

ASSESSING AND MANAGING INSIDER THREATS

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AGENCY



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The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is ...



HOUSING
PROVIDER



MILITARY



EMPLOYER



NATIONAL
SECURITY




RETAILER



CHILDCARE
PROVIDER



EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS



HEALTHCARE
PROVIDER

Learning Objectives



You will be able to:

- 1 Recognize types of insider threat and how these may become the focus of a threat assessment investigation.
- 2 Describe special considerations for conducting a threat assessment when the person of concern is an insider.
- 3 Identify approaches that DOD has taken to protect against insider threat and strategies that your organization can take to protect against insider threat.



Who Are DOD Insiders?

CIVILIANS

**MILITARY SERVICE
MEMBERS**

CONTRACTORS



Insiders have

**ACCESS
KNOWLEDGE
TRAINING
RIGHTS**

**What about MILITARY VETERANS
and MILITARY FAMILIES?**






What Types of Threats Are We Concerned With?



Intentional Threats



Unintentional Threats



ESPIONAGE

Intelligence activity directed towards the acquisition of information through clandestine means.

TERRORISM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE

The unlawful use of violence or the threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies.

A communication or physical transfer of classified information to an unauthorized recipient.

SABOTAGE

Deliberate damage, destruction, or obstruction, particularly for political or military advantage.

TARGETED VIOLENCE

A premeditated act of violence against an individual, group, or location.

SUICIDE

Death caused by self-directed injurious behavior with an intent to die as result of the behavior.

OTHER THREATS

Other loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities

3 Cases
3 Insiders
3 Lessons




CASE 1

**ESPIONAGE/
UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURE**



CASE 2

**TERRORISM/
TARGETED VIOLENCE**



CASE 3

**TARGETED VIOLENCE/
SUICIDE/
OTHER THREATS**



CASE 1

ESPIONAGE/ UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE



CASE 1

THE INSIDER

- 31yo DOD Contractor, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
 - Political geography analyst
 - TOP SECRET/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI)
- Air Force Veteran (Enlisted 2009 – 2014)
 - Studied Mandarin at DLI
 - Deployed (Afghanistan) as Intelligence Analyst (2012)
- History of childhood abuse and deprivation
 - History of pre-service mental health issues
 - History of homelessness
 - Dropped out of community college and UVA



INSIDER
ACCESS?
KNOWLEDGE?
TRAINING?
RIGHTS?



CASE 1

THE THREAT

- Began communicating with a reporter (2013)
- Devoted himself to “anti-war activism” (2014)
- Accepted “lucrative job offer” with Leidos as a government contractor (2014)
- Printed classified documents, gave them to reporter (2014)
- Plead guilty, sentenced to 45 months in prison (2021)

I too ignored the voice inside AS I continued walking blindly towards the edge of AN ABYSS. AND WHEN I found myself at the brink, ready to give in, the voice said to me, "You who had been a hunter of men, ARE NO LONGER. By the grace of God you've been saved. Now go forth and be a fisher of men so that others might know the Truth." So I ran to the press with documents in hand, NOT ONE MORE NOR ONE less than NECESSARY, to dispel the DEMONSTRABLE lie that said DRONE WARFARE kept us safe, that our lives ARE worth more than theirs

INSIDER
ACCESS?
KNOWLEDGE?
TRAINING?
RIGHTS?



CASE 1

It is not a secret that I struggle to live with depression and post traumatic stress disorder. Both stem from my childhood experience growing up in a rural mountain community and were compounded by exposure to combat during military service. Depression is a constant. Though stress, particularly stress caused by war, can manifest itself at different times and in different ways. The tell-tale signs of a person afflicted by PTSD and depression can often be outwardly observed and are practically universally recognizable. Hard lines about the face and jaw. Eyes, once bright and wide, now deep set and fearful. And an inexplicably sudden loss of interest in things that used to spark joy. These are the noticeable changes in my demeanor marked by those who knew me before and after military service.

INSIDER
ACCESS?
KNOWLEDGE?
TRAINING?
RIGHTS?

CASE 1 – THE LESSONS



- 1) Risks Intersect**
- 2) Warning Signs Are Detectable**
- 3) Mitigation Requires Action**



CASE 1 – THE RESEARCH LITERATURE



Herbig, K. L. (2017). The expanding spectrum of espionage by Americans, 1947-2015. Defense Personnel and Security Research Center: Seaside, CA.

<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1040851>



Thompson, T. J. (2018). A psycho-social motivational theory of mass leaking. *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 31(1), 116–125.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2017.1374800>



Lenzenweger, M. F., & Shaw, E. D. 2022. The Critical Pathway to Insider Risk Model: Brief Overview and Future Directions. *Counter-Insider Threat Research and Practice* 1(1).

<https://citrap.scholasticahq.com/article/36186>



CASE 2
***TERRORISM/
TARGETED
VIOLENCE***

Case 2



THE INSIDER

- 49-year-old U.S. Coast Guard Lieutenant
- Acquisitions Officer, USCG Headquarters, Washington, DC
- 30+ years military (USMC, Army National Guard, and USCG)
- SECRET Security Clearance



**INSIDER
ACCESS?
KNOWLEDGE?
TRAINING?
RIGHTS?**

Case 2



THE THREAT

- Self identified white nationalist/neo-Nazi/white power skinhead who advocated for “focused violence”
- Used government computer to read mass murder manifestos
- Performed Internet searches and developed lists of potential “leftist” targets, including journalists and politicians
- Conducted attack and targeting research and planning, and operational cover support activities
- Cache of weapons, ammunition, opioids, and steroids
- Tramadol (opiate) addiction

**INSIDER
ACCESS?
KNOWLEDGE?
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RIGHTS?**



CASE 2



“I don’t think I can cause complete destruction on my own, However if I could enlist the unwitting help of another power/country would be best. Who and how to provoke???”

- Draft email dated June 2, 2017

36		
37	JOEY	sheila jackson
38	Chris hayes	ilhan omar
39	Sen blumen jew	chris cuomo
40	pelosi	angela davis
41	sen kaine	DSA
42	ari melber	van jones
43	thumper	podesta
44	don lemon	
45	gillabran	
46	pose warren	
47	cortez	
48	booker	
49	harris	
50	beto orourke	
51	maxine waters	
52		
53		



CASE 2 – THE LESSONS



- 1) Risks Intersect
... and Change Over Time**
- 2) Warning Signs Are Detectable**
- 3) Mitigation Requires Action**



CASE 2 – THE RESEARCH LITERATURE



Dmitrieva, A. M., & Meloy, J. R. (2022). Troubled waters: Domestic terrorism threat in the U.S. Coast Guard and the TRAP-18. *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, 9 (3), 153-170.

<https://doi.org/10.1037/tam0000170>



Baweja, J., Dunning, M. P., & Noonan, C. (2022). Domestic extremism: How to counter threats posed to critical assets. *Counter-Insider Threat Research and Practice*, 1(1).

<https://citrap.scholasticahq.com/article/36185-domestic-extremism-how-to-counter-threats-posed-to-critical-assets>



Clesle, A., Knable, J., & Rettenberger, M. (2024). Risk and threat assessment instruments for violent extremism: A systematic review. *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, Advanced online publication.

<https://doi.org/10.1037/tam0000223>



CASE 3

***TARGETED VIOLENCE/
SUICIDE/
OTHER THREATS***


CASE 3

UNCLASSIFIED



THE INSIDER

- 27-year-old Army Specialist, Infantry, Fort Bragg, NC
- Married, with two children under age 5
- Enlisted 2004
- Deployed Iraq 10/2006-11/2007;
Afghanistan 9/2010-07/2011
- SECRET Security Clearance



**INSIDER
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CASE 3

THE THREAT

- Stolen military equipment spurred an investigation.
- Awaiting court martial for larceny (\$1,700 toolkit)
- Preservice offenses:
 - Burglary
 - Battery
 - Marijuana possession
- In-service offenses:
 - Assault (2007)
 - DUI and leaving the scene of an accident (2009)
 - Reckless aggravated battery (2010)
- History of Concussion; Combat Trauma
- Probable PTSD and TBI



**INSIDER
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"My mind in the past couple of years has folded on itself. I just went to the Dr. and they said I just tested positive for Dementia."

"So one week before I was supposed to get out I was charged with these damn tools. So instead of a (\$)20,000 severance I get to loose (sic) all the benefits and everything I've worked so hard for."

"If you come toward me, I will kill you."

Sometimes U just have to pull the pin. Sorry about the mess. I think this tool is urs as well."

CASE 3 – THE LESSONS



- 1) Risks Intersect
... and Change Over Time**
- 2) Warning Signs Are Detectable**
- 3) Mitigation Requires Action**



CASE 3 – THE RESEARCH LITERATURE



Elbogen, E. B., Wagner, H. R., Kimbrel, N. A., Brancu, M., Naylor, J., Graziano, R., & Crawford, E. (2018). Risk factors for concurrent suicidal ideation and violent impulses in military veterans. *Psychological Assessment*, 30(4), 425-435.

<https://doi.org/10.1037/pas0000490>



Hourani, L. L., Williams, J., Lattimore, P. K., Morgan, J. K., Hopkinson, S. G., Jenkins, L., & Cartwright, J. (2018). Workplace victimization risk and protective factors for suicidal behavior among active-duty military personnel. *Journal of affective disorders*, 236, 45-51.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2018.04.095>



Low, E. C., Scalora, M. J., Bulling, D. J., DeKraai, M. B., & Siddoway, K. R. (2024). Willingness to report in military workplace violence scenarios: Initial findings from the Marine Corps on the impact of rank and relationship to the person of concern. *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, 11(1), 19–31.

<https://doi.org/10.1037/tam0000202>

SOLUTIONS



Solutions

- #1 TAKE CARE OF YOUR PEOPLE**
- #2 Destigmatize mental health care**
- #3 Entry screening AND Continuous Evaluation**
- #4 Intervention (modifiable states) & Separation (non-modifiable traits)**
- #5 Invest in ...TEAMS
TOOLS
TECHNOLOGY
TRAINING**



Resources



CDSE

Center for Development
of Security Excellence

Insider Threat Toolkit

- Training
- Job Aids
- Best Practice Guides
- Case Study Library
- Webinars and Podcasts
- Games

<https://www.cdse.edu>



CITRAP
Counter-Insider Threat
Research and Practice

<https://citrap.scholasticahq.com/>



<https://securityawareness.usalearning.gov/aire.html>

<https://insiderthreat.westpoint.edu/mirror-journal-page/>



QUESTIONS?

**DEFENSE
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AND SECURITY AGENCY**

