCR falls within the applicability of Intelligence Oversight requirements. In some cases, personnel security adjudicators come across questionable information contained in a personnel security investigation file which may be of counterintelligence concern. When that information is received by the DCSA CI Directorate for further review and analysis, it too falls within the Intelligence Oversight guidelines.

**Why do we need Intelligence Oversight?**

During the 1960's and early 1970's, the strong and often violent opposition to the Vietnam War and Civil Rights issues prompted many leaders at the highest levels of government to view groups involved in these issues not just as political threats but also as threats to civil order. In the belief that foreign governments were involved, military intelligence units and other government agencies were ordered to aggressively collect information about U.S. citizens engaged in anti-war and Civil Rights Movements. Reaction to such "Big Brother" activities led to public demands for curbs on the
Intelligence Community to protect against abuse of the Constitutional provision against unlawful search and seizure.

In 1976, Executive Order 11905 established the first rules on the collection, retention, and dissemination of information on U.S. Persons. This process culminated in Executive Order 12333, which President Ronald Reagan signed in December 1981. Each president since President Reagan has endorsed this same executive order. This order was recently amended but remains essentially unchanged.

Although the abuses that brought about the Intelligence Oversight system occurred many years ago, Intelligence Oversight requirements remain current and relevant today - especially in light of the ongoing global war on terror, and ever increasing threats by industrial espionage. By the nature of their jobs, DCSA personnel are in contact with U.S. Person information and therefore need to be aware of the need for increased Intelligence Oversight vigilance.

**Determining a U.S. Person**

U.S. Person determination factors are as follows:

- A United States citizen
- An alien known by the Defense intelligence component concerned to be a permanent resident alien
- An unincorporated association substantially composed of U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens
- A corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
- A corporation or corporate subsidiary incorporated abroad, even if partially or wholly owned by a corporation incorporated in the United States, is not a U.S. Person.
- A person or organization in the United States is presumed to be a U.S. Person, unless there is specific information to the contrary is obtained.
- Conversely, a person or organization outside the United States, or whose location is not known to be in the United States, is presumed to be a non-U.S. Person, unless specific information to the contrary is obtained.

**Where can I get information on Intelligence Oversight Regulations?**

Intelligence Oversight, as authorized in Executive Order 12333, is implemented through DoD Directive 5148.13 entitled “Intelligence Oversight”. DoD Manual 5240.01 entitled “Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities” outlines the procedures for proper collection, retention, and dissemination of U.S. Person information by U.S. DoD components.

The focus of this training will include the following procedures of DoD Manual 5240.01:
- Procedure 1 deals with general provisions
- Procedures 2 through 4 cover collection, retention, and dissemination of information about U.S. Persons
- Procedures 5 through 10 will not be addressed in this training

This training will include the employee responsibilities for conduct and required training and encompasses identifying, investigating, and reporting questionable intelligence activities.

**Procedure 1: General Provisions**

DoD Intelligence Components must not infringe upon the Constitutional rights of any U.S. Person. Intelligence Component’s actions must be based on a lawfully assigned function and employ the least intrusive, lawful techniques. All actions must comply with all regulatory requirements.

Important: DoD Manual 5240.01 does not in itself authorize intelligence activity. The DoD element must first have the mission and authority to conduct the intelligence activity. This regulation does not apply to law enforcement activities, including civil disturbance operations.

It is also important to note that this regulation does not apply to industrial security or personnel security activities. Those activities are defined in the National Industrial Security Program (NISP).

**Procedure 2: Collection of U.S. Persons Information (USPI)**

Collection is defined as: Information collected when it is received by a Defense Intelligence Component (DIC) whether or not it is retained by the DIC for intelligence or other purposes. Collected information includes information obtained by any means, including information that is volunteered to the Component.

U.S. Persons Information (USPI) can be collected, if necessary, to perform a function assigned to DCSA and the information fits into one or more of the defined categories of information types below. The following exemption categories are further defined in the handout available on the course resources page.

1. Publicly Available Information
2. Consent
3. Foreign Intelligence
4. Counterintelligence
5. Threats to Safety
6. Protection of Intelligence Sources, Methods, and Activities
7. Current, Former, or Potential Sources of Assistance to Intelligence Activities
8. Persons in Contact with Sources or Potential Sources
9. Personnel Security
10. Physical Security
11. Communications Security Investigation
12. Overhead and Airborne Reconnaissance
13. Administrative Purposes

Procedure 3: Retention of Information

Information is defined as retained only if it can be retrieved by the person’s name or other personal identifying data.

DCSA Intelligence Personnel can retain information concerning U.S. Persons if it was collected pursuant to Procedure 2, in that it’s information gathered by DCSA employees in the course of their official duties, and if the information fits into one or more of the following categories:

- The information that could have been collected intentionally under Procedure 2. This means it was a part of an assigned task or job responsibility.
- The information is necessary to understand or assess foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.
- The information is foreign intelligence or counterintelligence collected from electronic surveillance.

DCSA can retain U.S. Person information not related to our mission or functions only long enough to refer to other agencies or to report Intelligence Oversight violations.

Access to U.S. Person information will be restricted to certain individuals on a need-to-know basis.

Procedure 4: Dissemination of Information

This procedure governs the types of USPI that may be disseminated without the person’s consent outside of the DoD Intelligence Component which collected and retained the information.

The DoD Intelligence Component may disseminate USPI if it was collected, retained, or both, under Procedures 2 and 3, and the recipient is reasonably believed to have a need to receive such information for the performance of a lawful governmental function and is one of the following:

- A DoD employee or contractor who has a need for such information in the course of his or her official duties.
- A law enforcement entity of federal, state, or local government and the information may indicate involvement in activities that may violate laws the recipient is responsible to enforce.
• An agency within the Intelligence Community.
• A federal government agency authorized to receive such information in the performance of a lawful government function.
• A foreign government when dissemination is undertaken pursuant to an agreement or other understanding with such government.

Any exceptions to dissemination requires legal review.

**Questionable Intelligence Activities**

DoD Directive 5148.13 provides for the identification, investigation, and reporting of questionable intelligence activities (QIAs) and significant or highly sensitive matters (SHSMs). A QIA refers to any intelligence or intelligence related activity when there is a reason to believe such activity may violate the law, any Executive Order or Presidential Directive, including Executive Order 12333 reference A, or applicable DoD policy. More information on QIAs can be found in the handout available on the course resources page. Be sure and review the Questionable Intelligence Activities Quick Reference Guide on the course resources page for detailed information on reporting procedures. An SHSM refers to any development or circumstance involving an intelligence activity or intelligence personnel that could impugn the reputation or integrity of the DoD Intelligence Community or otherwise call into question the propriety of an intelligence activity.

**Examples of a Significant or Highly Sensitive Matter Activity**

Significant or Highly Sensitive Matters might be manifested in, or by, an activity that falls into one of the following categories in that the matter:

• Involves congressional inquiries or investigations.
• May result in adverse media coverage.
• May have impact on foreign relations or foreign partners, or
• Is related to the unauthorized disclosure of classified or protected information, such as information identifying a sensitive source and method.

Reporting under this procedure does not include reporting of routine security violations.

An example of an SHSM would be if a leak the magnitude of Wiki-leaks occurred but this time the leak occurred at a cleared defense contractor by a disgruntled employee that perhaps had access to multiple classified programs.

Reporting under this paragraph does not include reporting of routine security violations. Spillage occurring when classified information is inadvertently sent over a unclassified system would not normally be considered an SHSM. This would be handled through an administrative inquiry.
Reporting Violations of Intelligence Regulations

The following applies to all individuals in the DCSA community:

- You are required to report QIAs and SHSMs immediately through your chain of command or supervisor to the DCSA Senior Intelligence Oversight Official (SIOO).
- You can also report QIAs or SHSMs to the DCSA Office of General Counsel (GC), or to the DCSA Inspector General (IG), or to the DoD GC, or to the DoD SIOO, or to the Joint Staff IG, or the Legal Counsel for Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), or to the DoD IG, or to the Intelligence Community IG.
- No reprisal or adverse action may be taken against personnel for reporting possible Intelligence Oversight violations.
- Conversely, adverse action may be taken against personnel who were aware of violations but failed to report them.

Summary

The purpose of Intelligence Oversight is to enable DoD components performing authorized intelligence functions to carry out those functions in a manner that protects the constitutional rights of U.S. Persons. DoD Manual 5240.01 established the rules and procedures for collecting data on U.S. Persons. Remember the term U.S. Persons includes U.S. citizens but is actually much broader.

DCSA can collect U.S. Person information if necessary to perform an Industrial Security function under the authority of the NISP or other authorized function assigned to DCSA and the information fits into one of the 13 information categories.

Members of DCSA not only have the responsibility to report violations of Intelligence regulations, they must also report any questionable activities. No reprisal or adverse action may be taken against personnel for reporting possible Intelligence violations.