

Student Guide

Course: Introduction to DOD HSPD-12 CAC Credentialing, v3

Course Introduction

Introduction

1. Course Introduction

Janine works for a defense contractor and just started on a new project that will require her to regularly enter multiple military installations.

Enrique just arrived for in-processing after enlisting into the Army and will require access to his new duty station as well as the Department of Defense, or DOD, network.

Brenda is a newly hired DOD employee, who will need access to DOD facilities and information systems.

Finally, Colin, a U.S. citizen, has been a DOD contractor for 1 year and has just been assigned to a new contract which requires him to have access to DOD information systems.

One thing all four of these individuals have in common is the need for a Common Access Card, or CAC, to be able to access DOD facilities and, for some, a DOD network.

To obtain a CAC, they all need a favorable Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, or HSPD-12 credentialing adjudication, at a minimum. Some may need to undergo additional adjudications such as suitability or fitness for federal employment or eligibility for a security clearance.

Favorable HSPD-12 adjudications will ensure that Janine, Enrique, Brenda, and Colin are not known or reasonably suspected of being terrorists, do not provide an avenue for terrorism, and do not pose a risk to DOD personnel or assets. This course will detail the HSPD-12 process that personnel like Janine, Enrique, Brenda, and Colin will undergo in order to receive a CAC. Welcome to the Introduction to DOD HSPD-12 CAC Credentialing course.

1. Course Objectives

Here are the lesson objectives:

- Identify the purpose of HSPD-12 adjudications
- Identify the purpose of HSPD-12 adjudications
- Identify the basic steps in the HSPD-12 process

- Identify the purpose of and requirements for interim CAC review pending completion of background investigation
- Identify the HSPD-12 investigative requirements and process
- Apply the HSPD-12 basic and, if applicable, supplemental standards to scenarios that present potentially disqualifying information
- Identify the process for handling unfavorable determinations
- Identify the requirements for recording the final adjudicative determination

Lesson 1: Overview of HSPD-12 Credentialing

Introduction

2. Objectives

Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 Adjudications seek to ensure that personnel who receive HSPD-12 credentials are not known or suspected terrorists and do not provide an avenue for terrorism. This lesson will begin by briefly reviewing the three main types of adjudications. It will then narrow its focus to the subject of HSPD-12 adjudications, discussing the purpose of and requirements for HSPD-12 adjudications and the legal and regulatory foundations of HSPD-12 adjudications.

Here are the lesson objectives:

- Identify the purpose of HSPD-12 adjudications
 - Identify the controlling regulations and their requirements for HSPD-12 adjudications
 - Identify the circumstances under which an HSPD-12 adjudication must be executed

Introduction to Adjudications

1. Purpose of Adjudications

So, what is adjudication?

In order to access classified information, perform sensitive duties, work in the competitive or excepted government service, or receive credentials to access Department of Defense (DOD) controlled facilities or information systems, DOD employees and contractor personnel must undergo investigation and adjudication by trusted government personnel.

During an adjudication, trusted government personnel evaluate pertinent information obtained from background investigations and other reliable sources to ensure that all individuals who work for the DOD are appropriately vetted and meet the eligibility standards to work for the Federal government as a civilian, contractor, or military member.

2. Types of Adjudications Standards

There are three main types of adjudications in the DOD: national security adjudications, adjudications for suitability or federal employment, and HSPD-12 adjudications. National security adjudications determine whether an individual is eligible to access classified information or perform sensitive national security duties. Suitability and fitness adjudications determine whether an individual can be a Federal employee. Finally, HSPD-12 adjudications determine

who may be issued credentials for physical access to DOD-controlled facilities or access to DOD controlled information systems, also referred to as “logical” access. Although this course focuses specifically on HSPD-12 investigations and adjudications, it is important for you to be aware of the other types of adjudications so that you can better understand how HSPD-12 adjudications fit into the bigger picture of protecting the DOD by ensuring the approval of an individual for credentials does not create unacceptable risk.

3. Relationship Between Adjudications

Each of the three types of adjudications has a distinct purpose and criteria. Of these three types, HSPD-12 adjudications are based on a minimum level of risk and sensitivity. If an applicant requires a suitability, fitness, or national security determination, then the HSPD-12 determination is inherent in either of those determinations and a separate HSPD-12 determination is not required.

Purpose of HSPD-12 Adjudications

1. What are HSPD-12 Adjudications?

Recall that the fundamental purpose of HSPD-12 credentialing is to ensure that all personnel who are issued credentials for long-term access to federal facilities and information systems meet certain security requirements. Within the DOD, this identity credential is known as the Common Access Card (CAC). HSPD-12 credentialing standards are applied to ensure that personnel are not known or suspected terrorists and do not provide an avenue for terrorism.

It also ensures that personnel do not pose an unacceptable risk to DOD assets, including the life, safety, or health of employees, contractors, vendors, or visitors; physical assets or information systems; personal property; records, including classified, privileged, proprietary, financial, or medical records; or the privacy of data subjects. To this end, and to ensure the CAC is a trusted credential for use within the DOD and across the federal government, the issuance of a CAC is based on four main criteria: eligibility, verification of DOD affiliation, completion of background vetting requirements, and verification of claimed identity. HSPD-12 adjudications must follow the nondiscrimination policy outlined in OPM Federal Investigations Notice (FIN) 10-05.

2. Who Must Undergo HSPD-12 Adjudication?

In the DOD, HSPD-12 adjudication is required for issuance of a CAC to federal employees, contractors, and other eligible personnel as identified in DOD Instruction 1000.13, “Identification Cards for Members of the Uniformed Services, Their Dependents, and Other Eligible Individuals.” Eligible personnel must be sponsored for a CAC by a DOD or Uniformed Service entity or employer. The CAC may provide them physical access on a recurring basis to DOD facilities or to non-DOD federally-controlled facilities on behalf of the DOD. The CAC may also provide logical access to DOD networks, such as the NIPRNet, via login either onsite using a

computer with a government-controlled configuration or remotely using DOD remote access procedures. HSPD-12 applies to all new military and civilian employees, contractors and other eligible personnel as well as to current employees, contractors and applicable individuals who possess a CAC but who have not already undergone a background investigation at the appropriate level and been favorably adjudicated.

The Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) is a global, long-haul Internet Protocol (IP)-based network to support unclassified IP data communications services for combat support applications in the Department of Defense.

3. Reciprocity

For those current employees, contractors, and applicable individuals who have a valid Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card or a CAC from their former department or agency, reciprocity applies. The purpose of reciprocity is to prevent an individual from needing to undergo repeated investigations. In order for reciprocity to apply, the valid PIV card or CAC must be verified by the individual's former department or agency. Furthermore, the individual must have undergone the required investigation and must have received a favorable adjudication from the former agency. In addition, the individual must have had no break in government service greater than 24 months, and there must be no actionable information since the date of the last investigation.

Regulatory Foundations of HSPD-12 Adjudications

1. Authority for HSPD-12 Credentialing

The authority for HSPD-12 adjudications is documented in several key regulations. The ultimate authority came from President George W. Bush in 2004, when he issued the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, which required government-wide standards for personal identity verification (PIV). The CAC is the DOD's federally recognized PIV. The goals of this directive are to ensure that the credentials issued are based on sound criteria for verifying an employee's identity; are strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation; and can be rapidly authenticated electronically. In 2005, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Memorandum M-05-24, which directed that HSPD-12 adjudication be based on a type of investigation called a "National Agency Check with Inquiries" (NACI) or on an employment or national security background investigation at an equivalent level.

In October 2014, the Revised Federal Investigative Tier 1 Investigation requirements replaced the NACI.

The 2006 Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 201-1, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, established several additional requirements, such as requiring that agencies maintain appeals procedures for those individuals who are denied credentials or whose credentials are revoked.

In 2008, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) issued a memorandum titled Final Credentialing Standards for Issuing Personal Identity Verification Cards under HSPD-12. This document established the standards for HSPD-12 adjudications. The DOD implements the government-wide standards and the OPM guidance in the September 9, 2014 Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5200.46, which is called DOD Investigative and Adjudicative Guidance for Issuing the Common Access Card (CAC). This instruction establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for investigating and adjudicating eligibility to hold a CAC. The 5200.46 incorporates and cancels DOD Instruction 5200.02 Enclosure 4.

Review Activity 1

The purpose of HSPD-12 adjudications is to ensure that all applicants for a CAC_____.

Select ALL that apply.

- Are able to perform the duties of their position
- Are not terrorists and do not provide an avenue for terrorism
- May have access to classified information
- Do not pose an unacceptable risk to the life, safety, or health of employees, contractors, vendors, and visitors

Review Activity 2

Which of the following would you consult for DOD investigative and adjudication guidelines for HSPD-12 credentialing?

- ICPG 704.2: Adjudicative Guidelines
- DODI 5200.46
- OMB M-05-24
- DODI 5200.02, Enclosure 4

Conclusion

1. Lesson Summary

This lesson discussed the general purpose, definition, and types of adjudications as well as the relationship between these types of adjudications. It then detailed the purpose of HSPD-12 adjudications and examined the regulatory foundations that have influenced and established the current policies governing HSPD-12 adjudications.

Answer Key

Review Activity 1

The purpose of HSPD-12 adjudications is to ensure that all applicants for a CAC_____.

- Are able to perform the duties of their position*
- Are not terrorists and do not provide an avenue for terrorism (correct answer)*
- May have access to classified information*
- Do not pose an unacceptable risk to the life, safety, or health of employees, contractors, vendors, and visitors (correct answer)*

Review Activity 2

Which of the following would you consult for DOD investigative and adjudication guidelines for HSPD-12 credentialing?

- ICPG 704.2: Adjudicative Guidelines*
- DODI 5200.46 (correct answer)*
- OMB M-05-24*
- DODI 5200.02, Enclosure 4*

Lesson 2: Overview of HSPD-12 Credentialing

Introduction

3. Objectives

Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 Adjudications seek to ensure that personnel who receive HSPD-12 credentials are not known or suspected terrorists and do not provide an avenue for terrorism. This lesson will begin by briefly reviewing the three main types of adjudications. It will then narrow its focus to the subject of HSPD-12 adjudications, discussing the purpose of and requirements for HSPD-12 adjudications and the legal and regulatory foundations of HSPD-12 adjudications. Finally, this lesson will introduce the basic elements of the HSPD-12 process. Here are the lesson objectives. Take a moment to review them.

Lesson Objectives:

- Identify the purpose of HSPD-12 adjudications
- Identify the controlling regulations and their requirements for HSPD-12 adjudications
- Identify the circumstances under which an HSPD-12 adjudication must be executed

Introduction to Adjudications

4. Purpose of Adjudications

So, what is adjudication?

In order to access classified information, perform sensitive duties, work in the competitive or excepted government service, or receive credentials to access Department of Defense (DOD) controlled facilities or information systems, DOD employees and contractor personnel must undergo investigation and adjudication by trusted government personnel.

During an adjudication, trusted government personnel evaluate pertinent information obtained from background investigations and other reliable sources to ensure that all individuals who work for the DOD are appropriately vetted and meet the eligibility standards to work for the Federal government as a civilian, contractor, or military member.

Screen text:

Adjudication

The evaluation of pertinent information from background investigations and other sources to determine—

- Eligibility to access classified information or perform sensitive duties
- Eligibility for federal employment
- Eligibility to access DOD facilities or information systems

5. Types of Adjudications

There are three main types of adjudications in the DOD: national security adjudications, adjudications for suitability or federal employment, and HSPD-12 adjudications. National security adjudications determine whether an individual is eligible to access classified information or perform sensitive national security duties. Suitability and fitness adjudications determine whether an individual can be a Federal employee. Finally, HSPD-12 adjudications determine who may be issued credentials for physical access to DOD-controlled facilities or access to DOD-controlled information systems, also referred to as logical access. Although this course focuses specifically on HSPD-12 investigations and adjudications, it is important for you to be aware of the other types of adjudications so that you can better understand how HSPD-12 adjudications fit into the bigger picture of protecting the DOD by ensuring the approval of an individual for credentials does not create unacceptable risk.

6. Relationship Between Adjudications

Each of the three types of adjudications has a distinct purpose and criteria. Of these three types, HSPD-12 adjudications are based on a minimum level of risk and sensitivity. If an applicant requires a suitability, fitness, or national security determination, then the HSPD-12 determination is inherent in either of those determinations and a separate HSPD-12 determination is not required.

Purpose of HSPD-12 Adjudications

4. What are HSPD-12 Adjudications?

Recall that the fundamental purpose of HSPD-12 credentialing is to ensure that all personnel who are issued credentials for long-term access to federal facilities and information systems meet certain security requirements. Within the DOD, this identity credential is known as the Common Access Card (CAC). HSPD-12 credentialing standards are applied to ensure that personnel are not known or suspected terrorists and do not provide an avenue for terrorism.

It also ensures that personnel do not pose an unacceptable risk to DOD assets, including the life, safety, or health of employees, contractors, vendors, or visitors; physical assets or information systems; personal property; records, including classified, privileged, proprietary, financial, or medical records; or the privacy of data subjects. To this end, and to ensure the CAC is a trusted credential for use within the DOD and across the federal government, the issuance of a CAC is based on four main criteria: eligibility, verification of DOD affiliation, completion of

background vetting requirements, and verification of claimed identity. HSPD-12 adjudications must follow the nondiscrimination policy outlined in the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Federal Investigations Notice (FIN), 10-05.

5. Who Must Undergo HSPD-12 Adjudication?

In the DOD, HSPD-12 adjudication is required for issuance of a CAC to federal employees, contractors, and other eligible personnel as identified in DOD Manual 1000.13, Volume 1, which is called DOD Identification Cards: ID Card Life-Cycle. Eligible personnel must be sponsored for a CAC by a DOD or Uniformed Service entity or employer. The CAC may provide them physical access on a recurring basis to DOD facilities or to non-DOD federally-controlled facilities on behalf of the DOD. The CAC may also provide logical access to DOD networks, such as the NIPRNet, via login either onsite using a computer with a government-controlled configuration or remotely using DOD remote access procedures. HSPD-12 applies to all new military and civilian employees, contractors and other eligible personnel as well as to current employees, contractors and applicable individuals who possess a CAC but who have not already undergone a background investigation at the appropriate level and been favorably adjudicated.

Rollover text:

Physical Access - Physical access on a recurring basis to multiple DOD facilities and/or multiple non-DOD, federally controlled facilities on behalf of the DOD

Logical Access - Logical access to DOD networks via login:

- Onsite using a computer with a government-controlled configuration
- Remotely using DOD-approved remote access procedures in accordance with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG)

NIPRNet - The Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) is a global, long-haul Internet Protocol (IP)-based network to support unclassified IP data communications services for combat support applications in the Department of Defense.

DOD Manual 1000.13 Volume 1 - DOD Manual 1000.13, Volume 1, which is called DOD Identification Cards: ID Card Life-Cycle.

6. Reciprocity

For those current employees, contractors, and applicable individuals who have a valid Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card or a CAC from their former department or agency, reciprocity applies. The purpose of reciprocity is to prevent an individual from needing to undergo repeated investigations. In order for reciprocity to apply, the valid PIV card or CAC must be verified by the individual's former department or agency. Furthermore, the individual must have undergone the

required investigation and must have received a favorable adjudication from the former agency. In addition, the individual must have had no break in government service greater than 24 months, and there must be no actionable information since the date of the last investigation.

Rollover text:

PIV - Personal Identity Verification

CAC - Common Access Card

Reciprocity - The mutual acceptance of an adjudicative determination by all government agencies regardless of which agency issued the determination

actionable information - Information that may be disqualifying based on credentialing standards addressed later in the course

Presidential Authority

2. Authority for HSPD-12 Credentialing

The authority for HSPD-12 adjudications is documented in several key regulations. The ultimate authority came from President George W. Bush in 2004, when he issued the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, which required government-wide standards for personal identity verification, or PIV. The CAC is the DOD 's federally recognized PIV. The goals of this directive are to ensure that the credentials issued are based on sound criteria for verifying an employee's identity; are strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation; and can be rapidly authenticated electronically. In 2005, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Memorandum M-05-24, which directed that HSPD-12 adjudication be based on a type of investigation called a "National Agency Check with Inquiries," or NACI, or on an employment or national security background investigation at an equivalent level.

The Federal Investigative Standards established the Tiered Investigation Model. The Tier 1 investigation, which is currently the baseline investigation for HSPD-12, replaced the NACI.

The 2006 Federal Information Processing Standards, or FIPS, 201-1, Personal Identity Verification, or PIV, of Federal Employees and Contractors, established several additional requirements, such as requiring that agencies maintain appeals procedures for those individuals who are denied credentials or whose credentials are revoked.

In 2008, the Office of Personnel Management, or OPM, issued a memorandum titled Final Credentialing Standards for Issuing Personal Identity Verification Cards under HSPD-12. This document established the standards for HSPD-12 adjudications. The DOD implements the government-wide standards and the OPM guidance in the September 9, 2014 Department of Defense Instruction, or DODI, 5200.46, which is called DOD Investigative and Adjudicative

Guidance for Issuing the Common Access Card, or CAC. This instruction establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for investigating and adjudicating eligibility to hold a CAC. The 5200.46 incorporates and cancels DOD Instruction 5200.02 Enclosure 4.

In 2018, Section 951 of the National Defense Authorization Act 1 (NDAA) called for a phased transition of national security investigations from OPM to DCSA no later than October 2020. DCSA now serves as the Investigative Service Provider for the DOD.

Rollover text:

OPM - Office of Personnel Management

HSPD-12 - Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors (2004) sets government-wide standards for personal identity verification (PIV) and ensures identification, resistance to fraud and tampering, and authentication.

OMB M-05-24 - Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-05-24 (August 2005) directs that HSPD-12 adjudications be based on a National Agency Check with Inquiries (NACI) or an equivalent or greater employment or national security investigation.

FIPS 201-1 - Federal Information Processing Standards, or FIPS, 201-1, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors requires, among other things, that agencies establish appeals procedures for those individuals who are denied credentials or whose credentials are revoked.

DODI 5200.46 - Department of Defense Instruction 5200.46: DOD Investigative and Adjudicative Guidance for Issuing the Common Access Card (CAC)

Memorandum: Final Credentialing Standards for Issuing PIV Cards under HSPD-12 - This memorandum establishes standards for HSPD-12 adjudications.

Review Activity 1

Take a moment to check your understanding.

The purpose of HSPD-12 adjudications is to ensure that all applicants for a CAC_____.

Select ALL that apply.

- Are able to perform the duties of their position*
- Are not terrorists and do not provide an avenue for terrorism*
- May have access to classified information*
- Do not pose an unacceptable risk to the life, safety, or health of employees, contractors, vendors, and visitors*

Review Activity 2

Now try this question.

Which of the following would you consult for DOD investigative and adjudication guidelines for HSPD-12 credentialing?

Select ALL that apply.

- ICPG 704.2: Adjudicative Guidelines*
- DODI 5200.46*
- OMB M-05-24*
- DODI 5200.02, Enclosure 4*

Conclusion

2. Lesson Summary

This lesson discussed the general purpose, definition, and types of adjudications as well as the relationship between these types of adjudications. It then detailed the purpose of HSPD-12 adjudications and examined the regulatory foundations that have influenced and established the current policies governing HSPD-12 adjudications. Roll over these key concepts for a quick review.

Rollover text:

Purpose and definition -

Adjudication is the evaluation of reliable and relevant information to determine—

- Eligibility to access classified information or perform sensitive duties
- Suitability or fitness for Federal employment
- Eligibility to access DOD facilities or information systems

The purpose of adjudication is to ensure that all DOD employees are loyal, trustworthy, and of good conduct.

Types of adjudications -

- National security adjudications
- Suitability adjudications
- HSPD-12 adjudications

Relationship between adjudications -

- Each type of adjudication has distinct purposes and criteria
- HSPD-12 adjudications are based on a minimum level of risk and sensitivity
- If an applicant requires an employment or national security determination, then HSPD-12 adjudication is inherent in either of those determinations

Purpose

Ensure that all individuals granted a CAC—

- Are not known or appropriately suspected terrorists and do not provide an avenue for terrorism
- Do not pose an unacceptable risk to DOD assets

Regulatory Foundations

- HSPD-12
- OMB M-05-24
- FIPS 201-1
- OPM Memorandum: Final Credentialing Standards for Issuing Personal Identity Verification Cards under HSPD-12
- DODI 5200.46

Answer Key

Review Activity 1

The purpose of HSPD-12 adjudications is to ensure that all applicants for a CAC_____.

- Are able to perform the duties of their position*
- Are not terrorists and do not provide an avenue for terrorism (correct answer)*
- May have access to classified information*
- Do not pose an unacceptable risk to the life, safety, or health of employees, contractors, vendors, and visitors (correct answer)*

Review Activity 2

Which of the following would you consult for DOD investigative and adjudication guidelines for HSPD-12 credentialing?

- ICPG 704.2: Adjudicative Guidelines*
- DODI 5200.46 (correct answer)*
- OMB M-05-24*
- DODI 5200.02, Enclosure 4*

Lesson 3: The HSPD-12 Process

Introduction

1. Objectives

The HSPD-12 process can be broken down into four distinct phases: those activities that occur before the investigation, the activities that occur during the interim CAC review, the investigation itself, and the adjudication. Before we can fully examine each of these phases, we must first identify the key players involved in the adjudication process and the tools that are used to support this process.

This lesson will take a close look at each of these phases, including the steps and tasks included in each. The specific phases of the HSPD-12 process may vary slightly by agency or component, but the activities conducted throughout the process are the same. Here is the lesson objective. Take a moment to review it.

Here is the lesson objective:

- Identify the phases in the HSPD-12 process, including the steps and tasks in each phase

Overview of the HSPD-12 Process

4. Phases in the Process

As you learned earlier, the HSPD-12 process seeks to determine whether an individual can receive a CAC. You will learn about the phases in this process by following Robert, a Component Adjudicator, who works in Fort Bravo's security office and adjudicates applicants for HSPD-12 credentialing, and Lisa, who has just been hired into a CAC eligible position at Fort Bravo and requires regular access to the facility. You will learn what Robert must know and what tasks he must perform for Lisa to obtain a CAC.

The HSPD-12 process includes four main phases: pre-investigation, interim CAC review, investigation, and adjudication.

In the pre-investigation phase, the sponsor determines Lisa's need to have a CAC, her identity is checked, and Robert searches for previous investigations conducted on Lisa, then Robert submits a Tier 1 request to the Investigative Service Provider. In the interim CAC review phase, Lisa is subjected to an FBI criminal history check. Robert then reviews the information received about Lisa, up to this point in the process, to include the results of the FBI criminal history check against the HSPD-12 credentialing standards. If the interim CAC review has revealed no unfavorable information, Lisa may be granted a CAC on an interim basis.

In the investigation phase, more information is gathered on Lisa's background to see whether she meets the requirements for obtaining a CAC.

And finally, in the adjudication phase, an adjudicator assigned to the DOD Consolidated Adjudications Facility, or DOD CAF, does an initial review of Lisa's investigation and compares the complete results of Lisa's investigation against the HSPD-12 credentialing standards to determine if a favorable credentialing determination can be made. If the DOD CAF adjudicator cannot make a favorable determination, the case is returned to Robert, the Component Adjudicator, to make a final determination as to whether Lisa will be issued a CAC. If Robert makes an unfavorable HSPD-12 adjudication determination, then Lisa may appeal the decision. Note that a favorable HSPD-12 determination means one can be issued a credential, but obtaining a CAC in and of itself does not allow physical and logical access. That is left to the discretion of the installation commander or system owner. You will learn about each of the phases in the HSPD-12 process in more detail throughout this lesson.

5. Players in the Process

There are five key players in the HSPD-12 process.

As you just learned, Lisa is applying for a CAC in order to fulfill her duties at Fort Bravo. As the applicant, Lisa must provide identification to show her identity; she must complete an application online; and she must have her fingerprints taken.

Both a DOD Component Adjudicator and a DOD CAF adjudicator play a role in Lisa's CAC adjudication. Robert is an HSPD-12 adjudicator from the security office at Fort Bravo. Robert's role as the Component Adjudicator in the HSPD-12 process is to review Lisa's application and results of the background investigation against the HSPD-12 credentialing standards in order to make an interim determination during the Interim CAC Review phase, and later to make a final determination during the Adjudication phase, should the DOD CAF be unable to make a favorable HSPD-12 adjudication. During the Adjudication phase, the DOD CAF adjudicator initially reviews Lisa's application and results of the background investigation and compares them to the HSPD-12 credentialing standards. If the DOD CAF adjudicator cannot make a favorable final determination, the case is returned to the Component Adjudicator for final adjudication.

The investigative service provider, or ISP, conducts Lisa's investigation and provides the results of that investigation to DOD to make a determination. The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, or DCSA, is the ISP for most DOD agencies and many other federal agencies.

Once a favorable interim or final credentialing determination has been made, Lisa will schedule an in-person visit at a DOD card issuance facility equipped with a DEERS/RAPIDS workstation. A DEERS/RAPIDS employee will issue Lisa's CAC contingent on successfully "proofing" her identity.

Component Adjudicator

Role:

- Review applications and background investigations
- Apply HSPD-12 credentialing standards
- Make HSPD-12 interim decisions
- Make final credentialing determination if CAF Adjudicator is unable to make a favorable decision

CAF Adjudicator

Role:

- Review applications and conduct initial review of background investigations
- Apply HSPD-12 credentialing standards
- Return case to Component Adjudicator for final decision, if unable to make favorable determination

Investigative Service Provider

Role:

- Conduct investigation
- Provide results to DOD (DCSA is the Investigative Service Provider for most DOD agencies)

DOD Card Issuance Facility

Role:

- Complete identity proofing and registration
- Issue CACs

6. Databases and Information Systems

Several different databases and information systems are used to support the HSPD-12 process. Some are electronic tools that are used early in the HSPD-12 process to enter information for later use. And others are database systems that store information and facilitate the sharing of information to support reciprocity among all federal agencies. Some of these tools and systems are owned by OPM and others by the DOD. Let's take a look at the specific systems that support the HSPD-12 process. After the investigation is initiated, the applicant completes the background investigation form using e-QIP, the Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing system.

e-QIP completely automates the application process by allowing individuals to enter their personal information directly into the system and then uses that information to complete the required investigative forms. e-QIP is in the process of being replaced by a successor system (electronic application) in a phased implementation. The successor system will serve as the mechanism by which federal applicants and employees will complete the investigative Standard Forms (SFs) and provide necessary information to process their personnel background investigations. The Central Verification System, or CVS, is OPM's centralized database supporting reciprocity and information sharing within the federal government. The CVS captures and maintains information on all types of investigations and adjudications. So the adjudicator can check CVS to determine if the correct level of investigation has been conducted on Lisa and

whether it resulted in a favorable adjudication. Because multiple federal agencies use the CVS, it is key to ensuring reciprocity of previous investigations and adjudications. CVS is the system of record for HSPD-12.

The DOD also has its own centralized databases and systems to support HSPD-12 adjudications. The Defense Information System for Security (DISS) is a centralized database that securely connects DOD security personnel around the world. It is used extensively by DOD adjudicators to record national security adjudicative actions and determinations. DISS is used in the HSPD-12 process to determine whether an applicant has already undergone a favorably adjudicated national security investigation. By definition, all national security investigations meet or exceed the Tier 1 requirement for HSPD-12 investigations. DISS not only records national security but suitability and HSPD-12 determinations as well.

The Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System, or DEERS, and the Real-time Automated Personnel Identification System, or RAPIDS, are DOD systems used to support both identity proofing and registration and CAC issuance. DEERS is the definitive source for personnel identity data and registration for the DOD. RAPIDS relies on information stored in DEERS and is used to issue DOD CACs. In the future, RAPIDS will interface with DISS to verify that a favorable determination is made before issuing the CAC.

Pre-investigation

1. Overview of Steps

The first phase of the HSPD-12 process, the pre-investigation phase, includes all of the activities that occur before the ISP starts the investigation. The three steps in this phase are determining the requirement for the CAC, conducting identity proofing and registration, and initiating the investigation.

Step 1: Determine Requirement for CAC

As you learned earlier, Lisa was recently hired to work at Fort Bravo. The first step in the pre-investigation phase of the HSPD-12 process is to determine if Lisa is eligible to be processed for a CAC and whether she requires a CAC to do her job. When Lisa begins her job, she will need a CAC for regular access to Fort Bravo as well as to DOD information systems.

Once it has been determined that Lisa is eligible to be processed for, and needs a CAC to do her job, Human Resources (HR) personnel at Fort Bravo will notify the security office that Lisa requires a CAC. HR will have Lisa complete the OF-306, Declaration for Federal Employment, which OPM requires in order to initiate a background investigation. Depending on the Component, either HR or the security office will initiate the investigation.

Step 2: Identity Proofing and Registration

The second step in the pre-investigation phase of the HSPD-12 process is identity proofing and registration, a series of automated personnel processes that begins in the preinvestigative stage and is completed at CAC issuance. Lisa will complete this step by visiting a DOD Card Issuance Facility at least once, but possibly multiple times. During her visit, Lisa must provide two forms of identification to the RAPIDS workstation for the verifying official to review. One form must be a federal or state government-issued photo ID, such as a passport or driver's license. The second form of identification must be from a list of acceptable documents found in Form I-9, Department of Homeland Security, Employment Eligibility Verification. This list may be found online.

The identity proofing and registration process must meet the requirements of Federal Information Processing Standard, or FIPS, 201-1. Requirements for eligible non-U.S. persons may vary based on available identification documents. After Lisa has received a favorable determination for a CAC, either on an interim or final basis, she will return to the card issuance facility. At this time, she will present two forms of ID, provide the fingerprint of her index finger, and receive her CAC.

Step 2: Identify Proofing and Registration (More button): Special Note

Note that in this scenario, Lisa is going to DEERS/RAPIDS for identity proofing and registration prior to the initiation of the investigation and will return to DEERS/RAPIDS to obtain her CAC, if her investigation is favorably adjudicated. In reality, some components may opt to have their applicant follow this scenario while others may opt to do the investigation first and then send the applicant for identity proofing and registration after the interim or final adjudication has been completed.

Identification Requirements for Foreign Nationals (More button): Non-U.S. persons within the continental United States must present a valid (unexpired) foreign passport as the primary form of identity source documentation.

At foreign locations, eligible non-U.S. persons must provide personal ID to support an accepted foreign national background investigation. DOD organizations based outside the continental United States should work with the local consular affairs office to determine guidelines for the appropriate identity documentation for eligible non-U.S. persons in accordance with agreements with host nations. It is recommended that a foreign passport be used as the primary form of identity source documentation.

The requirement for the primary identity document to have a photo cannot be waived. Additional documentation used to verify identity must be original or certified true copies. All documentation not in English must have a certified English translation.

Step 3: Initiation of the Investigation

The third step in the pre-investigation phase of the HSPD-12 process is initiation of the investigation. In this step, a search of databases is done to see whether previous investigations have been conducted on Lisa. If that search finds that Lisa does not already have a favorably adjudicated Tier 1 investigation or equivalent on record, then Robert will initiate Lisa's application for HSPD-12 adjudication using e-QIP or its successor system.

Next Robert will collect Lisa's fingerprints. Once Lisa has completed her application in e-QIP, Robert will review it for completeness and submit it to the ISP, which in this case is DCSA. Select each task to learn more.

Task 1: Check for Previous Investigations

The first task in the initiation of investigation step is to search for previously conducted and adjudicated investigations. Robert will use the information on the forms that he received from HR, that is, Lisa's OF-306, and he will access DOD's DISS and CVS, to check for any previous HSPD-12, employment, or national security investigations conducted on Lisa. If Lisa already has a favorably adjudicated Tier 1 or higher on file, then she may be issued a CAC immediately. Otherwise, Robert will continue with the initiation step and the HSPD-12 process.

Task 2: Initiate Application

The second task is to initiate the application. If the search in DISS and CVS shows that there is no favorably adjudicated Tier 1 investigation or greater in those systems, then Robert will initiate Lisa's application in e-QIP, or its successor.

In e-QIP, Lisa will complete the SF-85, Questionnaire for Non-sensitive Positions, since she is undergoing an HSPD-12 adjudication. Note if Lisa were undergoing a higher level employment or national security adjudication, she may need to complete an SF-85P, Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions, or an SF-86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions in e-QIP instead. Regardless of which type of adjudication Lisa is seeking, she must complete her application accurately and honestly.

Task 3: Collect Fingerprints

The third task is to collect fingerprints. Robert first checks Lisa's identity against Lisa's photo ID. He then collects Lisa's fingerprints and submits them to the ISP, which in turn submits the fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI will run Lisa's fingerprints through its database to see whether she has a criminal history or is a known or suspected terrorist.

Task 4: Submit Application to ISP

The last task is to submit the application to the ISP. Robert first reviews Lisa's application in e-QIP to ensure that it is complete. He then requests fingerprint check results from DCSA, and submits the application to DCSA to initiate the investigation.

Interim CAC Review

1. Purpose and Overview of Steps

We've now completed the first phase of the HSPD-12 process. The second phase of the HSPD-12 process is the interim CAC review phase.

In this phase, U.S. persons may be granted an interim credentialing determination based on favorable results of the FBI National Criminal History Check and a scheduled investigation. A favorable interim credentialing determination allows the individual to obtain a CAC before the background investigation and final adjudication are completed.

An interim HSPD-12 determination typically precedes other determinations, including suitability or fitness for federal employment and national security. However, if an applicant has been granted a favorable suitability determination or an interim national security decision, then he will also get an interim CAC.

The interim CAC review phase includes all of the activities that occur after the pre-investigation phase but before the formal investigation. There are four steps in the interim CAC review phase: first, verifying that the investigation is scheduled, second, receiving the results of the FBI national criminal history check, third, applying the HSPD-12 credentialing standards, and fourth, making an interim determination.

Note that foreign nationals may not be issued interim credentials; they must wait for the investigation to be completed and a final determination to be made.

Step 1: Verify Investigation Is Scheduled

The first step in the Interim CAC Review phase is to verify that the investigation has been scheduled. You'll recall that at the end of the pre-investigation phase, Robert submitted Lisa's application to the ISP using e-QIP. Now Robert must verify in DISS that the investigation has been scheduled by DCSA before he can perform the interim CAC review. Although DISS is the system of record for national security adjudications, a shell is created for the applicant in DISS when DCSA schedules the investigation.

Step 2: Receive FBI National Criminal History Check

The second step in the interim CAC review phase is to receive the FBI National Criminal History Report. You'll recall in the pre-investigation phase that Robert collected Lisa's fingerprints and sent the investigative package which contains the fingerprints to DCSA who in turn sent the fingerprints to the FBI. DCSA will send the results to the Component for review and adjudication.

Step 3: Apply HSPD-12 Standards

The third step in the interim CAC review phase is to apply the HSPD-12 standards to the information available to date. In this step, the adjudicator reviews three documents to identify any presumptively disqualifying information regarding the applicant. That is, Robert will look for any information about Lisa that may indicate that she should not receive a CAC until a full investigation is completed. To make this determination, Robert will apply the HSPD-12 basic standards and, if applicable, the supplemental standards to the facts that he discovers in his review of Lisa's completed SF-85 and OF-306 and to the results of the FBI national criminal history check. If there is no presumptively disqualifying information, Robert would make a favorable determination. If Robert were conducting an interim CAC review on an individual undergoing a suitability or national security adjudication, then he would review the applicant's SF-85, SF-85P, or SF-86. In addition to revealing any past arrests or convictions for crimes, a review of the FBI Criminal History Report will also indicate whether Lisa's name appears in the FBI Terrorist Screening Database as a known or reasonably suspected terrorist and will help Robert to verify Lisa's claimed identity. Select Basic and Supplemental to view the HSPD-12 standards in each category. You'll learn more about these standards and how they are applied later in the course.

HSPD-12 Basic Standards

- Terrorism
- Problems with identity verification
- Fraudulent identify information
- Unauthorized access concerns
- Unlawful or inappropriate use of identity credentials
- Unlawful, unauthorized, or inappropriate use, modification, corruption, or destruction of federally-controlled information systems

HSPD-12 Supplemental Standards

- Misconduct or negligence in employment
- Criminal or dishonest conduct
- Material, intentional false statement, deception, or fraud in connection with federal or contract employment
- Alcohol abuse
- Drug use
- Statutory or regulatory bar
- Treasonous acts or activities

Step 4: Make Interim Determination

The final step in the interim CAC review phase is to make an interim determination. Based on the application of the HSPD-12 standards to Lisa's SF-85, OF-306, and FBI Criminal History Report, the adjudicator will either make a favorable determination for issuance of an interim CAC or, if there is presumptively disqualifying information, wait for the investigation to be completed prior to making a determination. After making the interim CAC determination, Robert's organization will inform Lisa's sponsor, or the agency hiring manager, of the determination in accordance with agency or component procedures.

Investigation

1. Investigative Requirement

The third phase of the HSPD-12 process is the investigation phase. The investigation phase is required for all individuals who, like Lisa, are being considered for a CAC.

We've learned that a Tier 1 investigation, or an investigation at the same level or greater, is required for all HSPD-12 adjudications. Later in this course, you will learn more about the approved investigative types, as well as the information provided by the Tier 1. The Tier 1 or equivalent investigation is mandated by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum M-05-24, and in accordance with an OPM memorandum titled Final Credentialing Standards for Issuing Personal Identity Verification Cards under HSPD-12.

2. Investigative Service Provider

As you learned earlier, DCSA is the investigative service provider, or ISP, for most federal and DOD agencies. However, some agencies, especially those in the Intelligence Community, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency, do not use DCSA and instead have their own investigative service providers. Regardless of who the ISP is, though, its role is the same: to conduct a background investigation on the applicant and to submit investigative results to a DOD sponsoring activity.

Adjudication

1. Overview of Steps

The fourth phase of the HSPD-12 process is the adjudication phase. This phase includes all of the activities that occur after the investigation. There are four steps in this phase: first, applying the HSPD-12 standards to the investigation results; second, making the CAC determination; third, initiating due process proceedings, if applicable; and fourth, recording the final determination.

As you learned previously, the DOD CAF Adjudicator initially reviews the final background investigation results and applies the HSPD-12 standards in order to make a credentialing determination. If the DOD CAF Adjudicator cannot make a favorable determination, the case is returned to the Component Adjudicator for final determination. Both the CAF Adjudicator and the Component Adjudicator use the same process for steps one and two of the Adjudication process in order to make a credentialing determination.

Step 1: Apply HSPD-12 Standards to Report of Investigation

In the first step of the adjudication phase, the adjudicator reviews the investigative results and applies the HSPD-12 standards to the facts derived from the investigation. This step of the adjudication phase begins once DCSA or another ISP, sends the results of the investigation back to the appropriate adjudicative facility or office. The adjudicator then applies the basic and, if applicable, the HSPD-12 supplemental credentialing standards to the facts detailed in the investigative results so that he can make a final determination. We will discuss the basic and supplemental credentialing standards and how to apply them later in this training.

HSPD-12 Basic Standards	HSPD-12 Supplemental Standards
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Terrorism • Problems with identity verification • Fraudulent identify information • Unauthorized access concerns • Unlawful or inappropriate use of identity credentials • Unlawful, unauthorized, or inappropriate use, modification, corruption, or destruction of federally-controlled information systems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Misconduct or negligence in employment • Criminal or dishonest conduct • Material, intentional false statement, deception or fraud in connection with federal or contract employment • Alcohol abuse • Drug use • Statutory or regulatory bar • Treasonous acts or activities

Step 2: Make Determination

Step two of the adjudication phase involves determining whether the applicant should be issued a CAC or if doing so would pose an unacceptable risk to the DOD. The adjudicator applies the HSPD-12 credentialing standards to the results of Lisa's investigation as a part of the credentialing determination process. Again, if the DOD CAF adjudicator cannot make a favorable determination, the case is returned to the Component Adjudicator for final determination. If the final determination is favorable, then Lisa will be issued a CAC, or if she had been issued one on an interim basis, she will retain the credential, and the adjudicator will record the determination. If the determination is unfavorable, then Lisa's CAC will be denied—or, if she had been issued an interim CAC, it will be

revoked. In this case, Lisa may have the opportunity to appeal the decision. The CAC provides military service members with Geneva Convention protection and authorized benefits, so it may not be revoked or denied until separation, discharge, or retirement.

Step 3: Due Process

Step three of the adjudication phase provides an opportunity for the applicant to appeal an unfavorable determination. This is known as due process. Due process is an established administrative process designed to ensure the fair and impartial adjudication of facts and circumstances when an unfavorable determination is being considered. This process provides the applicant with adequate notice of the basis for the unfavorable determination as well as an opportunity to appeal the final adverse determination to another decision-maker and be heard regarding the underlying facts and circumstances. Due process proceedings are intended to ensure that unfavorable administrative decisions are not the result of unfair, arbitrary, or unreasonable treatment of the individual by the U.S. government. The procedures for due process are complex and differ depending on whether the individual is a contractor or a Federal civilian employee, whether the CAC is being denied for the first time or an existing CAC is being revoked, and whether there are other issues involved like a removal from employment or revocation of a security clearance. So what does due process involve?

First you must know that how due process is handled is different for an uncleared contractor than for other individuals such as cleared employees, DOD employees, and military personnel. So let's assume Lisa is an uncleared contractor applying for her first CAC and her Report of Investigation (ROI) contains presumptively disqualifying information.

First, Robert may contact Lisa for clarification regarding this derogatory information. If Lisa is unable to provide mitigating information, Robert's organization will send Lisa a letter of intent to deny. Lisa may then respond with additional information explaining or refuting the concern, and Robert's organization will make a new adjudicative determination. If the determination is still unfavorable, Lisa will have an opportunity to formally appeal the decision. If she chooses to do so, she can submit a written request for appeal in accordance with instructions provided by Robert's organization. The DOD Component will have an appeals board review her case, which will render a final determination. Select each task to learn more.

Task 1: Obtain Clarifying Information

The first task in the due process step is to obtain clarifying information from the applicant regarding presumptively disqualifying information contained in the ROI.

If Robert determines the presumptively disqualifying information in Lisa's ROI can be clarified by asking Lisa for additional information, Robert may contact her directly. This is referred to as an "interrogatory" or a direct effort to obtain clarifying information. If Lisa is able to provide supporting evidence that explains, refutes, or mitigates the concern, Robert

may make a favorable determination for CAC issuance. However, if the additional information fails to mitigate the concern, Robert will deny issuance of Lisa's CAC and his organization will send a letter of intent to deny.

Task 2: Send Letter of Intent to Deny

The second task in the due process step is to send the applicant a letter of intent to deny via certified return receipt. Robert will provide Lisa with a written statement that contains a summary of the concerns that led to the determination to deny or revoke the CAC. This summary will identify the disqualifying conditions and cite the relevant HSPD-12 standard and will detail any supporting adverse information.

Finally, the letter will list instructions for responding. Lisa may respond in writing within 30 days, to explain, clarify, or mitigate the circumstances that led to the unfavorable determination. Failure to respond will result in automatic CAC denial or revocation.

If Lisa does respond, Robert's organization will re-adjudicate the case, based on the newly provided information and make a new determination. If the determination is favorable, a CAC may be issued. If the determination is still unfavorable, Lisa may request a formal appeals hearing.

Task 3: Hold Appeal Hearing

The third task in the due process step is the appeals hearing. If her CAC is denied and Lisa decides to appeal, she may submit her appeal request to an appeals board that will adjudicate her case. The three member board is composed of not more than one security representative and one human resources representative. The appeals board will render a determination which is final. Lisa will then be notified in writing of the final determination. Note that this appeal process does not apply when a CAC is denied due to an unfavorable suitability or national security adjudication, as the individual would then seek an appeal through the applicable suitability or national security procedures.

Step 4: Recording the Determination

The final step of the adjudication phase is documenting the final determination. This takes place regardless of whether a favorable or unfavorable determination was made. The final determination must be recorded in multiple systems of record. In recording the determination, it will indicate whether the supplemental standards were applied and the rationale for deciding whether to apply those standards.

If a CAC is approved, then the adjudicator who made the favorable determination—who could be either a DOD CAF or Component Adjudicator—will record the favorable determination and, if applicable, document any concerns that may have been uncovered, as well as the extenuating circumstances that mitigated those concerns.

If a CAC is denied or revoked, then the Component Adjudicator will record the determination and document the concerns and the specific disqualifying conditions.

All of this information must be maintained in local records for eventual posting in the Defense Information Systems for Security (DISS) which will include an interface that links to OPM's Central Verification System, or CVS. In addition, the determination itself must be recorded in CVS, which captures and maintains information about adjudicative determinations. Although it provides the ability to document only the determination and not any mitigating or disqualifying conditions, its use is important in supporting reciprocity among agencies.

Review Activity 1

For each activity described below, determine in which phase it occurs in the HSPD-12 process.

- A) Pre-investigation
- B) Interim CAC Review
- C) Investigation
- D) Adjudication

Due process proceedings are held _____

Conducted by DCSA for the DOD _____

Identity proofing and search for previously conducted investigations _____

Review of the application and FBI criminal history report _____

Review Activity 2

Now check your knowledge.

Select the role responsible for performing the described activity.

Conducts identity proofing and registration.

- Applicant
- Component Adjudicator
- CAF Adjudicator
- ISP
- DEERS/RAPIDS

Completes the SF-85 using the e-QIP system

- Applicant
- Component Adjudicator
- CAF Adjudicator
- ISP
- DEERS/RAPIDS

Conducts the investigation and provides the investigation results

- Applicant
- Component Adjudicator
- CAF Adjudicator
- ISP
- DEERS/RAPIDS

Applies the HSPD-12 standards and makes an interim and, if necessary, final CAC determination

- Applicant
- Component Adjudicator
- CAF Adjudicator
- ISP
- DEERS/RAPIDS

Used to issue the applicant's CAC

- Applicant
- Component Adjudicator
- CAF Adjudicator
- ISP
- DEERS/RAPIDS

Review Activity 3

Which of the following does the component adjudicator review when making an interim CAC determination for a non-cleared contractor?

Select all that apply.

- SF-85
- OF-306
- Report of Investigation
- FBI Criminal History Report
- SF-85P
- SF-86

Conclusion

1. Lesson Summary

This lesson examined the four phases of the HSPD-12 adjudication and discussed the specific steps and tasks that occur before the investigation, during the interim CAC review, as part of the investigation, and during the adjudication phase. It identified the key players involved in the adjudication process and the tools that are used to support this process. And it examined each phase of the adjudication process, including the steps and tasks included in each.

Pre-investigation

- Determine requirement for CAC
- Identity proofing and registration
- Initiation of investigation
 - Check for previous investigations
 - Initiate application
 - Collect fingerprints
 - Submit application to ISP

Interim CAC Review

- Verify investigation is scheduled
- Receive FBI National Criminal History Report
- Apply HSPD-12 credentialing standards
- Make interim CAC credentialing determination

Investigation

- Gathering of information on the subject's background to meet the investigative requirements for obtaining a CAC
- Tier 1 or greater required for HSPD-12

Adjudication

- Apply HSPD-12 credentialing standards to investigative results
- Make final CAC credentialing determination
- Hold due process proceedings (if applicable)
- Record the final determination

Applicant

- Provide identification
- Complete application online
- Have fingerprints taken
- In-person visit to card issuing facility to receive CAC

Component Adjudicator

- Review applications and background investigations
- Apply HSPD-12 credentialing standards
- Make HSPD-12 interim decisions
- Make final credentialing determination if CAF Adjudicator is unable to make a favorable decision

CAF Adjudicator

- Review applications and conduct initial review of background investigations
- Apply HSPD-12 credentialing standards

- Return case to Component Adjudicator for final decision, if unable to make favorable determination

ISP - Investigative service provider

- In most cases, DCSA
- Conduct investigation
- Provide results to component

DOD Card Issuance Facility

- Use of DEERS/RAPIDS
- Conduct identity proofing and registration
- Issue CACs

e-QIP - Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing

- Automates application process

CVS - Central Verification System

- Owned and managed by OPM
- Stores information on investigations and adjudications
- Key to ensuring reciprocity

DISS - Defense Information System for Security

- Securely connects DOD security personnel around the world
- Stores national security adjudicative actions and determinations
- Contains a shell indicating whether investigation has been scheduled
- Will store national security, suitability, and HSPD-12 determinations

DEERS/RAPIDS - Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System, Real-time Automated Personnel Identification System

- DEERS: definitive data source of DOD personnel identity verification
- RAPIDS: used to verify identity and issue the CAC

Answer Key

Review Activity 1

For each activity described below, determine when it occurs in the phases of the HSPD-12 process.

- A) Pre-investigation
- B) Interim CAC Review
- C) Investigation
- D) Adjudication

Due process proceedings are held _____ [D]

Conducted by the DCSA for the DOD _____ [C]

Identity proofing and search for previously conducted investigations _____ [A]

Review of the application and FBI criminal history report _____ [B]

Review Activity 2

Select the role responsible for performing the described activity

Conducts identity proofing and registration

- Applicant
- Component Adjudicator
- CAF Adjudicator
- ISP
- DEERS/RAPIDS (correct answer)

Completes the SF-85 using the e-QIP system

- Applicant (correct answer)
- Component Adjudicator
- CAF Adjudicator
- ISP
- DEERS/RAPIDS

Conducts the investigation and provides the investigation results

- Applicant
- Component Adjudicator
- CAF Adjudicator
- ISP (correct answer)
- DEERS/RAPIDS

Applies the HSPD-12 standards and makes an interim and, if necessary, final CAC determination

- Applicant
- Component Adjudicator (correct answer)
- CAF Adjudicator
- ISP
- DEERS/RAPIDS

Used to issue the applicant's CAC

- Applicant
- Component Adjudicator
- CAF Adjudicator
- ISP
- DEERS/RAPIDS (correct answer)

Review Activity 3

Which of the following does the adjudicator review when making an interim CAC determination for a non-cleared contractor?

Select all that apply.

- SF-85
- OF-306
- Report of Investigation
- FBI Criminal History Report
- SF85P
- SF86

Lesson 4: Inputs to the HSPD-12 Adjudication

Introduction

2. Objective

This lesson covers the documents and the type of investigation used in the HSPD-12 adjudication process. It also provides examples of each document the adjudicator must review. By the end of this lesson, you will be able to locate specific information contained in these documents.

Here is the lesson objective:

- Identify the information the adjudicator must review for the HSPD-12 adjudication process

3. Forms Overview

During this lesson, you will become familiar with the types of information included in the various documents used to conduct an HSPD-12 adjudication as well as the format and appearance of that information. In addition, you will have an opportunity to explore examples of these documents, so you can easily locate the relevant information when you perform your own adjudications. The examples provided are designed to be representative of real-life documents, but always keep in mind there may be variations in the documents submitted for any specific applicant, depending on their individual histories and experiences.

The first set of documents the adjudicator reviews are the forms that the applicant completes for submission. The applicant's investigative forms are submitted to Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, or DCSA, the Investigative Service Provider that conducts the investigation. After the applicant's fingerprints are submitted, the adjudicator receives and reviews the FBI National Criminal History Report. And finally, the adjudicator receives the Report of Investigation, or ROI, which contains the results of the full investigation.

The forms that the applicant completes are used to initiate the investigation, and the adjudicator reviews them in both the interim CAC and final HSPD-12 determination phases. The adjudicator reviews the National Criminal History Report in both the interim CAC review and final HSPD-12 determination phases. After the investigation is complete, the adjudicator reviews the ROI in the final HSPD-12 determination phase only.

Investigative Forms

7. Investigative Forms Overview

The first investigative form the applicant completes is the OF-306, the Declaration for Federal Employment. Note that contractor personnel may use the OF-306 or they may provide their answers to questions 1, 8 through 13, 16, and 17 in a separate attachment.

Next, the applicant will complete the Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions (SF-85) which is the minimum investigative form for the CAC, in the Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Process, or e-QIP, or its successor system. If the applicant is applying for a position of public trust, then she completes the Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions, or SF-85P, rather than the SF-85. And finally, if the applicant is applying for a security clearance, then she completes the Questionnaire for National Security Positions, or SF-86, instead of the SF-85. Let's take a look now at the OF-306 and the SF-85 in more detail.

8. OF-306

The OF-306 contains biographical and other information important to the HSPD-12 adjudication process.

Blocks 1 through 6 contain personal information about the applicant. Among other details, these blocks document the applicant's name, date, and place of birth; Social Security number; and phone numbers. The applicant's Selective Service and military history, if applicable, is documented in Blocks 7 and 8.

The questions of most relevance to the HSPD-12 adjudication, information about the applicant's background, are covered in Blocks 9 through 13. Blocks 9 through 11 ask questions about the applicant's criminal history. Block 12 asks if the applicant has ever been fired from a job. Block 13 asks if the applicant is delinquent on any federal debt.

Further questions are listed in Blocks 14 through 18. Block 16 provides space for additional information related to the questions asked on this form. In Block 17, the applicant certifies that the information on the form is true.

9. e-QIP Forms

The e-QIP forms are the basis for the investigation. The SF-85 is completed by the applicant in e-QIP, or occasionally on the paper-based version of the form. Eventually it will only be submitted electronically. Sometimes you will see the SF-85P or the SF-86 instead of the SF-85, if the applicant is applying for a position of public trust or national security. Like the OF-306, the SF-85, SF-85P, and SF-86 contain biographical and other information important to the HSPD-12 adjudication process.

10. SF-85

Now we'll take a closer look at what information is captured on the SF-85. The first several pages of the SF-85 are instructions, which have been left off for purposes of this course.

Sections 1 through 6 contain personal information about the applicant. These blocks document the applicant's name, date and place of birth, Social Security number, other names used, and gender. The applicant's citizenship information is captured in Sections 7a through 7e. In Section 8, the applicant must list all addresses where he or she has lived for the past 5 years. Section 9 covers education history, and Section 10 covers employment history. In Section 11, the applicant must list people who know the applicant well. Section 12 covers the applicant's Selective Service and Section 13 covers military history. In Section 14, the applicant must report any involvement with illegal drugs.

Practice Activity 1

Try this question.

To review the sample OF-306, refer to the Lesson 3 Practice Activity 1 in the Student Guide menu.

According to the OF-306, the applicant reports she was convicted of what crime in the last 10 years?

- Sports gambling
- Promoting gambling
- Bookmaking
- None. She states she has never even been arrested in the last 10 years.

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE(S).

Answer: Practice Activity 1

According to the OF-306, the applicant reports she was convicted of what crime in the last 10 years?

- Sports gambling
- Promoting gambling (correct answer)
- Bookmaking
- None. She states she has never even been arrested in the last 10 years.

Practice Activity 2

Now try this question.

To review the sample SF-85, refer to the Lesson 3 Practice Activity 2 in the Student Guide menu.

According to the information listed in the SF-85, did the applicant state that he has been involved with illegal drugs in the past year?

- Yes
- No

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE(S).

Answer: Practice Activity 2

According to the information listed in the SF-85, did the applicant state that he has been involved with illegal drugs in the past year?

- Yes (correct answer)
- No

National Criminal History Report

2. National Criminal History Report Overview

If the applicant has a criminal history in the FBI database, the National Criminal History Report contains those details. However, not all jurisdictions report criminal history to the FBI.

DCSA, as you learned earlier in this course, submits the applicant's fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or FBI. The FBI then runs a National Criminal History Report on the applicant. The Component HR or security office receives this report. Efforts are underway to speed the return of the report to the HR or Security Offices.

The adjudicator must carefully read the *entire* Criminal History Report. The details in this report are very important to the HSPD-12 adjudication decision. And that decision affects risk to DOD assets as well as to the applicant's ability to gain employment.

3. Parts of the National Criminal History Report

The National Criminal History Report is returned attached to a CHR cover sheet. The CHR cover sheet is called the Advance Fingerprint Report. The FBI National Criminal History Report includes a Cover Sheet and the FBI Identification Record, as well as arrest information for each incident.

a. CHR Cover Sheet: Advance Fingerprint Report

The Advance Fingerprint Report contains applicant information such as name, Social Security number, and date of birth. This sheet also contains a summary of the results of the criminal history check. The result will be either Record, No Record, No Pertinent Record (NPR), or Unclassifiable. Record signifies if the applicant's fingerprints are on file with the FBI. Arrest information and disposition of charges are provided, if known. No Record signifies that there is no prior arrest data for the applicant in the FBI database. NPR indicates that the applicant's name appears in the FBI database, but without derogatory information. Unclassifiable signifies it could not be determined if the applicant has a criminal history record, due to a typographical error, illegible name or fingerprints, or missing information.

If the result is Unclassifiable, then the adjudicator must delay the interim CAC determination until new fingerprint results are received, if requested, or the results of the FBI name check are received.

b. Cover Sheet and FBI Identification Record

If the applicant has a criminal history record, then there will be a Cover Sheet and FBI Identification Record. This section includes the applicant's name and biographical data, such as the applicant's physical description, from the *first* arrest, so data may have changed since this information was recorded. This section also includes the applicant's date and place of birth, and race, as well as the FBI Number. This number is unique to each applicant. It tracks the entire criminal history record of the applicant and links all arrest and court information for the applicant.

c. Arrest Information

This section contains the arrest information for each incident. The arrest information includes the date the applicant was arrested, the agency and state that made the arrest, the charge or charges levied by the agency and by the court, and, when available, the disposition of the arrest, that is, the current status of the arrest event. The disposition could be listed as Final, Interim, or Non-conviction.

Supplemental Court Data may also be present, providing any information on court updates or changes to the disposition after a final disposition has been received. Finally, the arrest information will indicate whether the individual is wanted in connection with a crime or listed as a sex offender.

The report contains several acronyms which can be located online. If the disposition of an arrest is not known or cannot be determined, an interim CAC must not be issued. Instead, the adjudication must wait until after the final investigation is complete so a final determination may be made.

Practice Activity 3

To review the sample Criminal History Report, refer to the Lesson 3 Practice Activity 3 in the Student Guide menu.

According to the Criminal History Report, what is the most recent arrest charge for this applicant?

- Trespassing
- Burglary
- Check fraud

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE(S).

Answer: Practice Activity 3

According to the Criminal History Report, what is the most recent arrest charge for this applicant?

- Trespassing (correct answer)
- Burglary
- Check fraud

HSPD-12 Investigations

1. Tier 1

In order to receive a CAC, every DOD employee must be investigated as part of the HSPD-12 process. The type of investigation used in compliance with HSPD-12 adjudications is the Tier 1 investigation. The Tier 1 serves as the minimum type of investigation required to be issued a CAC.

The Tier 1 investigation consists of several elements, including database and local agency checks as well as written inquiries. The investigation examines the last five years of an applicant's life, but no further back than the applicant's 18th birthday.

a. Checks

The National Agency Check (NAC) is the first part of the investigation. The NAC consists of searches of the Security and Suitability Investigations Index (SII); DOD's Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII); as well as the FBI National Criminal History Check and other files or indices when necessary.

Examining SII checks for the results of any investigations previously conducted by DCSA or other non-DOD Federal investigative agencies. Running the applicant through the DCII checks for the results of any investigations previously conducted by DOD entities. As you've already learned, the fingerprint and name check through the FBI database searches for any criminal history. The Social Security Administration, military service, and terrorist databases are also checked. Next, written inquiries are sent to law enforcement agencies covering jurisdictions where the applicant was employed, resided, or went to school.

b. Written Inquiries

The investigation also includes written inquiries, regarding the applicant's current and past employment history and educational history. For example, education is verified by written inquiry to colleges and universities, and employment is verified by written inquiry to supervisors at places of employment.

2. Other Investigations

The Tier 1 is the minimum type of investigation necessary to be issued a CAC; however, other investigations may be substituted for HSPD-12 adjudication purposes as long as they are equivalent or greater than the T1.

These investigations include types used for adjudications for positions of public trust or national security and may be used as long as there is not a break in the applicant's service of more than two years.

Current

- Tier 2
- Tier 3
- Tier 4
- Tier 5

No longer performed but will be accepted

- Access National Agency Check and Inquiries (ANACI)
- Background Investigation (BI)
- Child Care National Agency Check plus Written Inquiries and Credit (CNACI)
- Moderate Risk Background Investigation (MBI)
- National Agency Check with Law and Credit (NACLC)
- Periodic Reinvestigation (PRI)
- Phased Periodic Reinvestigation (PPR)
- Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI)
- Periodic Reinvestigation for SSBI (SSBI-PR)

3. Foreign Nationals

A DOD sponsored foreign national may be processed for a CAC. Just like any applicant who is a U.S. citizen, a foreign national must be investigated and favorably adjudicated. While the requirements for issuing a CAC are the same as those for an American citizen, the investigation process may be adjusted in order to accommodate a foreign national's application.

If the foreign national is located in a foreign country, the process for the background investigation is controlled by reciprocity treaties that exist between the U.S. and the foreign government concerning identity assurance and information exchange. If no standing reciprocity treaty exists, the foreign national will not be issued a CAC unless the foreign national meets the direct or indirect hire guidelines, or is a foreign military, government civilian, or contractor employee sponsored by his or her government as part of an official visit or assignment, directly working to support the DOD.

The investigation for a foreign national must be consistent with the Tier 1 to the greatest extent possible. This means that there must be a fingerprint check against the FBI database, as well as an FBI investigations file and a name check against the Terrorist Screening Database.

If the foreign national is located in the U.S. or one of its territories and has resided here for three years or more, a Tier 1 or greater is required. If the foreign national has lived in the U.S. for less than three years, there may be a delay in conducting the investigation until the applicant has reached the three-year mark. In the interim, in lieu of the CAC, an alternative facility access credential may be issued to the foreign national at the discretion of the relevant component official as appropriate based on a risk determination.

Report of Investigation

1. ROI Overview

Now that you've learned the kinds of information obtained during an investigation, let's examine what the entire report of investigation, or ROI, looks like. When an adjudicator receives the final ROI, it has a Case Closing Transmittal as the cover sheet, which summarizes the results of the various investigation checks.

The ROI contains the applicant's responses to the OF-306 and the SF-85. It also contains the FBI Criminal History Report and supporting documentation related to issues that were found with any of the investigation checks.

a. Case Closing Transmittal

The Case Closing Transmittal contains the type of investigation covered by this ROI. This transmittal lists the results of the employment check and education check, both from the SF-85. It also lists the local law enforcement check and the components of the NAC, including the SII, SIIC, FBIF, FBIN, and the DCII. If Issue appears in the Results column for a particular investigation check, then further examination of the supporting documentation for that check is in order.

Contents of the Case Closing transmittal

- EMPL – Employment check
- EDUC – Education check
- LAWE – Local law enforcement check
- SII – Security/Suitability Investigations Index check
- SIIC – Security/Suitability Investigations Index check (if CVS data is available on the applicant)
- FBIF – FBI Fingerprint check
- FBIN – FBI Name check
- DCII – Defense Clearance and Investigations Index check

Practice Activity 4

Now, try this question.

To review the sample ROI, refer to the Lesson 3 Practice Activity 4 document in the Student Guide menu.

An adjudicator will need to look in more detail at any issues that arise from any portion of the investigation. Which type of investigation check is reporting issues about this applicant on the Case Closing Transmittal Sheet in the ROI?

- | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> EMPL | <input type="checkbox"/> FBIF |
| <input type="checkbox"/> EDUC | <input type="checkbox"/> FBIN |
| <input type="checkbox"/> LAWE | <input type="checkbox"/> DCII |
| <input type="checkbox"/> SII | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> SIIC | |

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE(S).

Answer: Practice Activity 4

An adjudicator will need to look in more detail at any issues that arise from any portion of the investigation. Which type of investigation check is reporting issues about this applicant on the Case Closing Transmittal Sheet in the ROI?

- EMPL (correct answer)
- EDUC
- LAWE
- SII
- SIIC
- FBIF
- FBIN
- DCII

Practice Activity 5

Now, try this question.

To review the sample ROI, refer to the Lesson 3 Practice Activity 5 document in the Student Guide menu.

The FBI Criminal History Report contained in the ROI shows that the applicant was arrested for shoplifting.

Which agency arrested the applicant?

- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Baltimore Police Department
- Office of Personnel Management

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE(S).

Answer: Practice Activity 5

The FBI Criminal History Report contained in the ROI shows that the applicant was arrested for shoplifting.

Which agency arrested the applicant?

- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Baltimore Police Department (correct answer)
- Office of Personnel Management

Practice Activity 6

Now, try this question.

To review the sample ROI, refer to the Lesson 3 Practice Activity 6 document in the Student Guide menu.

The ROI contains supporting documentation that shows why there were issues with this applicant's Employment History check.

What adverse information did you learn about this applicant from this supporting documentation?

- Missed work several times without contacting his supervisor
- Made unauthorized phone calls
- Downloaded unauthorized software

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE(S).

Answer: Practice Activity 6

The ROI contains supporting documentation that shows why there were issues with this applicant's Employment History check.

What adverse information did you learn about this applicant from this supporting documentation?

- Missed work several times without contacting his supervisor
- Made unauthorized phone calls
- Downloaded unauthorized software (correct answer)

Conclusion

2. Summary

In this lesson you learned about the documents and types of investigations used in the HSPD-12 adjudication process. You should now be able to locate specific information contained in the documents the adjudicator must review when making an HSPD-12 determination. Select each topic for a brief review.

Investigative Forms

Contents of OF-306

- Biographical information
- Selective Service and military history
- Background information
- Additional questions/continuation space

Overview of e-QIP forms

- Basis for the investigation
- Applicant completes SF-85, SF-85P or SF-86, depending on position held or being sought
- Applicant completes
 - Form in e-QIP, OR
 - Paper-based version of form
- Contains biographical and other information important to adjudication process

National Criminal History Report

Overview of National Criminal History Report

- Generated by FBI
- Entire report must be read since HSPD-12 adjudication decision affects
 - Risk to DOD assets
 - Applicant's ability to gain employment

National Criminal History Report

- Has attached:
 - CHR Cover Sheet
- Contains
 - Cover Sheet and FBI Identification Record
 - Arrest Information

HSPD-12 Investigations

Tier 1 - Tier 1 is the minimum investigation required to be issued a CAC. It contains database checks and written inquiries.

Checks - The investigation includes the following types of checks:

- Security and Suitability Investigations Index (SII) - Investigations previously conducted by OPM or other non-DOD Federal investigative agencies
- Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) - Investigations previously conducted by DOD
- FBI National Criminal History Check – checks on criminal history
- Social Security Administration, military service, and terrorist databases
- Local Agency Checks – Checks on history with law enforcement agencies covering applicant's employment, residence, and education

Written Inquiries - The investigation includes written inquiries, regarding the applicant's employment history and educational history.

Report of Investigation

Report of Investigation - The Report of Investigation (ROI) contains the results of the investigation.

Case Closing Transmittal - The Case Closing Transmittal is the cover sheet and provides a summary of the results of the investigation.

OF-306 - Optional Form 306, Declaration for Federal Employment

SF-85 - Standard Form 85 (Questionnaire for Non-sensitive Positions) is used to apply for a CAC.

FBI National CHR - FBI National Criminal History Report

Support Documents - If there are any issues with the results of the investigation, such as with any of the checks or written inquiries, the supporting documentation is included in the ROI.

Lesson 5: HSPD-12 Credentialing Standards

Lesson Introduction

4. Objectives

You have learned about the steps in the HSPD-12 process. And you have learned how to read an individual's application materials, the results of the criminal background check, and the results of the investigation. Now you will learn how to make a determination about whether to authorize issuing a CAC to an individual, either at the interim CAC review phase or during the adjudication phase to make a determination based on the information collected earlier in the process.

Here are the lesson objectives:

- Apply the HSPD-12 basic and supplemental standards to scenarios that present potentially disqualifying information
 - Identify the structure of HSPD-12 standards
 - Recognize the purpose of the supplemental standards
 - Identify factors to consider when applying credentialing standards
 - Identify relevant information using HSPD-12 basic and supplemental standards
 - Evaluate background information using HSPD-12 basic and supplemental standards

HSPD-12 Criteria

1. Adjudicative Methodology

By now you have an understanding of the investigation that an applicant goes through in order to obtain a CAC. The adjudication serves as the key component in ensuring that an applicant does not pose a risk to DOD assets. Whether at the interim or final CAC determination level, adjudicators hold the responsibility of protecting government interests by determining if someone poses a risk to DOD personnel, property, or information. Adjudicators must review the SF-85, OF-306, the criminal history report, and the report of investigation (ROI) results. During the interim CAC review phase, the adjudicators will not yet have the full investigation results that they will when making the final determination.

However, in order to make a fair decision at either the interim or final determination, adjudicators match issues of significance with the HSPD-12 credentialing standards, outlined in DOD Instruction 5200.46, the DOD Investigative and Adjudicative Guidance for Issuing the Common Access Card. Each standard has the same structure: the concern itself and conditions related to that concern that may disqualify the applicant from receiving a CAC or that may mitigate the concern and allow issuance of a CAC.

This careful evaluation of favorable and unfavorable information, from an applicant's past and present, takes the whole person into consideration. Applying the credentialing standards to the applicant's information allows adjudicators to determine whether the applicant is a known or reasonably suspected terrorist, would provide an avenue for terrorism, or poses an unacceptable risk to DOD employees, information, or property and, in turn, determine whether the applicant may be issued a CAC.

2. Basic and Supplemental Standards

There are 13 credentialing standards that may be reviewed during the HSPD-12 adjudication process. There are six basic standards and seven supplemental standards.

Using each one of these standards helps form a better picture of the person and whether that person is a suspected terrorist, provides an avenue for terrorism, or poses an unacceptable risk to DOD personnel, property, or information. All adjudications must apply the basic standards.

The supplemental credentialing standards are intended to ensure that the issuance of a CAC to an individual does not create an unacceptable risk. The supplemental credentialing standards may be used based on the risk associated with the position or work on the contract.

The HSPD-12 credentialing standards are:

- Basic Standard 1: Terrorism
- Basic Standard 2: Problems with Identity Verification
- Basic Standard 3: Fraudulent Identity Information
- Basic Standard 4: Unauthorized Access Concerns
- Basic Standard 5: Unlawful or Inappropriate Use of Identity Credentials
- Basic Standard 6: Unlawful, Unauthorized, or Inappropriate Use, Modification, Corruption, or Destruction of Federally-Controlled Information Systems
- Supplemental Standard 1: Misconduct or Negligence in Employment
- Supplemental Standard 2: Criminal or Dishonest Conduct
- Supplemental Standard 3: Material, Intentional False Statement, Deception, or Fraud in Connection with Federal or Contract Employment
- Supplemental Standard 4: Alcohol Abuse
- Supplemental Standard 5: Drug Use
- Supplemental Standard 6: Statutory or Regulatory Bar
- Supplemental Standard 7: Treasonous Acts or Activities

3. Credentialing Standard Structure

Adjudicators apply each credentialing standard, whether basic or supplemental, in the same manner. Adjudicators identify the concerns and then use the credentialing standards to determine if the individual is a known or reasonably suspected terrorist, provides an avenue for terrorism, or creates an unreasonable risk. Some conduct may potentially disqualify an individual from receiving a CAC.

Other behaviors could mitigate the concern. This structure helps adjudicators examine each candidate fairly in the context of a whole, complex individual. For each standard, the concern identifies the reason why a behavior could provide an avenue for terrorism or create an unacceptable risk.

For example, the standard for alcohol abuse states the concern that excess drinking may lead to questionable judgment and failure to control impulses. The disqualifying conditions for each standard indicate the specific behaviors that may provide an avenue for terrorism or put DOD assets at risk. Adjudicators should consider whether there has been a recent or recurring pattern of behavior, questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally unstable behavior.

For example, a pattern of alcohol-related arrests presents a disqualifying concern under the alcohol abuse standard. When reviewing these conditions, adjudicators must assess if the behavior disqualifies the applicant. Mitigating conditions, on the other hand, may relieve the concern. They include factors such as the amount of time that has passed, the frequency of the behavior, and unusual circumstances surrounding the behavior.

For example, consider an individual who binged on alcohol in college but stopped after graduation. After several years without drinking, the individual will less likely repeat the behavior. It may not cast doubt on the individual's current judgment. When reviewing these conditions, adjudicators must ask if the circumstances surrounding the behavior reduce the seriousness of the concern.

Thus, adjudicators must weigh the seriousness or regularity of the behavior against all mitigating conditions to decide if an individual provides an avenue for terrorism or poses an unacceptable risk to DOD assets. Note that some standards do not have mitigating conditions, so issues related to those particular concerns, such as the inability to verify an applicant's identity, or the submission of fraudulent information in the attempt to obtain a CAC, automatically disqualify an applicant.

4. Guidelines and Factors in Applying Credentialing Standards

When making their credentialing decisions, adjudicators must use common sense in the context of the whole person. Adjudicators must consider the uniqueness of each case, which must be judged on its own merits, based on the disqualifying and mitigating conditions. Adjudicators must receive formal training to ensure consistency and fairness. To sort through all the

information received about an applicant, adjudicators use several tools. To aid in applying the basic and supplemental standards, adjudicators use several factors to help evaluate both the positive and negative information about a subject's conduct.

These factors include aspects of the conduct itself, such as its nature and seriousness, the circumstances surrounding the conduct, whether or not the individual participated knowingly, and the frequency and recency of the conduct. More recent conduct causes greater concern.

Factors also include the individual's age and maturity when the conduct took place and any external conditions that contributed to the conduct. The final factors examine whether the individual has sought rehabilitation or made other permanent behavioral changes. Any time a concern arises, adjudicators should consider the concern in the context of these factors.

Nature and seriousness: Define and describe the conduct. How serious was the issue? Poor conduct may vary in nature from minor traffic violations to major issues, such as an arrest for murder.

Circumstances: What caused the conduct? Was an arrest due to illegal activity or did the individual innocently happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time? The adjudicator must understand the full facts and circumstances to ensure fair and equitable treatment to the person and protection of U.S. government interests.

Frequency and recency: How many times did the subject commit an offense? When did it occur? A single offense that occurred ten years ago may be of less concern than the same offense within the past year. The recurrence of an offense indicates a pattern of behavior, so a single offense may be of less concern than multiple offenses, even if minor in nature.

Age and maturity: Did a subject's immaturity contribute to the poor conduct? The naïve actions of a 17-year-old may be more excusable than the same actions from someone with more life experience. Adjudicators treat offenses committed as a minor less seriously than those committed as an adult, unless the offense happened very recently, as part of a pattern, or is particularly heinous.

Rehabilitation: Has the subject displayed evidence of rehabilitating his or her life or behavior? Has the subject successfully completed a rehabilitation program? Did he enter the program voluntarily or did the court order him to attend? What motivated the subject for rehabilitation? Does he now have a satisfactory job performance history? What is the prognosis?

External conditions: Did economic or cultural conditions influence the subject's behavior? Being raised in a certain way can influence a subject's decisions. A mitigating factor could apply if the subject removes the external condition and it no longer affects the subject.

5. Non-Discrimination Policy

In addition to applying the credentialing standards and factors laid out in the DOD CAC Instruction, adjudicators must comply with federal non-discrimination policies.

The Office of Personnel Management Federal Investigations Notice, or OPM FIN, 10-05 and Executive Order 11478 outline specific non-discrimination policy and prohibited considerations.

OPM FIN 10-05 prohibits discrimination on the basis of conduct or personal characteristics, such as sexual orientation, that do not adversely affect performance. This notice does not prohibit taking the conviction for any crime into account.

Executive Order 11478 provides equal opportunity for all persons and prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, age, sexual orientation, or status as a parent.

6. HSPD-12 Determinations

At both the interim CAC review and final determination phases, adjudicators may make one of two possible credentialing determinations: favorable or unfavorable. If the determination is favorable, then the CAC may be approved and issued on an interim or final basis. If the interim determination is unfavorable, then issuance of the CAC is deferred, pending receipt and adjudication of the report of investigation.

An unfavorable determination at the final stage means a CAC may not be issued. In general, a favorable determination will be made unless there is substantiated disqualifying information that cannot be mitigated.

Basic Credentialing Standards 1-6

1. Basic Credentialing Standards

As you have learned, the HSPD-12 credentialing standards are made up of basic and supplemental standards.

By applying both sets of standards, the adjudicator considers a wide range of facts about an applicant, within the context of the whole person, to determine whether issuing the applicant a CAC will pose an unacceptable risk to the DOD. Each standard considers a different aspect of the applicant's behavior.

Let's explore the basic standards first. The basic credentialing standards apply to all adjudications and seek to guide the adjudicator who must determine, based on the results of a qualifying personnel security investigation, whether CAC issuance is consistent with the Basic

Standards, would create an unacceptable risk for the DOD, or would provide an avenue for terrorism. Let's look at each of the basic standards in turn.

Basic Standard 1: Terrorism

11. Concern

As you have learned, HSPD-12 adjudications ensure that personnel who receive CACs are not known or reasonably suspected of being terrorists, do not provide an avenue for terrorism, and do not pose an unacceptable risk to DOD assets, including employees, property, and records.

To this end, the first of the HSPD-12 credentialing standards directly addresses this overarching goal: to prevent individuals with access to federal property and information systems from putting the U.S. government at risk by avoiding the possibility of granting access to facilities and information to individuals that have knowingly and willfully been involved with domestic or international terrorist contacts or foreign intelligence entities.

12. Scenario

Jim Johnson has just been hired into a CAC eligible position. The criminal history check conducted by the FBI found Mr. Johnson's name in the Terrorist Screening Database. A CAC was not issued at the interim stage, pending the results of the full investigation.

The investigation revealed the following facts. Mr. Johnson had been involved in the Global Animal Freedom Network, an international organization with the stated aim of freeing all animals used for animal testing in government and private research labs across the world. After years of peaceful activities, the organization escalated to militant violence as a tactic to free animals from government labs, and they were added to the list of active terrorist groups. Mr. Johnson freely admits to his involvement with the group and explained that it occurred many years ago when he was in college, a time when the organization had not yet adopted its violent tactics. He left the group after learning of their willingness to engage in violent activities and has not associated with them since. The investigator confirmed this information.

How do these facts affect whether Mr. Johnson should be granted a CAC?

To make this determination, you need to consider both disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Basic Standard 1.

13. Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions

Disqualifying conditions for Basic Standard 1 include evidence that the individual has knowingly and willfully been involved with reportable domestic or international terrorism contacts, activities,

indicators, and behaviors, as contained in Department of Defense Directive, or DODD, 5240.06: Counterintelligence and Reporting.

You can easily see why involvement in terrorism poses a danger to national security. Even so, circumstances exist in which involvement or association with dangerous groups may be mitigated. If the individual did not knowingly and willfully engage in violent activities designed to overthrow the U.S. government, it is a mitigating condition. Finally, if, at the time of the individual's involvement, the organization refrained from unlawful or terrorist activities, the concern may be mitigated. Review the international terrorism indicators to see a list of reportable terrorism activities.

International Terrorism Indicators

1. Advocating violence, the threat of violence, or the use of force to achieve goals on behalf of a known or suspected international terrorist organization.
2. Advocating support for a known or suspected international terrorist organizations or objectives.
3. Providing financial or other material support to a known or suspected international terrorist organization or to someone suspected of being an international terrorist.
4. Procuring supplies and equipment, to include purchasing bomb making materials or obtaining information about the construction of explosives, on behalf of a known or suspected international terrorist organization.
5. Contact, association, or connections to known or suspected international terrorists, including online, e-mail, and social networking contacts.
6. Expressing an obligation to engage in violence in support of known or suspected international terrorism or inciting others to do the same.
7. Any attempt to recruit personnel on behalf of a known or suspected international terrorist organization or for terrorist activities.
8. Collecting intelligence, including information regarding installation security, on behalf of a known or suspected international terrorist organization.
9. Familial ties, or other close associations, to known or suspected international terrorists or terrorist supporters.
10. Repeated browsing or visiting known or suspected international terrorist websites that promote or advocate violence directed against the United States or U.S. forces, or that promote international terrorism or terrorist themes, without official sanction in the performance of duty.

Adjudication Activity: Basic Standard 1: Terrorism

Now that you know about disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Basic Standard 1, look again at Jim Johnson's case.

Review the case items. Then make your determination.

Adjudication of Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States
<p>Concern</p> <p>Avoiding the possibility of granting the access to facilities and information to individuals who are involved with domestic or international terrorism in some form is one of the main concerns of HSPD-12 adjudications.</p>
<p>Disqualifying Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of reportable domestic or international terrorism: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Contacts ○ Activities ○ Indicators ○ Behaviors • International terrorism indicators in DODD 5240.06
<p>Mitigating Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not knowingly and willfully engaged in violent activities • Involved when organization was not engaged in unlawful or terrorist activities
<p>Case Details</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mr. Johnson was involved with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Global Animal Freedom Network: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Free all animals in government and private sector research labs across globe ▪ Willing to use violence • He was involved many years ago • He left the group after learning of violence

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

What determination should you make for Mr. Johnson?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer Key

Adjudication Activity: Basic Standard 1: Terrorism

What determination should you make for Mr. Johnson?

- a. Favorable (correct answer)
- b. Unfavorable

Rationale: Sufficient mitigating evidence exists to allow a favorable determination because of Mr. Johnson's youth at the time and because he left the group when he discovered they would consider using violence.

Basic Standard 2: Problems with Identity Verification

4. Concern

Verifying an applicant's identity helps not only to continue the investigation process, but also to establish a basis for trust.

Inability to verify someone's identity is a risk to DOD personnel, property, and information. Without verifying the identity of the individual, investigators and adjudicators cannot be sure that the information generated during the investigation provides the best material from which to make a determination.

Sometimes applicants do not cooperate with the validation of their identity or provide false information. If an applicant's information regarding his identity cannot be clearly authenticated or validated, a CAC must not be issued.

5. Scenario

Alan DeWitt is a DOD contractor who will require a CAC. Mr. DeWitt has completed his SF-85 through e-QIP, or its successor system, and his fingerprints were taken.

When the FBI ran his fingerprints through their database, they found that his prints matched to a man named Aaron Weisman.

How do these facts affect whether Mr. DeWitt should be granted a CAC?

Let's consider the disqualifying and mitigating conditions of Basic Standard 2.

6. Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions

There are several disqualifying conditions for Basic Standard 2.

For example, if the individual claimed he could not provide two identity source documents at DEERS/RAPIDS, or he provided only one identity source document from the list of acceptable documents, he will be disqualified. If the applicant is a foreign national and was unable to provide a valid and unexpired foreign passport, he may not be issued a CAC.

The applicant may also be disqualified if he did not appear in person as required by Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 201-1. If the individual refused to cooperate with the documentation and investigative requirements to validate his identity, the adjudicator will disqualify him. The adjudicator will disqualify anyone involved with identity substitution, meaning different individuals appeared on separate occasions, both claiming to be the same person.

If the identity associated with the fingerprints in the FBI's files does not belong to the person attempting to obtain a CAC, the applicant will be disqualified. And sometimes the investigation results in the inability to confirm the individual's claimed identity. No mitigating conditions exist if the adjudicator is unable to verify an applicant's identity. Without the ability to verify identity, the adjudicator has no basis to make a favorable determination.

Adjudication Activity: Basic Standard 2: Problems with Identity Verification

Now that you know about the disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Basic Standard 2, look again at Alan Dewitt's case. Review the case items. Then make your adjudicative determination.

Adjudication of Basic Standard 2: Problems with Identity Verification
<p>Concern</p> <p>A CAC must not be issued to a person if the agency employing the person is unable to verify the individual's claimed identity.</p>
<p>Disqualifying Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Applicant: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Failed to provide two I-9 identity source documents ○ Did not appear in person ○ Refused to cooperate with the documentation and investigative requirements ○ Appeared different than the person who arrived at another time • Fingerprints: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Did not belong to the identity associated with the application • Investigation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Failed to confirm the individual's claimed identity
<p>Mitigating Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None
<p>Case Details</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Successfully completed SF-85 application • Fingerprints associated with another name

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

What determination should you make for Alan DeWitt?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer Key

Adjudication Activity: Basic Standard 2: Problems with Identity Verification

What determination should you make for Alan DeWitt?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable (correct answer)

Rationale: *The submitted fingerprints belong to someone who is not named Alan DeWitt. No mitigating factors exist for the inability to verify the identity of the applicant. He must not receive a CAC.*

Basic Standard 3: Fraudulent Identity Information

1. Concern

Like Basic Standard 2, Basic Standard 3 concerns an applicant's identity.

Willfully concealing one's identity is a risk to DOD personnel, property, and information. Who is this person?

Conducting a thorough investigation answers these fundamental questions. A CAC must not be issued if the adjudicator has a reasonable basis to believe an individual has submitted fraudulent information concerning his identity in an attempt to obtain a CAC.

2. Scenario

Margery Perkins has applied to a CAC eligible position at Fort Bravo.

When she arrived for fingerprinting, she offered her passport to verify her identity. The adjudicator noticed signs that the passport had been physically altered such that the adjudicator has reason to believe Ms. Perkins's passport has been forged.

How do these facts affect Ms. Perkins's application? Should she be granted a CAC?

Let's consider the disqualifying and mitigating conditions of Basic Standard 3.

3. Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions

The disqualifying conditions regarding Basic Standard 3 exist if the adjudicator has a reasonable basis to believe that the individual submitted fraudulent information concerning her identity or evidence that the individual has submitted official documentation or credentials that have been falsely made, forged, counterfeited, altered, or tampered with.

No conditions can mitigate submission of fraudulent information.

Adjudication Activity: Basic Standard 3: Fraudulent Identity Information

Now that you know about disqualifying conditions for Basic Standard 3, look again at Margery Perkins's case. Review the case items. Then make your determination.

<p>Adjudication of Basic Standard 3: Fraudulent Identity Information</p>
<p>Concern</p> <p>If the adjudicator has a reasonable basis to believe an individual has submitted fraudulent information concerning her identity, he must deny issuance of a CAC.</p>
<p>Disqualifying Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fraudulent information concerning his or her identity • Official documentation or credentials that have been <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Made falsely ○ Forged ○ Counterfeited ○ Altered ○ Tampered with
<p>Mitigating Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None
<p>Case Details</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Margery Perkins is applying for a CAC eligible position • She submitted an invalid government issued ID

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

What determination should you make for Margery Perkins?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer Key

Adjudication Activity: Basic Standard 3: Fraudulent Identity Information

What determination should you make for Margery Perkins?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable (correct answer)

Rationale: *Margery Perkins's identification appears fraudulent. No mitigating conditions exist for submitting fraudulent identification documents. She must not receive a CAC.*

Basic Standard 4: Unauthorized Access Concerns

1. Concern

Attempts to circumvent the regulations for protecting classified, proprietary, or other sensitive information, such as information protected by the Privacy Act, may pose an unacceptable risk to DOD assets.

If an individual attempts unauthorized access to U.S. government information, or improper use of the information once granted access, granting him a credential may pose a significant risk to national security, compromise individual privacy, and make proprietary information public, compromising the operations and missions of DOD entities.

A CAC must not be issued if the adjudicator has a reasonable basis to believe the individual will attempt to gain unauthorized access to classified documents, information protected by The Privacy Act of 1974, information proprietary in nature, or other sensitive or protected information.

2. Scenario

Jessica Anderson has been hired into a CAC eligible position.

Her investigation revealed that, at a former job, she was involved in an incident involving unauthorized access to information protected by the Privacy Act. Ms. Anderson was cited for looking up a coworker's personnel file without permission. It turns out Ms. Anderson had never received instructions regarding proper procedures for accessing protected information at her workplace. She has since attended training and is following the correct procedures.

Should Ms. Anderson's unauthorized access of protected information prevent her from receiving a CAC?

Let's look more closely at Basic Standard 4.

3. Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions

Two disqualifying conditions exist for Basic Standard 4.

The first disqualifying condition involves failure to comply with rules governing the safeguarding of classified, sensitive, or other protected information. And the second disqualifying condition entails an attempt to gain access to this protected information without authorization.

A few possible mitigating conditions do exist. If the person has demonstrated a favorable change in behavior since the offending activity occurred, or if the individual responded favorably

to counseling or training and has since demonstrated a positive attitude toward information-handling or security responsibilities, she may no longer pose a risk to DOD assets.

Similarly, if the behavior happened long ago, was minor, or occurred under circumstances unlikely to happen again, this might mitigate concern.

Adjudication Activity: Basic Standard 4: Unauthorized Access Concerns

Now that you know about disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Basic Standard 4, look again at Jessica Anderson's case.

Review the case items. Then make your determination.

Adjudication of Basic Standard 4: Unauthorized Access Concerns
<p>Concern</p> <p>Attempting to gain unauthorized access to classified documents or other sensitive or protected information poses a significant risk to national security, individual privacy, and proprietary information.</p>
<p>Disqualifying Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Failure to comply with rules for safeguarding or any attempt to gain access to information considered: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Classified ○ Sensitive ○ Protected
<p>Mitigating Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individual displays a <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Favorable change in behavior ○ Favorable response to counseling or remedial training • Activity occurred under circumstances unlikely to recur
<p>Case Details</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jessica Anderson admits: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ She accessed protected information without proper authorization on a single occasion • Inquiry into incident reveals: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ She had not received proper training ○ She has since attended training and is complying with procedures

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

What determination should you make for Jessica Anderson?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer Key

Adjudication Activity: Basic Standard 4: Unauthorized Access Concerns

What determination should you make for Jessica Anderson?

- a. Favorable (correct answer)
- b. Unfavorable

Rationale: *Although Ms. Anderson accessed protected information without proper authorization, she had never been instructed on the correct access procedures. She has since received training and displayed a favorable change in behavior. Valid mitigation exists to support a favorable determination.*

Basic Standard 5: Unlawful or Inappropriate Use of Identity Credentials

1. Concern

Unlawful or inappropriate use of credentials outside the workplace indicates that an applicant may be untrustworthy and could put at risk the DOD's physical assets and employees' personal property on a DOD facility. If such a risk exists, a CAC must not be granted.

2. Scenario

Charles Smith has applied for a CAC eligible position at Fort Echo. Three years ago, he had worked as a private security guard at a bank. The employment check during the investigation revealed that Mr. Smith had been terminated from his last position after a local business owner complained that Mr. Smith had attempted to use his badge to elicit special treatment from the business. A subsequent inquiry uncovered that Mr. Smith had repeatedly used his credentials to demand favors and intimidate cashiers at local businesses.

Should Mr. Smith's past history of inappropriate use of his credentials cause him to be denied a CAC?

Let's look more closely at Basic Standard 5.

3. Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions

Disqualifying conditions for Basic Standard 5 include having a documented history of fraudulent requests for credentials or other official documentation. If the individual used credentials or other official documentation to circumvent rules or regulations, he may be disqualified from receiving a CAC. If the individual has a history of incidents that puts physical assets or personal property at risk, he may be disqualified from receiving a CAC.

Unlawful or inappropriate use of identity credentials may be mitigated if the behavior happened so long ago, or under such unusual circumstances that its recurrence is unlikely. Concern may also be mitigated if the indiscretion was minor. If the applicant unintentionally or inadvertently performed the conduct and followed up with good-faith effort to correct the situation, this might also mitigate the concern.

Adjudication Activity: Basic Standard 5: Unlawful or Inappropriate Use of Identity Credentials

Now that you know about disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Basic Standard 5, look again at Charles Smith's case. Review the case items. Then make your determination.

Adjudication of Basic Standard 5: Unlawful or Inappropriate Use of Identity Credentials
<p>Concern</p> <p>A history of conduct involving fraudulent credentials or documentation may pose a threat to the U.S. government's physical assets and to employees' personal property on a U.S. government facility.</p>
<p>Disqualifying Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fraudulent requests for credentials or documentation • Credentials or documentation used to circumvent rules or regulations • History of incidents that put physical assets or personal property at risk
<p>Mitigating Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individual displays favorable change in behavior • Incident occurred long ago or under unusual circumstances, or was minor • Conduct performed unintentionally or inadvertently, and followed by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Prompt corrective effort
<p>Case Details</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Charles Smith applied for a security guard position at Fort Echo • Mr. Smith had repeatedly used his private security badge to demand favors from local businesses

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

What determination should you make for Charles Smith?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer Key

Adjudication Activity: Basic Standard 5: Unlawful or Inappropriate Use of Identity Credentials

What determination should you make for Charles Smith?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable (correct answer)

Rationale: *Mr. Smith displayed a pattern of abusing his official credentials outside the workplace. He must be denied a CAC.*

Basic Standard 6: Unauthorized Use of Information Systems

1. Concern

Information technology (IT) systems are essential to government and military functions. These systems process and store a great deal of important information. Because of the importance of these information systems, failure to comply with the regulations governing them raises serious concerns about whether an individual should be issued a CAC.

Using federally-controlled information systems unlawfully, making unauthorized modifications, corrupting or destroying, or engaging in inappropriate uses of information systems or data risks DOD assets.

2. Scenario

Mr. Jeffrey Dial is applying for a CAC eligible position. Mr. Dial had previously worked in a government research lab more than three years ago. His investigation found an incident report showing that while working at the lab previously, under research scientist Dr. Jane Grower, Mr. Dial logged into Dr. Grower's computer to submit an important research paper while she was on travel. When Mr. Dial completed his annual computer security training the next day, he realized his error and reported his unauthorized access to the appropriate security official.

Should Mr. Dial's unauthorized use of technology cause him to be denied a CAC?

Let's look more closely at Basic Standard 6.

3. Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions

Basic Standard 6 includes several disqualifying conditions.

For example, the illegal, unauthorized, or inappropriate use of an information technology system or component could disqualify a candidate. Unauthorized modification, destruction, or manipulation of information, software, firmware, or hardware that corrupts or destroys information technology systems or data also disqualifies candidates. Like many of the other basic standards, the mitigating conditions focus on the current or recent behavior of the individual.

A behavior may not cast doubt on the individual's trustworthiness if the individual has demonstrated a favorable behavior change or if the behavior happened so long ago, was so minor, or occurred under such unusual circumstances that its recurrence is unlikely. If the applicant unintentionally or inadvertently performed the conduct and followed up with good-faith effort to correct the situation, this might also mitigate the concern.

Adjudication Activity: Basic Standard 6: Unauthorized Use or Modification of Federal Information Systems

Now that you know about disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Basic Standard 6, look again at Jeffrey Dial's case. Review the case items. Then make your determination.

Adjudication of Basic Standard 6: Unauthorized Use or Modification of Federal Information Systems
<p>Concern</p> <p>Information technology systems underlie many essential government and military functions so failure to comply with the regulations governing them raises serious concerns about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness.</p>
<p>Disqualifying Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Illegal, unauthorized, or inappropriate use of an IT system • Unauthorized information, software, hardware, or firmware: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Modification ○ Destruction ○ Manipulation ○ Corruption
<p>Mitigating Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individual displays favorable change in • Incident occurred long ago or under unusual circumstances, or was minor • Conduct performed unintentionally or inadvertently, and followed by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Prompt corrective effort
<p>Case Details</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jeffrey Dial formerly worked as a research assistant on an important paper with Dr. Jane Grower • Mr. Dial logged on to Dr. Grower's computer and submitted the research paper while Dr. Grower was traveling • Upon learning this was a violation of IT use, Mr. Dial reported his unauthorized access

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

What determination should you make for Jeffrey Dial?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer Key

Adjudication Activity: Basic Standard 6: Unauthorized Use or Modification of Federal Information Systems

What determination should you make for Jeffrey Dial?

- a. Favorable (correct answer)
- b. Unfavorable

Rationale: *Although Mr. Dial used his coworker's login and password improperly and without authorization, he intended only to improve the organization's effectiveness. In addition, he reported the violation as soon as he realized his mistake. Relevant mitigation exists to support a favorable decision.*

Supplemental Standards 1-7

1. Supplemental Credentialing Standards

Whereas the basic credentialing standards apply to all adjudications, the supplemental credentialing standards are intended to ensure that the issuance of a CAC to an individual does not create unacceptable risk. Heads of Components have the discretion to use the supplemental credentialing standards, in addition to the basic credentialing standards, based on the risk associated with the position or work on the contract. Generally, however, the supplemental credentialing standards should be used for CAC adjudication of individuals who are not also subject to an adjudication for eligibility to hold a sensitive position or for access to classified information, suitability for Federal employment in the competitive service, or qualification for Federal employment in the excepted service.

These standards address concerns about the conduct and behavior of the applicant that may indicate that issuing a CAC to the applicant will pose an unacceptable risk to DOD assets.

Supplemental Standard 1: Misconduct or Negligence in Employment

2. Concern

If an individual has previously violated a non-disclosure commitment with his employer, such that he released proprietary information, he may repeat the offense. Maybe she stole from the employer, failed to secure the office when leaving, or let unauthorized visitors move throughout the restricted area unescorted.

Misconduct or negligence in an individual's employment history could present a risk to persons, personal property, or DOD property or information systems. This may indicate that granting a CAC poses an unacceptable risk.

3. Scenario

Mallory Jordan works for a defense contractor and needs regular access to the DOD network to support her contract, and therefore needs a CAC. During the investigation, information surfaced that Ms. Jordan's last employer fired her. According to the report, someone informed Ms. Jordan's supervisor that Ms. Jordan printed large quantities of materials after hours. When her supervisor confronted her, Ms. Jordan admitted she did not have a printer at home and used the office printer to prepare for her night classes but states she had never been informed of the no-personal-use policy. She also offered to repay the company for the use of the company resources. Her company maintained a no-tolerance policy for misuse of office resources. Ms. Jordan's supervisor fired her.

Should Ms. Jordan be issued a CAC?

Let's look more closely at Supplemental Standard 1.

4. Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions

Disqualifying conditions for Supplemental Standard 1 include having a history of intentional wrongdoing on the job, a pattern of workplace dishonesty or rule violations, or evidence of disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the workplace. A violation of written or recorded commitments to protect information made to an employer, such as breach of confidentiality or the release of proprietary information, represents another disqualifying condition. Other grounds for disqualification involve evidence of someone's significant misuse of an employer's time or resources.

On the other hand, several mitigating conditions exist to account for unique circumstances. A behavior may not cast doubt on the individual's trustworthiness if the behavior was minor, happened long ago, or under such unusual circumstances that its recurrence is unlikely. In some cases, the individual did not receive an adequate warning about the unacceptable conduct and could not reasonably recognize the conduct as wrong or negligent, in which case the concern may be mitigated. If the individual followed the conduct by a prompt, good-faith effort to correct the situation, this could also be considered grounds for mitigation.

Adjudication Activity: Supplemental Standard 1: Misconduct or Negligence in Employment

Now that you understand the disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Supplemental Standard 1, look again at Mallory Jordan's case.

Review the case items. Then make your determination.

Adjudication of Supplemental Standard 1: Misconduct or Negligence in Employment
<p>Concern</p> <p>Misconduct or negligence in an individual's employment history could be a risk to DOD assets.</p>
<p>Disqualifying Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A previous history of intentional wrongdoing on the job or other acts that may pose an unacceptable risk to people, property, or information systems • Pattern of dishonesty, rule violations or other acts that pose a risk to people, property or information systems • Disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior • Violation of written or recorded commitments to protect information • Misuse of employer's time or resources
<p>Mitigating Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incident occurred long ago, under unusual circumstances, or was minor • Individual did not receive appropriate warning that the conduct was unacceptable • Prompt corrective effort followed
<p>Case Details</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mallory Jordan wants to work as a consultant and needs logical access. • Misuse: Used printer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ After hours ○ For personal use ○ Unaware of policy ○ Offered to repay company • Response: Fired

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

What determination should you make for Mallory Jordan?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer Key

Adjudication Activity: Supplemental Standard 1: Misconduct or Negligence in Employment

What determination should you make for Mallory Jordan?

- a. Favorable (correct answer)
- b. Unfavorable

Rationale: Although Ms. Jordan did lose her job, it appears that the abuse of resources was relatively minor, and she had been unaware of the policy. There are sufficient mitigating conditions to make a favorable determination.

Supplemental Standard 2: Criminal or Dishonest Conduct

1. Concern

Criminal activity or dishonesty creates doubt about a person's reliability or trustworthiness and may put DOD personnel, property, or information systems at risk. By its very nature, criminal activity calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. With regard to criminal conduct, evaluate the individual's behavior as the primary consideration, not whether the individual was prosecuted or convicted. Adjudicators consider intentional acts, such as theft, as more serious than less intentional offenses, such as traffic violations.

2. Scenario

Think about this scenario. Maria Green has applied for a CAC eligible position. On her OF-306, Ms. Green admits to having been convicted for shoplifting. When the adjudicative agency received and reviewed the FBI Criminal History Report, it revealed that police arrested the subject ten times in the past 15 years on various charges, including shoplifting, petty theft, unemployment fraud, and auto theft. Convicted four times, she received sentences varying from fines to probation, which have all been satisfied.

Should Ms. Green's past criminal behavior disqualify for a CAC?

Let's look more closely at Supplemental Standard 2 to decide.

3. Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions

Criminal and dishonest conduct covers a wide range of conditions. Many disqualifying and mitigating conditions exist for this Supplemental Standard.

a. Disqualifying Conditions:

Disqualifying conditions for Supplemental Standard 2 include items like a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses, or an allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the court formally charged, prosecuted, or convicted the applicant.

Dishonest acts, such as theft, accepting bribes, falsifying claims, perjury, forgery, or attempting to obtain identity documentation without proper authorization, can also disqualify an applicant. If an applicant has engaged in deceptive or illegal financial practices, such as embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, or filing deceptive loan statements, these acts may also disqualify her. Actions that involve violence or sexual behavior of a criminal nature

may also pose an unacceptable risk. In addition, a documented history of misusing workplace information systems to distribute pornography may serve as grounds for disqualification. An applicant's financial irresponsibility is also disqualifying. Although financial debt in and of itself is not a cause for denial, a consistent failure to satisfy significant debts may indicate an unacceptable risk to DOD assets should a CAC be issued.

Finally, a deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts or deliberately providing false or misleading information will disqualify an applicant.

b. Mitigating Conditions

Some criminal conduct concerns may be mitigated. A behavior may not cast doubt on the individual's trustworthiness if the behavior happened long ago, or under such unusual circumstances that its recurrence is unlikely. Concern may also be mitigated if the indiscretion was minor. Similarly, grounds for mitigation may exist if the court dismissed the charges or there is evidence that the individual did not commit the offending act. Sometimes an authority figure or even lawyer gives the individual inadequate advice, which significantly contributes to the individual's omission, concealment, or falsification of information.

In these instances, when confronted about his actions, he confesses fully and makes an effort to correct the situation. And sometimes the applicant will make prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification even before being confronted with the discrepancy. Evidence of successful rehabilitation, such as remorse or restitution, good employment record, constructive community involvement, or the passage of time without recurrence, can also mitigate the concern.

Adjudication Activity: Supplemental Standard 2: Criminal or Dishonest Conduct

Now that you understand the disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Supplemental Standard 2, look again at Maria Green's case.

Review the case items. Then make your determination.

Adjudication of Supplemental Standard 2: Criminal or Dishonest Conduct
<p>Concern</p> <p>Criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness and calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.</p>
<p>Disqualifying Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses • Charge or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of formal charge, prosecution, or conviction • Dishonest acts • Deceptive or illegal financial practices • Actions involving violence or criminal sexual behavior • Use of workplace information systems to distribute pornography • Financial irresponsibility (NOT solely financial debt, but consistent failure to repay significant debts.) • Omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts deliberately
<p>Mitigating Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Behavior: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Occurred long ago ○ Happened under unusual circumstances ○ Considered minor • Evidence: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Of doubt that the individual did commit the act ○ Of improper or inadequate advice from authorized personnel or legal counsel ○ Of efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification of conduct ○ Of successful rehabilitation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Remorse or restitution ▪ Job training, higher education, or good employment record ▪ Constructive community involvement ▪ Passage of time

Adjudication of Supplemental Standard 2: Criminal or Dishonest Conduct**Case Details**

- Maria Green's OF-306 reveals:
 - Police arrested her three times for shoplifting
 - She received one conviction
- FBI CHR reveals:
 - Ten arrests over 15 years for shoplifting, petty theft, unemployment fraud, and auto theft
 - Four convictions, with all terms satisfied

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

What determination should you make for Maria Green?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer Key

Adjudication Activity: Supplemental Standard 2: Criminal or Dishonest Conduct

What determination should you make for Maria Green?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable (correct answer)

Rationale: Ms. Green engaged in repeated criminal behavior over the course of many years. Her repeated criminal acts demonstrate a pattern of criminal conduct, one of the best indicators of potential security concern. No mitigating conditions exist, so an unfavorable determination must be made.

Supplemental Standard 3: Material, Intentional False Statement, Deception or Fraud in Connection with Federal or Contract Employment

1. Concern

Attempts to circumvent the federal hiring process through deception, fraud, or intentional false statements calls into question an individual's reliability and trustworthiness in regards to the safety of people, property, and information systems. If an individual is lying to get hired, it poses an unacceptable risk to the DOD.

2. Scenario

Katherine Ryan is applying for a CAC eligible position. The investigation showed several discrepancies regarding the employment information Ms. Ryan submitted in her application. Employment inquiries revealed Ms. Ryan never worked at multiple of her claimed positions and in one case did not work for the company at all. Additionally, Ms. Ryan reported earning a college degree required for the position she was applying for, but the investigation revealed she had never attended the named university.

Should Ms. Ryan's incorrect employment history disqualify her from receiving a CAC?

Let's look further at Supplemental Standard 3.

3. Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions

The disqualifying conditions for Supplemental Standard 3 deal with falsification of information. If someone intentionally falsifies information, attempts to deceive or defraud the employment process for the current or a prior Federal or contract employment, she may be disqualified from receiving a CAC. This deception could happen at any time during the process, whether on the employment application, appointment or investigative documents, or during interviews.

Conditions that could mitigate these conditions include: a behavior may not cast doubt on the individual's trustworthiness if the behavior happened long ago, or under such unusual circumstances that its recurrence is unlikely. Concern may also be mitigated if the indiscretion was minor. If the applicant unintentionally or inadvertently performed the conduct and made a prompt effort to rectify the situation, the concern may no longer apply.

Adjudication Activity: Supplemental Standard 3: Material, Intentional False Statement, Deception or Fraud in Connection with Federal or Contract Employment

Now that you understand the disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Supplemental Standard 3, look again at Katherine Ryan's case.

Review the case details. Then make your determination.

<p>Adjudication of Supplemental Standard 3: Material, Intentional False Statement, Deception or Fraud in Connection with Federal or Contract Employment</p>
<p>Concern</p> <p>Attempts to circumvent the fair and open competition involved in the federal hiring process through deception, fraud, or intentional false statements could risk DOD assets.</p>
<p>Disqualifying Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Material, intentional falsification of experience, education, or other qualifications during current or prior hiring process for federal or contract employment
<p>Mitigating Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incident occurred long ago, under unusual circumstances, or was minor • Incident performed unintentionally or inadvertently, and followed by prompt corrective effort
<p>Case Details</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discrepancies in employment record • Information regarding former employment determined to be false • Claimed to have college degree required for position but no record of attendance

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

What determination should you make for Katherine Ryan?

- Favorable
- Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer Key

Adjudication Activity: Supplemental Standard 3: Material, Intentional False Statement, Deception or Fraud in Connection with Federal or Contract Employment

What determination should you make for Katherine Ryan?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable (correct answer)

Rationale: Ms. Ryan falsified information on her official forms. She demonstrated none of the mitigating conditions. She should not be issued a CAC.

Supplemental Standard 4: Alcohol Abuse

1. Concern

Excessive alcohol consumption or abuse may interfere with an applicant's ability to perform his duties. It leads to questions about that person's judgment and impulse control, and may put DOD assets at risk. A person's long-term abuse of alcohol without evidence of substantial rehabilitation may indicate that granting a CAC poses an unacceptable safety risk in a DOD facility.

2. Scenario

Andrew Wheaton is applying for a CAC eligible position. In completing the OF-306, Mr. Wheaton reported that he had been convicted of drunk and disorderly conduct after a night of binge drinking and enrolled in an alcohol treatment program 5 years ago. There, he was diagnosed as alcohol dependent. He was required to complete inpatient counseling and meet aftercare requirements.

Mr. Wheaton completed the inpatient counseling and enrolled in Alcoholics Anonymous as an aftercare program. He acknowledged that he continues to consume alcohol regularly and occasionally drinks to the point of intoxication, but no longer engages in reckless behavior when drunk.

To determine whether you can make a favorable determination for Mr. Wheaton, you will need to consider disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Supplemental Standard 4.

3. Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions

The disqualifying conditions for Supplemental Standard 4 include having a pattern of alcohol-related arrests or experiencing alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work while intoxicated or impaired, or drinking on the job. Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impairment or the continuing abuse or excessive consumption of alcohol may disqualify candidates. Failing to follow court-ordered instructions regarding alcohol education, evaluation, treatment, or abstinence may disqualify an applicant from receiving a CAC.

Mitigating conditions could apply if the individual acknowledges his or her alcohol abuse and provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, like establishing a pattern of abstinence, if she is alcohol dependent, or responsible use, if she is an abuser of alcohol. If the individual participates in counseling or treatment programs, has no history of previous treatment or relapse, and makes satisfactory progress, these circumstances may mitigate the concern. Another mitigating condition may apply if the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient counseling or rehabilitation along with any required aftercare. If she has demonstrated a clear pattern of modified consumption or abstinence in accordance with

treatment recommendations, such as participation in an alcohol treatment program, this will also mitigate the concern. And, finally, if the individual has received a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker, she may still be issued a CAC.

Adjudication Activity: Supplemental Standard 4: Alcohol Abuse

Now that you know the disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Supplemental Standard 4, look again at Andrew Wheaton's case.

Review the case details. Then make your determination.

Adjudication of Supplemental Standard 4: Alcohol Abuse
<p>Concern</p> <p>Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, and failure to control impulses.</p>
<p>Disqualifying Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An alcohol-related pattern of arrests • Alcohol-related incidents at work <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Reporting for work while intoxicated ○ Drinking on the job • Current continuing abuse or excessive consumption of alcohol • Continued failure to follow court orders regarding alcohol education, evaluation, treatment, or abstinence
<p>Mitigating Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individual acknowledges and overcomes problem <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Uses responsibly, if alcohol abuser ○ Abstains, if alcohol dependent • Individual participates in counseling/rehabilitation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Shows no prior history of treatment and relapse ○ Makes successful progress • Individual completes counseling or rehabilitation and required aftercare successfully <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Changed behavior ○ Received favorable prognosis
<p>Case Details</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convicted for drunk and disorderly conduct • Enrolled in alcohol treatment program 5 years ago • Diagnosed as alcohol dependent • Met inpatient counseling and aftercare requirements • Continues to drink regularly and occasionally drinks to excess

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

What determination should you make for Andrew Wheaton?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer Key

Adjudication Activity: Supplemental Standard 4: Alcohol Abuse

What determination should you make for Andrew Wheaton?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable (correct answer)

Rationale: *Although Mr. Wheaton voluntarily completed an alcohol treatment program, his continued occasional, heavy use of alcohol subsequent to a diagnosis of alcohol dependence reveals questionable judgment. He will not receive a CAC.*

Supplemental Standard 5: Drug Abuse

1. Concern

The abuse of illegal or prescription drugs may put people, property, or information systems at risk. Using illegal narcotics or other controlled substances raises questions about an individual's willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Drug abuse is defined as the use of an illegal drug, or the use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction. When evaluating drug abuse in a candidate's history, unless the person exhibits substantial rehabilitation, granting a CAC may pose an unacceptable safety risk to the DOD.

2. Scenario

William Huber is a new maintenance worker who requires a CAC to access his job site. He listed drug use on the SF-85. His explanation was that he became addicted to morphine while undergoing treatment for a serious back injury two years ago. In the Continuation Space on the form, he explained that he is currently undergoing treatment by a doctor for his addiction and has been clean for 11 months.

Does Mr. Huber's past history with drug abuse disqualify him from receiving a CAC?

Let's look at the disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Supplemental Standard 5.

3. Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions

Supplemental Standard 5 concerns drug abuse. The impact of individuals currently abusing drugs can be a risk to DOD assets. There are many disqualifying and mitigating conditions for this standard.

a. Disqualifying Conditions

Conditions that may raise concern and disqualify the individual include: current or recent illegal drug use, serious narcotic abuse, or other controlled substance offense; a pattern of drug-related arrests or problems in employment; or the possession of an illegal drug, including its cultivation, processing, or manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution, or the possession of any drug paraphernalia.

If the applicant has been diagnosed with drug abuse or dependence by a qualified medical professional, this could disqualify the applicant. Additionally, if a licensed clinical social worker on staff at a drug treatment program has made an evaluation of drug abuse or dependence, the applicant may be disqualified.

Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program, any illegal drug use after formally agreeing to comply with rules or regulations prohibiting drug use, and any illegal use or abuse of prescription or over-the-counter drugs are all grounds for disqualification.

b. Mitigating Conditions

Drug abuse may be mitigated if certain conditions exist. A behavior may not cast doubt on the individual's trustworthiness if the abuse happened so long ago, infrequently, or under such unusual circumstances that its recurrence is unlikely.

Another mitigating condition is if the individual has demonstrated an intent not to abuse drugs in the future, by abstaining from drug use; disassociating from drug-using associates and contacts; or changing or avoiding the environment where the drug use took place.

If the abuse of prescription drugs occurred after a severe or prolonged illness, during which these drugs were prescribed and the abuse has since ended, the concern may be mitigated. If the individual has completed a prescribed drug treatment program, including rehabilitation and aftercare, as required by the program, with no recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a qualified medical professional, his behavior could mitigate the concern.

Adjudication Activity: Supplemental Standard 5: Drug Abuse

Now that you have learned the disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Supplemental Standard 5, look again at William Huber's case.

Review the details. Then make your adjudicative determination.

Adjudication of Supplemental Standard 5: Drug Abuse
<p>Concern</p> <p>The abuse of illegal drugs or prescription drugs can pose a risk to DOD assets.</p>
<p>Disqualifying Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Current or recent illegal drug use • Drug-related pattern of arrests or problems in employment • Illegal drug possession <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Cultivation, processing, or manufacture ○ Purchase, sale, or distribution ○ Possession of drug paraphernalia • Drug abuse or dependence diagnosis of by a qualified medical professional • Drug abuse or drug dependence evaluation of by a licensed clinical social worker • Continued or ongoing failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program • Continued drug use after formally agreeing to comply with rules or regulations prohibiting drug use • Any illegal use or abuse of prescription or over-the-counter drugs
<p>Mitigating Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Behavior occurred long ago, infrequently, or under unusual circumstances • Individual demonstrates intent not to abuse drugs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Abstaining from drug use ○ Disassociating from drug-using associates and contacts ○ Changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used • Abuse of prescription drugs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Prescribed during severe illness ○ Abuse has since ended • Completion of drug treatment program including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Completed rehabilitation and aftercare ○ No recurrence of abuse ○ Favorable prognosis by qualified medical professional

Adjudication of Supplemental Standard 5: Drug Abuse**Case Details**

- William Huber sustained a back injury two years ago
- He became addicted to the prescription drug morphine
- He is currently undergoing treatment
- He has been clean for 11 months

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

What determination should you make for William Huber?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer Key

Adjudication Activity: Supplemental Standard 5: Drug Abuse

What determination should you make for William Huber?

- a. Favorable (correct answer)
- b. Unfavorable

Rationale: *Although Mr. Huber was recently addicted to morphine, the medication was legitimately prescribed and he has been clean for 11 months and is undergoing treatment for his addiction. A favorable determination may be made.*

Supplemental Standard 6: Statutory or Regulatory Bar

1. Concern

Federal statutes or regulations may prevent lawful employment. Debarment is a prohibition from taking a competitive service examination or from being hired for a federal position for a specific time period. For example, if someone is convicted of a felony related to inciting a riot or civil disorder, that individual is barred for five years from federal employment.

Another example of debarment would be if someone hired a relative to a position for which she was not otherwise qualified. Nepotism is another cause for debarment. This standard serves to verify whether an existing debarment is in place and if granting a CAC poses an unacceptable risk to persons, property, and assets in U.S. government facilities.

2. Scenario

Jeremy Marks is applying for a position as a contractor at a DOD facility and needs a CAC for access to DOD information systems. The investigation gathered information on his employment background. Mr. Marks was placed under a debarment from federal employment three years ago for submitting fraudulent invoices in relation to contract work he had performed for the government. The debarment is still in place.

Should Mr. Marks be issued a CAC?

Let's look deeper in Supplemental Standard 6.

3. Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions

There are several disqualifying conditions for Supplemental Standard 6. These conditions could result in debarment from both federal and DOD employment. Perhaps a debarment was imposed by OPM or the DOD. Or perhaps the suitability debarment was based on the presence of serious suitability issues. If the individual failed to register for the Selective Service, if required, this could result in debarment. There are two mitigating conditions for this standard. If the applicant is no longer under debarment because the reason for the debarment no longer exists, this could mitigate the concern. If the debarment is job- or position-specific and the applicant is applying for a job to which the debarment does not apply, then the concern may be mitigated.

Adjudication Activity: Supplemental Standard 6: Statutory or Regulatory Bar

Now that you have learned the disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Supplemental Standard 6, look again at Jeremy Marks' case.

Review the details. Then make your adjudicative determination.

Adjudication of Supplemental Standard 6: Statutory or Regulatory Bar
<p>Concern</p> <p>This standard serves to verify whether an existing debarment is in place and if granting a CAC poses an unacceptable risk to persons, property, and assets in U.S. government facilities.</p>
<p>Disqualifying Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Debarment was imposed by OPM, the DOD, or other federal agency • Suitability debarment was based on the presence of serious suitability issues • Individual failed to register for the Selective Service, if required
<p>Mitigating Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Applicant proves that <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ He or she is no longer under debarment ○ The reason for debarment no longer exists • Debarment is job- or position-specific and is not applicable to the job under consideration
<p>Case Details</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jeremy Marks was debarred for submitting fraudulent invoices • Debarment was disclosed

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

What determination should you make for Jeremy Marks?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer Key

Adjudication Activity: Supplemental Standard 6: Statutory or Regulatory Bar

What determination should you make for Jeremy Marks?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable (correct answer)

Rationale: Mr. Marks is currently under debarment. You must make an unfavorable determination.

Supplemental Standard 7: Treasonous Acts or Activities

1. Concern

Supplemental Standard 7 addresses the concerns surrounding treasonous acts. In addition to Basic Standard 1, this standard seeks to further stymie applicants from providing an avenue for terrorism. It also addresses the concern of individuals attempting to overthrow the U.S. government.

Individuals with access to DOD property and information systems must not put the DOD at risk or provide an avenue for terrorism. There is a difference between advocating lawful and peaceful change to a government and performing treasonous unconstitutional, unlawful, and destructive acts in order to make change.

Let's explore this standard further.

2. Scenario

Rick Jackson is applying for a CAC eligible position at Fort Echo. After he was fingerprinted his name came up as a member of a group called For the People, which advocates a socialist regime in the United States. The group has been accused multiple times of sabotaging IT networks of corporations that do business with the U.S. Government. The investigation showed that Mr. Jackson joined the group to advocate for laborers rights. Although Mr. Jackson had been aware of the sabotage, his involvement occurred more than 10 years ago, and had never personally engaged in any illegal activities or encouraged others to do so. He has long since disassociated himself from the group and renounced their tactics.

How do these facts affect whether Mr. Jackson should be issued a CAC?

To make this determination, you need to consider both disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Supplemental Standard 7.

3. Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions

Questions of loyalty to the United States that lead to treasonous acts are a major concern when issuing credentials for access to U.S. government facilities. Will this person harm the U.S. or risk DOD assets in some fashion? There are many disqualifying and mitigating conditions for this standard.

a. Disqualifying Conditions

Disqualifying conditions for Supplemental Standard 7 include involvement, training, support, or advocacy of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or

sedition against the United States. An applicant's association or agreement with persons who attempt to or commit any of these acts with the specific intent to further those unlawful aims is also a disqualifying condition. Another disqualifying condition is the association or agreement with individuals or groups that: advocate the use of violence or unconstitutional means to overthrow U.S. federal, state, or local governments; attempt to prevent government personnel from performing their official duties; or seek retribution for perceived wrongs caused by the government. Finally, if the applicant is directly involved in actively preventing others from exercising their constitutional rights, through the use of violence or threat of violence, a CAC may not be issued.

Sabotage - Preventing the authorized use of government property or facilities

Espionage - Providing classified information to another country, thereby causing damage to the U.S.

Treason - Levying war against the U.S. or giving aid and comfort to the enemies of the U.S.

Terrorism - Using or threatening to use violent acts to bring about an organization's desired change

Sedition - Trying to persuade others to commit acts that are unconstitutional or violent to bring about the overthrow or unlawful change of U.S. government

b. Mitigating Conditions

It is easy to see why treasonous acts or activities pose a danger to members and entities of the federal government including DOD personnel, information, and property. Even so, there are circumstances in which involvement or association with dangerous groups may be mitigated. Involvement that occurred long ago, was minor, or happened under such unusual circumstances, that it does not cast doubt on the current reliability, trustworthiness, or loyalty of the individual may mitigate the concern. The individual involved may have been unaware of an organization's unlawful aims, or the individual may not have intended to engage in any illegal or unconstitutional activities or to incite others to advocate, threaten, or use violence. Finally, if the individual was only involved for an official purpose, or for a short period of time due to curiosity or academic interest, the concern may be mitigated.

Adjudication Activity: Supplemental Standard 7: Treasonous Acts or Activities

Now that you know about disqualifying and mitigating conditions for Supplemental Standard 7, look again at Rick Jackson's case.

Review the details. Then make your adjudicative determination.

Adjudication of Supplemental Standard 7: Treasonous Acts or Activities
<p>Concern</p> <p>An individual wants to bring about change through unconstitutional, unlawful, or violent means.</p>
<p>Disqualifying Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involvement, training, support, or advocacy of any act of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Sabotage ○ Espionage ○ Treason ○ Terrorism ○ Sedition • Association or agreement with individuals attempting to commit any of the above acts. • Association or agreement with individuals or organizations that advocate, threaten, or use violence or unconstitutional means to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Overthrow the government ○ Prevent government personnel from performing their duties ○ Gain retribution for perceived government wrongs ○ Prevent others from exercising their constitutional rights
<p>Mitigating Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incident occurred long ago, was minor, or happened under unusual circumstances • Unaware of illegal, treasonous, or seditious activities • Did not intend to engage in violence or illegal activities or to incite others • Only involved for an official purpose • Only involved for a short time, due to curiosity or academic interest

Adjudication of Supplemental Standard 7: Treasonous Acts or Activities**Case Details**

Mr. Jackson:

- Member of For the People
 - Advocates a socialist regime
 - Accused of sabotage of an IT network of a major company
- Advocated for laborers rights
- Involved over a decade ago and never involved in violence
- Dissociated and renounced violent tactics

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

What determination should you make for Mr. Jackson?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer Key

Adjudication Activity: Supplemental Standard 7: Treasonous Acts or Activities

What determination should you make for Mr. Jackson?

- a. Favorable (correct answer)
- b. Unfavorable

Rationale: While Mr. Jackson was involved with a potentially unlawfully destructive group, his involvement occurred long ago, and he was never involved in illegal activities. There is sufficient mitigating evidence to allow a favorable determination.

Multiple Issues

1. Multiple-Standard Cases

Of course, many of the cases seen by adjudicators contain information that involves more than one credentialing standard. There are two types of multiple issue cases: cases that involve a single issue that relates to two or more standards, and cases that involve two or more unrelated issues that fall under different standards. Take, for example, the case of an individual who was caught buying marijuana and subsequently arrested for drug possession. The single issue in this case requires adjudicators to consider both the drug abuse and the criminal conduct standards. On the other hand, a case in which an individual is cited for unauthorized access and was also reprimanded for yelling at a coworker, is an example of a case with multiple, non-related issues. Adjudicators must consider both the unauthorized access and the misconduct in employment standards, but these standards apply to unrelated issues. When a case contains issues related to multiple standards and a concern is mitigated under one standard but not under another, a favorable determination cannot be made.

Adjudication Review Activity: Multiple Standards

Scenario 1

Sarah Thurman is applying for a CAC eligible position.

On her OF-306 form she reported that she was arrested and convicted for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The arrest occurred eight years ago. She completed her court mandated community service. However, Ms. Thurman continues to abuse alcohol.

Question 1

Which credentialing standards apply in this scenario? Select all that apply; then check your answers in the Answer Key on the following page.

Basic Credentialing Standards

- Terrorism
- Problems with Identity Verification
- Fraudulent Identity Information
- Unauthorized Access Concerns
- Unlawful or Inappropriate Use of Identity Credentials
- Unauthorized Use or Modification of Federal Information Systems

Supplemental Credentialing Standards

- Misconduct or Negligence in Employment
- Criminal or Dishonest Conduct
- Fraud in Connection with Federal Employment
- Alcohol Abuse
- Drug Use
- Statutory or Regulatory Bar
- Treasonous Acts or Activities

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE(S).

Answer: Question 1

Basic Credentialing Standards

- Terrorism
- Problems with Identity Verification
- Fraudulent Identity Information
- Unauthorized Access Concerns
- Unlawful or Inappropriate Use of Identity Credentials
- Unauthorized Use or Modification of Federal Information Systems

Supplemental Credentialing Standards

- Misconduct or Negligence in Employment
- Criminal or Dishonest Conduct (correct answer)
- Fraud in Connection with Federal Employment
- Alcohol Abuse (correct answer)
- Drug Use
- Statutory or Regulatory Bar
- Treasonous Acts or Activities

Rationale: This scenario clearly states that Ms. Thurman broke the law which is addressed by Supplemental Standard 2, Criminal or Dishonest Conduct, and also raises concerns about Ms. Thurman's relationship with alcohol, so Supplemental Standard 4: Alcohol Abuse also applies.

Question 2

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

Scenario 1

Sarah Thurman is applying for a CAC eligible position.

On her OF-306 form she reported that she was arrested and convicted for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The arrest occurred eight years ago. She completed her court mandated community service. However, Ms. Thurman continues to abuse alcohol.

According to the scenario, what determination should you make for Ms. Thurman?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer: Question 2

What determination should you make for Ms. Thurman?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable (correct answer)

Rationale: While there is mitigating evidence for Supplemental Standard 2, Criminal or Dishonest Conduct, there is no mitigating evidence regarding Supplemental Standard 4, Alcohol Abuse.

Scenario 2

Alejandra Mercado is a former DOD employee, applying for a new position.

Ms. Mercado's previous file includes an incident report. She was cited for downloading a movie from the internet to watch on her computer. When the activity was discovered Ms. Mercado declared she would not do it again and took remedial training in cyber security. She was also cited for a confrontation with another employee, but took prompt and corrective action to resolve the issue.

Question 1

Which credentialing standards apply in this scenario? Select all that apply; then check your answers in the Answer Key on the following page.

Basic Credentialing Standards

- Terrorism
- Problems with Identity Verification
- Fraudulent Identity Information
- Unauthorized Access Concerns
- Unlawful or Inappropriate Use of Identity Credentials
- Unauthorized Use or Modification of Federal Information Systems

Supplemental Credentialing Standards

- Misconduct or Negligence in Employment
- Criminal or Dishonest Conduct
- Fraud in Connection with Federal Employment
- Alcohol Abuse
- Drug Use
- Statutory or Regulatory Bar
- Treasonous Acts or Activities

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE(S).

Answer: Question 1**Basic Credentialing Standards**

- Terrorism
- Problems with Identity Verification
- Fraudulent Identity Information
- Unauthorized Access Concerns
- Unlawful or Inappropriate Use of Identity Credentials
- Unauthorized Use or Modification of Federal Information Systems (correct answer)

Supplemental Credentialing Standards

- Misconduct or Negligence in Employment (correct answer)
- Criminal or Dishonest Conduct
- Fraud in Connection with Federal Employment
- Alcohol Abuse
- Drug Use
- Statutory or Regulatory Bar
- Treasonous Acts or Activities

Rationale: *This scenario raises concerns about Ms. Mercado's use of federal information systems, as well as misconduct in employment.*

Question 2

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

Scenario 2

Alejandra Mercado is a former DOD employee, applying for a new position.

Ms. Mercado's previous file includes an incident report. She was cited for downloading a movie from the internet to watch on her computer. When the activity was discovered Ms. Mercado declared she would not do it again and took remedial training in cyber security. She was also cited for a confrontation with another employee, but took prompt and corrective action to resolve the issue.

According to this scenario, what determination should you make for Ms. Mercado?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer: Question 2

What determination should you make for Ms. Mercado?

- a. Favorable (correct answer)
- b. Unfavorable

Rationale: *There is mitigating evidence for both of the credentialing standards sufficient to grant Ms. Mercado a CAC.*

Scenario 3

George Jones is applying for a CAC in order to report for duty as maintenance contractor.

Mr. Jones completed his forms, submitted them, and was fingerprinted.

The FBI CHR returned stating that Mr. Jones has multiple arrests for harassment while on the job, but no convictions. He also has several aliases. Mr. Jones failed to report any of this on his SF-85 or OF-306 forms.

Question 1

Which credentialing standards apply in this scenario? Select all that apply; then check your answers in the Answer Key on the following page.

Basic Credentialing Standards

- Terrorism
- Problems with Identity Verification
- Fraudulent Identity Information
- Unauthorized Access Concerns
- Unlawful or Inappropriate Use of Identity Credentials
- Unauthorized Use or Modification of Federal Information Systems

Supplemental Credentialing Standards

- Misconduct or Negligence in Employment
- Criminal or Dishonest Conduct
- Fraud in Connection with Federal Employment
- Alcohol Abuse
- Drug Use
- Statutory or Regulatory Bar
- Treasonous Acts or Activities

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE(S).

Answer: Question 1

Which credentialing standards apply in this scenario? Select all that apply; then check your answers in the Answer Key on the following page.

Basic Credentialing Standards

- Terrorism
- Problems with Identity Verification (correct answer)
- Fraudulent Identity Information (correct answer)
- Unauthorized Access Concerns
- Unlawful or Inappropriate use of Identity Credentials
- Unauthorized Use or Modification of Federal Information Systems

Supplemental Credentialing Standards

- Misconduct or Negligence in Employment (correct answer)
- Criminal or Dishonest Conduct (correct answer)
- Fraud in Connection with Federal Employment
- Alcohol Abuse
- Drug Use
- Statutory or Regulatory Bar
- Treasonous Acts or Activities

Rationale: *This scenario raises concerns about Mr. Jones's potentially criminal conduct and misconduct in employment, and raises issues in regards to his identity and willingness to defraud the federal government.*

Question 2

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

Scenario 3

George Jones is applying for a CAC in order to report for duty as maintenance contractor.

Mr. Jones completed his forms, submitted them, and was fingerprinted. The FBI CHR returned stating that Mr. Jones has multiple arrests for harassment while on the job, but no convictions. He also has several aliases. Mr. Jones failed to report any of this on his SF-85 or OF-306 forms.

According to this scenario, what determination should you make for Mr. Jones?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer: Question 2

What determination should you make for Mr. Jones?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable (correct answer)

Rationale: *There is no mitigating evidence for any of the credentialing standards sufficient to grant Mr. Jones a CAC, at either the interim or final phase.*

Scenario 4

David Schuler is applying for a CAC eligible position at Fort Bravo.

Mr. Schuler completed his forms, submitted them, and was fingerprinted. The FBI CHR returned stating that Mr. Schuler has a single arrest for assaulting a man in a bar brawl. He was not convicted; charges were dropped. His name also appears in the Terrorist Screening Database, for a current affiliation with a group who wish to revive the practice of local militias and whom has been known to use force against local and federal law enforcement in order to maintain stock-piles of weaponry. Mr. Schuler knows about the group's goals and actively participates in its efforts.

Question 1

Which credentialing standards apply in this scenario? Select all that apply; then check your answers in the Answer Key on the following page.

Basic Credentialing Standards

- Terrorism
- Problems with Identity Verification
- Fraudulent Identity Information
- Unauthorized Access Concerns
- Unlawful or Inappropriate Use of Identity Credentials
- Unauthorized Use or Modification of Federal Information Systems

Supplemental Credentialing Standards

- Misconduct or Negligence in Employment
- Criminal or Dishonest Conduct
- Fraud in Connection with Federal Employment
- Alcohol Abuse
- Drug Use
- Statutory or Regulatory Bar
- Treasonous Acts or Activities

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE(S).

Answer: Question 1

Which credentialing standards apply in this scenario? Select all that apply; then check your answers in the Answer Key on the following page.

Basic Credentialing Standards

- Terrorism (correct answer)
- Problems with Identity Verification
- Fraudulent Identity Information
- Unauthorized Access Concerns
- Unlawful or Inappropriate Use of Identity Credentials
- Unauthorized Use or Modification of Federal Information Systems

Supplemental Credentialing Standards

- Misconduct or Negligence in Employment
- Criminal or Dishonest Conduct (correct answer)
- Fraud in Connection with Federal Employment
- Alcohol Abuse
- Drug Use
- Statutory or Regulatory Bar
- Treasonous Acts or Activities (correct answer)

Rationale: *This scenario raises concerns about Mr. Schuler's potential criminal conduct as well as ties to a group that practices terrorism. In this case, Mr. Schuler's potential ties to terrorism are addressed by two credentialing standards.*

Question 2

Make your adjudicative determination; then check your answer on the following page.

Scenario 4

David Schuler is applying for a CAC eligible position at Fort Bravo.

Mr. Schuler completed his forms, submitted them, and was fingerprinted. The FBI CHR returned stating that Mr. Schuler has a single arrest for assaulting a man in a bar brawl. He was not convicted; charges were dropped. His name also appears in the Terrorist Screening Database, for a current affiliation with a group who wish to revive the practice of local militias and whom has been known to use force against local and federal law enforcement in order to maintain stock-piles of weaponry. Mr. Schuler knows about the group's goals and actively participates in its efforts.

According to this scenario, what determination should you make for Mr. Shuler?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer: Question 2

What determination should you make for Mr. Shuler?

- a. Favorable
- b. Unfavorable (correct answer)

Rationale: *While there may be evidence to mitigate the concern regarding Mr. Schuler's criminal misconduct, there are currently no mitigating conditions for his ties to a terrorist organization. The mitigations are insufficient to grant Mr. Schuler a CAC at the interim stage. If the investigation reveals mitigating information, he may be issued a CAC at that time.*

Conclusion

3. Lesson Summary

In this lesson you learned how to apply the 13 credentialing standards, both basic and supplemental.

Basic Standard 1: Terrorism

Concern

Avoiding the possibility of granting the access to facilities and information to individuals who are involved with domestic or international terrorism in some form is one of the main concerns of HSPD-12 adjudications.

Disqualifying Conditions

- Evidence of reportable domestic or international terrorism:
 - Contacts
 - Activities
 - Indicators
 - Behaviors
- International terrorism indicators in DODD 5240.06

Mitigating Conditions

- Not knowingly engaged in violent activities
- Involved when organization was not engaged in terrorist activities

Basic Standard 2: Problems with Identity Verification

Concern

A CAC must not be issued to a person if the agency employing the person is unable to verify the individual's claimed identity.

Disqualifying Conditions

- Applicant:
 - Failed to provide two I-9 identity source documents
 - Did not appear in person
 - Refused to cooperate with the documentation and investigative requirements
 - Appeared different than the person who arrived at another time
- Fingerprints:
 - Did not belong to the identity association with the application
- Investigation:
 - Failed to confirm the individual's claimed identity

Mitigating Conditions

- None

Basic Standard 3: Fraudulent Identity Information

Concern

If the adjudicator has a reasonable basis to believe an individual has submitted fraudulent information concerning her identity, he will deny issuance of a CAC.

Disqualifying Conditions

- Fraudulent information concerning his or her identity
- Official documentation or credentials that have been
 - Made falsely

- Forged
- Counterfeited
- Altered
- Tampered with

Mitigating Conditions

- None

Basic Standard 4: Unauthorized Access Concerns

Concern
Attempting to gain unauthorized access to classified documents or other sensitive or protected information poses a significant risk to national security, individual privacy, and proprietary information.

Disqualifying Conditions

- Failure to comply with rules for safeguarding or any attempt to gain access to information considered:
 - Classified
 - Sensitive
 - Protected

Mitigating Conditions

- Individual displays a
 - Favorable change in behavior
 - Favorable response to counseling or remedial training
- Activity occurred under circumstances unlikely to recur

Basic Standard 5: Unauthorized Unlawful or Inappropriate Use of Identity Credentials

Concern
A history of conduct involving fraudulent credentials or documentation may pose a threat to the U.S. government's physical assets and to employees' personal property on a U.S. government facility.

Disqualifying Conditions

- Fraudulent requests for credentials or documentation
- Credentials or documentation used to circumvent rules or regulations

Mitigating Conditions

- Individual displays favorable change in behavior
- Incident occurred long ago or under unusual circumstances, or was minor
- Conduct performed unintentionally or inadvertently, and followed by:
 - Prompt corrective effort

Basic Standard 6: Modification, Corruption, or Destruction of Federally-Controlled Information Systems

Concern
Information technology systems underlie many essential government and military functions, so failure to comply with the regulations governing them raises serious concerns about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness.

Disqualifying Conditions

- Illegal, unauthorized, or inappropriate use of an IT system
- Unauthorized information, software, hardware, or firmware:
 - Modification
 - Destruction
 - Manipulation

- Corruption

Mitigating Conditions

- Individual demonstrated favorable behavior change
- Incident occurred long ago or under unusual circumstances, or was minor
- Conduct performed unintentionally or inadvertently, and followed by:
 - Prompt corrective effort

Supplemental Standard 1: Misconduct or Negligence in Employment Concern

Misconduct or negligence in an individual's employment history could be a risk to DOD assets.

Disqualifying Conditions

- History of intentional wrongdoing
- Pattern of dishonesty or rule violations
- Disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior
- Violation of written or recorded commitments to protect information
- Misuse of employer's time or resources

Mitigating Conditions

- Incident occurred long ago, under unusual circumstances, or was minor
- Individual did not receive appropriate warning that the conduct was unacceptable
- Prompt corrective effort followed

Supplemental Standard 2: Criminal or Dishonest Conduct Concern

Criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness, and calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.

Disqualifying Conditions

- Single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses
- Charge or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of formal charge, prosecution, or conviction
- Dishonest acts
- Deceptive or illegal financial practices
- Actions involving violence or criminal sexual behavior
- Use of workplace information systems to distribute pornography
- Financial irresponsibility (NOT solely financial debt, but consistent failure to repay significant debts)
- Omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts deliberately

Mitigating Conditions

Behavior:

- Occurred long ago
- Happened under unusual circumstances
- Was minor in nature

Evidence:

- That the individual did not commit the act
- Of improper or inadequate advice from authorized personnel or legal counsel
- Of efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification
- Of successful rehabilitation:
 - Remorse or restitution
 - Job training, higher education, or good employment record
 - Constructive community involvement

- Passage of time

Supplemental Standard 3:

Deception or Fraud in Connection with Federal or Contract Employment

Concern

Attempts to circumvent the fair and open competition involved in the federal hiring process through deception, fraud, or intentional false statements could risk DOD assets.

Disqualifying Conditions

- Material, intentional falsification of experience, education, or other qualifications during current or prior hiring process for federal or contract employment

Mitigating Conditions

- Incident occurred long ago, under unusual circumstances, or was minor
- Incident performed unintentionally or inadvertently, and followed by prompt corrective effort

Supplemental Standard 4: Alcohol Abuse

Concern

Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, and failure to control impulses.

Disqualifying Conditions

- A pattern of alcohol-related arrests
- Alcohol-related incidents at work
 - Reporting for work while intoxicated
 - Drinking on the job
- Current continuing abuse or excessive consumption of alcohol
- Continued failure to follow court orders regarding alcohol education, evaluation, treatment, or abstinence

Mitigating Conditions

- Individual acknowledges and overcomes problem
 - Uses responsibly, if alcohol abuser
 - Abstains, if alcohol dependent
- Participates in counseling/rehabilitation
 - Shows no prior history of treatment and relapse
 - Makes successful progress
- Completes counseling or rehabilitation and required aftercare successfully
 - Changed behavior
 - Received favorable prognosis

Supplemental Standard 5: Drug Abuse

Concern

The abuse of illegal drugs or prescription drugs can pose a risk to DOD assets.

Disqualifying Conditions

- Current illegal drug use
- Pattern of drug-related arrests or problems in employment
- Illegal drug possession
 - Cultivation, processing, or manufacture
 - Purchase, sale, or distribution
 - Possession of drug paraphernalia
- Diagnosis of drug abuse or dependence by a qualified medical professional
- Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical social worker

- Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program
- Illegal drug use after formally agreeing to comply with rules or regulations prohibiting drug use
- Any illegal use or abuse of prescription or over-the-counter drugs

Mitigating Conditions

- Behavior occurred long ago, infrequently, or under unusual circumstances
- Individual demonstrates intent not to abuse drugs
 - Abstaining from drug use
 - Disassociating from drug-using associates and contacts
 - Changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used
- Abuse of prescription drugs
 - Prescribed during severe illness
 - Abuse has since ended
- Satisfactory completion of drug treatment program including:
 - Rehabilitation and aftercare
 - No recurrence of abuse
 - Favorable prognosis by qualified medical professional

Supplemental Standard 6: Statutory or Regulatory Bar Concern

This standard serves to verify whether an existing debarment is in place and if the granting of a CAC poses an unacceptable risk to persons, property, and assets in U.S. government facilities.

Disqualifying Conditions

- Debarment was imposed by OPM, the DOD, or other federal agency
- Suitability debarment was based on the presence of serious suitability issues
- Individual failed to register for the Selective Service, if required

Mitigating Conditions

- Applicant proves that
 - He or she is no longer under debarment
 - The reason for debarment no longer exists
- Debarment is job- or position-specific and is not applicable to the job currently under consideration

Supplemental Standard 7: Treasonous Acts or Activities Concern

An individual wants to bring about change through unconstitutional, unlawful, or violent means.

Disqualifying Conditions

- Involvement, training, support, or advocacy of any act of:
 - Sabotage
 - Espionage
 - Treason
 - Terrorism
 - Sedition
- Association or agreement with individuals attempting to commit any of the above acts.
- Association or agreement with individuals or organizations that advocate, threaten, or use violence or unconstitutional means to:
 - Overthrow the government
 - Prevent government personnel from performing their duties
 - Gain retribution for perceived government wrongs
- Prevent others from exercising their constitutional rights

Mitigating Conditions

- Incident occurred long ago, was minor, or happened under unusual circumstances
- Unaware of illegal, treasonous, or seditious activities
- Did not intend to engage in violence or illegal activities or to incite others
- Only involved for an official purpose
- Only involved for a short time, due to curiosity or academic interest

Lesson 6: Conducting Interim CAC Reviews

Introduction

5. Objective

You have learned about the steps in the HSPD-12 process, how to read an individual's application materials, the results of the criminal background check, and the results of the investigation; as well as how to apply the CAC credentialing standards.

Now you will review how to make a determination at the interim CAC review phase, and you will practice making these determinations. Here is the lesson objective. Take a moment to review it.

Lesson Objective:

- Identify the purpose of and requirements for interim CAC issuance pending completion of background investigation

Interim CAC Review Process

14. Review of Steps

As you'll remember, the interim CAC review phase allows issuance of a CAC before the background investigation is complete. The four steps in this phase include verifying that the investigation is scheduled, receiving the results of the FBI National Criminal History Report, applying the HSPD-12 credentialing standards, and making an interim determination. When a favorable determination is made, the applicant must present two identity source documents, at least one of which is a valid Federal or State government-issued picture identification. This identity proofing is done at the DEERS/RAPIDS station prior to receiving a CAC.

15. Inputs to the Interim CAC Review

As you have learned, you will review the OF-306, the SF-85, or the SF-85P or SF-86, depending on the position held or being sought, and the FBI National Criminal History Report, to make an interim credentialing determination for U.S. nationals only.

Remember, foreign nationals are only eligible for consideration for a CAC at the final determination phase, after the full background investigation has been conducted. Although you must read the forms completely, there are a couple of items you should focus on at this phase.

On the OF-306, pay special attention to questions 9 through 13, which contain the applicant's background information. On the SF-85, pay attention to the applicant's answer to question 14, which concerns illegal drug use.

Remember, the FBI Criminal History Report shows the results of the fingerprint check which reveals whether the applicant has a criminal history record in the FBI database. This check is initiated by DCSA, the DOD's Investigative Service Provider, or ISP.

When reviewing these forms, you should compare them against one another and look for inconsistencies or evidence of fraudulent statements.

a. FBI Criminal History Report Results

- FBI Terrorist Screening Database searched
- Applicant's claimed identity verified
- Results
 - Record
 - Fingerprints match; arrest record
 - No Record or No Pertinent Data
 - No prior arrest data
 - Unclassifiable
 - No determination if criminal history record exists
 - Delay interim CAC determination until
 - New fingerprint results
 - Results of National Agency Check (NAC)

16. Apply HSPD-12 Standards and Make Determination

Next you apply the HSPD-12 standards to the information you have received so far. First, identify any presumptively disqualifying information regarding the applicant. Look for any information about the applicant that may indicate that he or she should not receive a CAC until a full investigation is completed. Apply the HSPD-12 basic standards and, if applicable, the supplemental standards to the facts you discover in your review.

Based on the information contained in these documents, you will make one of two determinations. If you find no issues of concern, or discover information that mitigates any issues you do find, you will make a favorable determination. Alternately, if you find issues of concern and information relating to those concerns that are presumptively disqualifying, you will make an unfavorable determination. If the interim determination is favorable, then the applicant will receive a CAC while the background investigation is underway. If the interim determination is unfavorable, then the determination about the applicant's CAC will be deferred until the full investigation has been completed.

You will now have the opportunity to review information for three sample applicants and make your own interim CAC determinations.

Basic - HSPD-12 Basic Standards

- Terrorism
- Problems with identity verification

- Fraudulent identify information
- Unauthorized access concerns
- Unlawful or inappropriate use of identity credentials
- Unlawful, unauthorized, or inappropriate use, modification, corruption, or destruction of federally-controlled information systems

Supplemental, if applicable - HSPD-12 Supplemental Standards

- Misconduct or negligence in employment
- Criminal or dishonest conduct
- Material, intentional false statement, deception or fraud in connection with Federal or contract employment
- Alcohol abuse
- Drug use
- Statutory or regulatory bar
- Treasonous acts or activities

Capstone Activity

1. Activity Introduction

Now you will review the applications and FBI National Criminal History Reports for three applicants. For each case, you will apply the HSPD-12 credentialing standards to make a determination for CAC issuance at the interim stage. For purposes of this activity, assume basic and supplemental standards must be applied to all cases.

This lesson features documents to help you complete your review. To access these documents, visit the Lesson 5 section of the Student Guides menu. Each document will open in a separate window as a PDF that you may leave open during your review or print out to have at your desk.

You also have access to the HSPD-12 credentialing standards to help you evaluate the facts in each package. To open this tool, select HSPD-12 Standards. Finally, from every case study, you will be able to open an electronic copy of the DOD Instruction 5200.46, the DOD Investigative and Adjudicative Guidance for Issuing the Common Access Card. These features will help you as you review the case studies to make your interim determinations.

Case Study 1

Now decide whether Ms. Eriksen may be issued a CAC based on the facts in her application and FBI National Criminal History Report by selecting Case Study 1 from the Student Guides menu under Lesson 5. Make your selection, then check your answer on the next page.

What action would you take?

- Make a favorable determination for interim CAC issuance

- Make an unfavorable determination pending results of the investigation

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer: Case Study 1

What action would you take?

- Make a favorable determination for interim CAC issuance (correct answer)
- Make an unfavorable determination pending results of the investigation

Based on the facts in her application and National Criminal History Report, Ms. Eriksen may receive a CAC at the interim stage.

The FBI Criminal History Report shows that Ms. Eriksen was arrested and convicted of larceny. This issue falls under Supplemental Standard 2, Criminal or Dishonest conduct. While criminal behavior is serious, the incident occurred long ago. In addition, she admitted fault, served out her sentence of probation and community service, and has had no further arrests. These factors mitigate the concern.

Based on these facts, Ms. Eriksen may receive an interim CAC while her investigation is conducted.

Case Study 2

Now decide whether Mr. Weasel may be issued a CAC based on the facts in his application and FBI National Criminal History Report by selecting Case Study 2 from the Student Guides menu under Lesson 5. Make your selection, and then check your answer.

What action would you take?

- Make a favorable determination for interim CAC issuance
- Make an unfavorable determination pending results of the investigation

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer: Case Study 2

What action would you take?

- Make a favorable determination for interim CAC issuance
- Make an unfavorable determination pending results of the investigation (correct answer)

Based on the facts in his application and National Criminal History Report, Mr. Weasel must not receive a CAC.

The FBI Criminal History Report shows that Mr. Weasel was arrested for a DUI five years ago and was subsequently convicted of this offense. On his OF-306, however, Mr. Weasel indicated that he had not been convicted of any crime during the past seven years, which is an omission or concealment of relevant facts. This issue falls under Supplemental Standard 2, Criminal Conduct, and Supplemental Standard 4, Alcohol Abuse, as well as Supplemental Standard 3, Material or Intentional False Statement in Conjunction with Federal or Contract Employment. Although Mr. Weasel's arrest and conviction occurred several years ago, so could otherwise be mitigated, his omission of this information on his application disqualifies him, pending the results of his investigation.

Based on these facts, Mr. Weasel must not be issued a CAC at the interim stage.

Case Study 3

Now decide whether Ms. Fox may be issued a CAC based on the facts in her application and FBI National Criminal History Report by selecting Case Study 3 from the Student Guides menu under Lesson 5. Make your selection, then check your answer.

What action would you take?

- Make a favorable determination for interim CAC issuance
- Make an unfavorable determination pending results of the investigation

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer: Case Study 3

What action would you take?

- Make a favorable determination for interim CAC issuance (correct answer)
- Make an unfavorable determination pending results of the investigation

Based on the facts in her application and the results of the FBI Criminal History Report, Ms. Fox may receive a CAC at the interim stage.

Her application does not reveal any concerns, and the results of the FBI Criminal History Report show that she does not have a criminal record. There are no issues of concern to prevent issuance of the CAC at the interim stage.

Based on these facts, Ms. Fox may receive a CAC while her investigation is conducted.

Conclusion

4. Lesson Summary

This lesson asked you to review sample applications and Criminal History Reports and apply the HSPD-12 credentialing standards to make interim determinations regarding CAC issuance.

Lesson 7: Making the Final HSPD-12 Determination

Introduction

6. Objective

You have learned all about HSPD-12 adjudications, including the process and the credentialing standards by which adjudicators make determinations. You have conducted interim CAC reviews.

Now you are ready to practice making final credentialing determinations. The basic and supplemental credentialing standards will be applied throughout this lesson. Here is the lesson objective. Take a moment to review it.

Lesson Objective:

- Apply the HSPD-12 basic and supplemental standards to scenarios that present potentially disqualifying information.

Adjudication Process

17. Review of Steps

You have learned about each phase of the HSPD-12 process in detail. In this lesson you will be making final HSPD-12 CAC determinations for a series of applicants. By this point, the investigation is complete, and you are ready to review the report of investigation (ROI) and apply the HSPD-12 credentialing standards to make a final determination. What is the process for making this determination?

Let's review the Adjudication phase. As you'll remember, the four steps in this phase include applying the HSPD-12 standards to the ROI, making the CAC determination by identifying issues of concern and determining whether those issues can be mitigated, initiating due process proceedings, if applicable, and recording the final determination.

18. Inputs to the Final Determination

As you have learned, you will review the ROI to make a final credentialing determination.

The ROI contains the applicant's OF-306, or the equivalent for contractors, and SF-85, along with the results of the investigation. The first page of the ROI is the Case Closing Transmittal. Assuming a Tier 1 investigation was conducted, the ROI will contain the results of the national agency check and any local checks, including the FBI National Criminal History Report, as well as the results of the written inquiries, such as details about education and employment.

You will consider all of the information contained within these documents to make a final determination for CAC issuance.

19. Apply HSPD-12 Standards to Report of Investigation

Now that you have received the ROI, you are ready to apply the HSPD-12 standards to the information contained within it. What information should you look for? What questions should you ask?

As you review the ROI, look for specific information that relates to the concerns described by each of the CAC credentialing standards. Ask yourself: “Are there any concerns? Is this information potentially disqualifying? Is there any information that mitigates the concern?”

Based on the information contained in the ROI, you will make one of two determinations. The determination will be favorable unless a disqualifying factor under the basic CAC credentialing standards is substantiated and cannot be mitigated, or when the derogatory information or conduct relating to an HSPD-12 CAC credentialing standard presents an unacceptable risk for the U.S. Government. In other words, if you find no issues of concern, or discover information that mitigates any issues you do find, you will make a favorable determination. Alternately, if you find issues of concern and information relating to those concerns that is disqualifying and is not mitigated, you will make an unfavorable determination. If the determination is favorable, then the applicant may be further processed for a CAC, or retain the one that had been issued based on the interim CAC review.

If the determination is unfavorable, and the applicant provides no further mitigating information, then the applicant will be issued a letter of intent to deny or revoke the CAC. If the applicant does not respond to the letter within the allotted time, the determination becomes final.

If the applicant does respond within the allotted time, and the adjudicator makes a favorable determination, the applicant may receive or retain the CAC. If the adjudicator makes an unfavorable determination, then the applicant may begin due process proceedings.

You will now have the opportunity to review sample ROIs and make your own determinations.

Basic - HSPD-12 Basic Standards

- Terrorism
- Problems with identity verification
- Fraudulent identity information
- Unauthorized access concerns
- Unlawful or inappropriate use of identity credentials
- Unlawful, unauthorized, or inappropriate use, modification, corruption, or destruction of federally controlled information systems

Supplemental, if applicable

- HSPD-12 Supplemental Standards
- Misconduct or negligence in employment
- Criminal or dishonest conduct
- Material, intentional false statement, deception or fraud in connection with federal or contract employment
- Alcohol abuse
- Drug use
- Statutory or regulatory bar
- Treasonous acts or activities

Capstone Activity

2. Activity Introduction

Now you will review the reports of investigation for three applicants. For each case, you will apply the HSPD-12 credentialing standards to make a determination for CAC issuance. For purposes of this activity, assume basic and supplemental standards must be applied to all cases.

This lesson features documents to help you complete your review. To access these documents, visit the Lesson 6 section of the Student Guides menu. Each document will open in a separate window as a PDF that you may leave open during your review or print out to have at your desk.

The entire case file can be accessed by selecting the appropriate Case Study from the Menu. Additionally you will have access to a PDF reviewing the HSPD-12 Credentialing Standards and an electronic copy of the DOD Instruction 5200.46, the DOD Investigative and Adjudicative Guidance for Issuing the Common Access Card. This feature will help you as you review the case studies to make your final determinations.

Case Study 1

Now decide whether Mr. Wolf meets the basic and supplemental standards to be issued a CAC based on the facts in the investigation package. To view the package, select Case Study 1 from the Student Guides menu under Lesson 6. Make your selection, then check your answer on the next page.

What action would you take?

- Make a favorable determination for CAC issuance
- Make an unfavorable determination for CAC denial/revocation

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer: Case Study 1

What action would you take?

- Make a favorable determination for CAC issuance
- Make an unfavorable determination for CAC denial/revocation (correct answer)

Based on the facts in the ROI, Mr. Wolf must not receive a CAC.

The investigation into Mr. Wolf's employment records shows that he was terminated for behavior and conduct reasons involving the use and downloading of unauthorized software and connection of a personal computer to the company system. This issue falls under Basic Standard 6, unlawful, unauthorized, or inappropriate use, modification, corruption, or destruction of federally-controlled information systems, as well as Supplemental Standard 1, misconduct or negligence in employment.

The behavior was recent and occurred frequently. He was warned and provided with additional training, and he still did not make a prompt, good-faith effort to correct the behavior. The facts of the case do not indicate any mitigating information.

There is a reasonable basis to believe Mr. Wolf will use Federally-controlled information systems unlawfully, make unauthorized modifications to such systems, corrupt or destroy such systems, or engage in inappropriate use of such systems. There is also a reasonable basis to believe, based on the individual's misconduct or negligence in employment, that issuance of a CAC poses an unacceptable risk.

Based on these facts, Mr. Wolf does not meet the credentialing standards and, therefore, you should make an unfavorable determination and issue a letter of intent to deny.

Case Study 2

You will remember Ms. Eriksen's name from the interim CAC review. At that time you decided to issue her a CAC. Now decide whether Ms. Eriksen meets the basic and supplemental standards to retain her CAC based on the results of the investigation. Select Case Study 2 from the Student Guides menu under Lesson 6. Make your selection, then check your answer on the next page.

What action would you take?

- Make a favorable determination for CAC issuance
- Make an unfavorable determination for CAC denial/revocation

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer: Case Study 2

What action would you take?

- Make a favorable determination for CAC issuance (correct answer)
- Make an unfavorable determination for CAC denial/revocation

At the interim CAC review, Ms. Eriksen was issued a CAC. Based on the facts in her subsequent ROI, Ms. Eriksen may retain her CAC.

The investigation confirmed the information Ms. Eriksen provided about her criminal history on the OF-306. She was arrested and convicted of larceny. This issue falls under Supplemental Standard 2, Criminal or Dishonest Conduct. While criminal behavior is serious, the incident occurred long ago. In addition, she admitted fault, served out her sentence of probation and community service, and has had no further arrests. These factors mitigate the concern.

Based on these facts, Ms. Eriksen meets the credentialing standards and may retain her CAC.

Case Study 3

You will remember Ms. Fox's name from the interim CAC review. At that time you decided to issue her a CAC. Now decide whether Ms. Fox meets the basic and supplemental standards to retain her CAC based on the results of the investigation. Select Case Study 3 from the Student Guides menu under Lesson 6. Make your selection, then check your answer on the next page.

What action would you take?

- Make a favorable determination for CAC issuance
- Make an unfavorable determination for CAC denial/revocation

DO NOT PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE SELECTED YOUR RESPONSE.

Answer: Case Study 3

What action would you take?

- Make a favorable determination for CAC issuance
- Make an unfavorable determination for CAC denial/revocation (correct answer)

Based on the facts in her ROI, Ms. Fox does not meet the credentialing standards.

The investigation into Ms. Fox's employment history shows that she is on probation with her current employer for consuming alcohol while on the job. This issue falls under Supplemental Standard 1, Misconduct or Negligence in Employment, and Supplemental Standard 4, Alcohol Abuse. This behavior happened recently, and there is no indication of any current rehabilitation.

Based on these facts, Ms. Fox does not meet the credentialing standards and, therefore, you should make an unfavorable determination and issue a letter of intent to revoke.

Next Steps

5. Writing the Letter of Intent to Deny or Revoke

So, what do you do after you make a credentialing determination? If the determination is favorable, you must record your determination in OPM's Central Verification System and in local records authorizing issuance of the CAC.

On the other hand, if you make an unfavorable determination, you must write a letter of intent to deny or revoke to send to the applicant. This letter will vary depending on the Component issuing it. The letter must contain a written statement explaining the reasoning behind the determination, identifying the disqualifying conditions, citing the relevant credentialing standards, and describing the supporting information for the concerns found by the investigation. The letter should also contain instructions for responding to the unfavorable determination and copies of the relevant credentialing standards. The letter of intent to deny or revoke should be as comprehensive and detailed as possible. Let's look at the letter of intent to deny that will be written to Mr. Wolf, whose ROI you reviewed earlier in this lesson.

First is the summary of concerns. In Mr. Wolf's case these are Basic Standard 6 and Supplemental Standard 1. Next, the letter details the disqualifying conditions for the relevant credentialing standards. Mr. Wolf's employment history investigation revealed the disqualifying conditions. The letter will detail the specific information supporting these conditions.

Next the letter will detail the steps the applicant can take in order to explain or change the determination. The applicant has thirty days after receipt of the letter of intent to deny to respond with any additional pertinent information before the unfavorable determination becomes finalized. If your determination is still unfavorable after receiving any additional information provided by the applicant, your decision will be to deny the CAC. The applicant will be informed and advised of the right to appeal, and of the manner and timeframe in which to submit an appeal.

Sample Letter of Intent to Deny

Subject: Denial of Common Access Card (CAC)

A tentative determination has been made to deny you issuance of a CAC based on disqualifying information falling under the DOD Instruction: DOD Investigative and Adjudicative Guidance for Issuing the Common Access Card.

Summary of concerns:

Information from an investigation of your personal history has led to this unfavorable determination. Your T1 investigation completed 01 September, 2012, specifically the Investigative Request for Employment Data and Supervisor Information, revealed past misconduct in the workplace and misuse of information systems.

These issues fall under the following HSPD-12 Credentialing Standards, as documented in the DOD CAC Instruction:

- Basic Standard 6: Unlawful, Unauthorized, or Inappropriate Use, Modification, Corruption, or Destruction of Federally-Controlled Information Systems.
- Supplemental Standard 1: Misconduct or Negligence in Employment

Attached please find a copy of the list of HSPD-12 Credentialing Standards.

Disqualifying conditions:

These issues are disqualifying based on the following factors:

- Your unauthorized use of an information technology system and unauthorized downloading of software
- A history of intentional wrongdoing on the job and pattern of workplace rules violation
- The repeated nature of the behavior and failure to take make a good faith effort to correct the behavior, even after receiving remedial training

Supporting Information:

Your T1 investigation revealed the following information: Misconduct and misuse at Global Networks Company. Terminated on 1/08/12 for failure to follow company rules and regulations and inappropriate and unauthorized use of IT systems.

- 1/8/12: Downloaded unauthorized software resulting in network failure. Terminated for cause.
- 11/21/11: Downloaded unauthorized software. Received written reprimand and remedial training.
- 9/9/11: Downloaded unauthorized software. Received written reprimand.
- 6/11/12: Unauthorized connection of personal computer to computer network. Received written reprimand and remedial training regarding rules and regulations for use of IT systems.

Instructions for Responding:

You have the right to challenge this Letter of Denial by responding in writing with any information or explanation that you think should be considered in reaching a final CAC determination. Your response must be received within 30 business days of receipt of this letter and submitted to:

Fort Bravo Security Office
100 Main Street
Anywhere, MD

If no response is received, our tentative determination will become final.

Your point of contact regarding this determination is Robert Jones at 555-555-5555 or robert.jones@fortbravo.mil.

Sincerely,
Robert Jones
Fort Bravo Security Office

Conclusion

1. Lesson Summary

This lesson asked you to review sample ROIs and apply the HSPD-12 credentialing standards to make final determinations regarding CAC issuance. You reviewed the steps that follow making the determination, including recording the determination if favorable or recommending revocation or denial of the CAC if an unfavorable determination is made. You also learned about the contents of a letter of intent to deny or revoke and had a brief review of due process.

Course Conclusion

Course Conclusion

7. Course Summary

During this course you learned the purpose of the HSPD-12 adjudications and the role it plays in ensuring that personnel do not provide an avenue for terrorism or pose an unacceptable risk to DOD assets. You learned about the HSPD-12 process and the activities involved in each phase of the process. You also explored the various inputs to the HSPD-12 adjudication and then learned how to use the HSPD-12 credentialing standards to make determinations for issuance of a CAC. Finally, you applied what you learned to realistic scenarios to make interim and final CAC determinations, just as you will in the real world.

8. Lesson Review

Course Overview

Lesson 1: Overview of HSPD-12 Credentialing

Lesson 2: The HSPD-12 Process

Lesson 3: Inputs to the HSPD-12 Adjudication

Lesson 4: HSPD-12 Credentialing Standards

Lesson 5: Conducting Interim CAC Reviews

Lesson 6: Making the Final HSPD-12 Determination

Course Conclusion

Pop-up text:

Lesson 1: Overview of HSPD-12 Credentialing:

Purpose and definition - Adjudication is the evaluation of reliable and relevant information to determine—

- Eligibility to access classified information or perform sensitive duties
 - Suitability or fitness for Federal employment
 - Eligibility to access DOD facilities or information systems
- The purpose of adjudication is to ensure that all DOD employees are loyal, trustworthy, and of good conduct.

Types of adjudications

- National security adjudications
- Suitability or fitness adjudications
- HSPD-12 adjudications

Relationship between adjudications

- Each type of adjudication has distinct purposes and criteria
- HSPD-12 adjudications are based on a minimum level of risk and sensitivity
- If an applicant requires an employment or national security determination, then HSPD-12 adjudication is inherent in either of those determinations

Purpose - Ensure that all individuals granted a CAC—

- Are not known or appropriately suspected terrorists and do not provide an avenue for terrorism
- Do not pose an unacceptable risk to DOD assets

Regulatory Foundations

- HSPD-12
- OMB M-05-24
- FIPS 201-1
- OPM Memorandum: Final Credentialing Standards for Issuing Personal Identity Verification Cards under HSPD-12
- DODI 5200.46

Lesson 2: The HSPD-12 Process:

Pre-investigation

- Determine requirement for CAC
- Identity proofing and registration
- Initiation of investigation
 - Check for previous investigations
 - Initiate application
 - Collect fingerprints
 - Submit application to ISP

Interim CAC Review

- Verify investigation is scheduled
- Receive FBI National Criminal History Report
- Apply HSPD-12 credentialing standards
- Make interim CAC credentialing determination

Investigation

- Gathering of information on the subject's background to meet the investigative requirements for obtaining a CAC
- Tier 1 or greater required for HSPD-12

Adjudication

- Apply HSPD-12 credentialing standards to investigative results
- Make final CAC credentialing determination
- Hold due process proceedings (if applicable)
- Record the final determination

Applicant

- Provide identification
- Complete application online
- Have fingerprints taken
- In-person visit to card issuing facility to receive CAC

Component Adjudicator

- Review applications and background investigations
- Apply HSPD-12 credentialing standards
- Make HSPD-12 interim decisions
- Make final credentialing determination if CAF Adjudicator is unable to make a favorable decision

CAF Adjudicator

- Review applications and conduct initial review of background investigations
- Apply HSPD-12 credentialing standards
- Return case to Component Adjudicator for final decision, if unable to make favorable determination

ISP - Investigative service provider

- In most cases, DCSA
- Conduct investigation
- Provide results to component

DOD Card Issuance Facility

- Use of DEERS/RAPIDS
- Conduct identity proofing and registration
- Issue CACs

e-QIP - Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing, or subsequent electronic version

- Automates application process

CVS - Central Verification System

- Owned and managed by OPM
- Stores information on investigations and adjudications
- Key to ensuring reciprocity

DISS - Defense Information System for Security

- Securely connects DOD security personnel around the world
- Stores national security, Suitability, and HSPD-12 adjudicative actions and determinations
- Contains a shell indicating whether investigation has been scheduled
- Will interface with DEERS/RAPIDS

DEERS/RAPIDS - Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System, Real-time Automated Personnel Identification System

- DEERS: definitive data source of DOD personnel identity verification
- RAPIDS: used to verify identity and issue the CAC
 - Used to verify identity and issue the CAC
 - In the future, will interface with DISS

Lesson 3: Inputs to the HSPD-12 Adjudication:

Investigative Forms:

Contents of OF-306

- Biographical information
- Selective Service and military history
- Background information
- Additional questions/continuation space

e-QIP forms, or subsequent electronic version,

- Basis for the investigation
- Applicant completes SF-85, SF-85P or SF-86, depending on position held or being sought
- Applicant completes
 - Form in e-QIP, or subsequent electronic version, OR
 - Paper-based version of form
 - Contains biographical and other information important to adjudication process

National Criminal History Report rollover text:

Overview of National Criminal History Report

- Generated by FBI
- Entire report must be read since HSPD-12 adjudication decision affects
 - Risk to DOD assets
 - Applicant's ability to gain employment

- DCSA Case Closing Transmittal Sheet attached
- Components include:
 - Cover Sheet and FBI Identification Record
 - Arrest information

HSPD-12 Investigations rollover text:

- Tier 1 is the minimum investigation required to be issued a CAC. It contains database checks and written inquiries
- The investigation includes the following types of checks:
 - Security and Suitability Investigations Index (SII) - Investigations previously conducted by OPM or other non-DOD Federal investigative agencies
 - Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) - Investigations previously conducted by DOD
 - FBI National Criminal History Check – checks on criminal history
 - Social Security Administration, military service, and terrorist databases
 - Local Agency Checks – Checks on history with law enforcement agencies covering applicant's employment, residence, and education
- The investigation includes written inquiries, regarding the applicant's employment history and educational history

Report of Investigation rollover text:

The Report of Investigation (ROI) contains the results of the investigation. The ROI is comprised of:

- The Case Closing Transmittal is the cover sheet and provides a summary of the results of the investigation.
- Optional Form 306 (Declaration for Federal Employment)
- Standard Form 85 (Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions) is used to apply for a CAC.
- FBI National Criminal History Report
If there are any issues with the results of the investigation, such as with any of the checks or written inquiries, the supporting documentation is included in the ROI

Lesson 4: HSPD-12 Credentialing Standards:

Basic Standard 1: Terrorism

Concern: A CAC will not be issued to a person who is known to be or reasonably suspected of being a terrorist.

Basic Standard 2:

Problems with Identity Verification

Concern: A CAC will not be issued if an employer is unable to verify the individual's claimed identity.

Basic Standard 3: Fraudulent Identity Information

Concern: A CAC will not be issued if there is a reasonable basis to believe the individual has submitted fraudulent information concerning his or her identity.

Basic Standard 4: Unauthorized Access Concerns

Concern: A CAC will not be issued if there is a reasonable basis to believe the individual will attempt to gain unauthorized access to classified documents, information protected by the Privacy Act, information that is proprietary in nature, or other sensitive or protected information.

Basic Standard 5: Unauthorized Unlawful or Inappropriate Use of Identity Credentials

Concern: A CAC will not be issued if there is a reasonable basis to believe the individual will use an identity credential outside the workplace unlawfully or inappropriately.

Basic Standard 6: Modification, Corruption, or Destruction of Federally Controlled Information Systems

Concern: A CAC will not be issued if there is a reasonable basis to believe the individual will use federally controlled information systems unlawfully, make unauthorized modifications to such systems, corrupt or destroy such systems, or engage in inappropriate uses of such systems.

Supplemental Standard 1: Misconduct or Negligence in Employment

Concern: A CAC will not be issued if there is a reasonable basis to believe based on the individual's misconduct or negligence in employment, that issuance of a CAC poses an unacceptable risk.

Supplemental Standard 2: Criminal or Dishonest Conduct

Concern: A CAC will not be issued if there is a reasonable basis to believe based on the individual's criminal or dishonest conduct, that issuance of a CAC poses an unacceptable risk.

Supplemental Standard 3:**Deception or Fraud in Connection with Federal or Contract Employment**

Concern: A CAC will not be issued if there is a reasonable basis to believe based on the individual's material, intentional, false statement, deception, or fraud in connection with Federal or contract employment that issuance of a CAC poses an unacceptable risk.

Supplemental Standard 4: Alcohol Abuse

Concern: A CAC will not be issued if there is a reasonable basis to believe based on the individual's alcohol abuse without evidence of substantial rehabilitation, that issuance of a CAC poses an unacceptable risk.

Supplemental Standard 5: Drug Abuse

Concern: A CAC will not be issued if there is a reasonable basis to believe based on the nature or duration of the individual's illegal use of narcotics, drugs, or other controlled substances without evidence of substantial rehabilitation, that issuance of a CAC poses an unacceptable risk.

Supplemental Standard 6: Statutory or Regulatory Bar

Concern: A CAC will not be issued if a statutory or regulatory bar prevents the individual's contract employment, or would prevent Federal employment under circumstances that furnish a reasonable basis to believe that issuance of a CAC poses an unacceptable risk.

Supplemental Standard 7: Treasonous Acts or Activities

Concern: A CAC will not be issued if an individual has knowingly and willfully engaged in acts or activities designed to overthrow the U.S. Government by force.

Lesson 5: Conducting Interim CAC Reviews:

CHR - Criminal History Report

OF-306 - Optional Form 306, Declaration for Federal Employment

SF-85 - Standard Form 85, Questionnaire for Non-sensitive Positions

Lesson 6: Making the Final HSPD-12 Determination:

- Summary of concerns
 - Disqualifying conditions
 - Relevant guidelines
 - Supporting information
- Instructions for responding

9. Course Objectives

Congratulations. You have completed the Introduction to DOD HSPD-12 CAC Credentialing course.

You should now be able to perform all of the listed activities:

- ✓ Identify the purpose of HSPD-12 adjudications
- ✓ Identify the basic steps in the HSPD-12 process
- ✓ Identify the purpose of and requirements for interim CAC review pending completion of background investigation
- ✓ Identify the HSPD-12 investigative requirements and process
- ✓ Apply the HSPD-12 basic and, if applicable, supplemental standards to scenarios that present potentially disqualifying information
- ✓ Identify the process for handling unfavorable determinations
- ✓ Identify the requirements for recording the final adjudicative determination

To receive course credit, you must take the **Introduction to DOD HSPD-12 CAC Credentialing** examination. Please use the STEPP system from the Center for Development of Security Excellence to register for the online exam.