

NDC Physical Security Plan

Overview/Description:

This is the physical security plan (PSP) for a fictional installation, the National Defense Center (NDC). In addition to the five sections common to a PSP, this plan also includes a sixth section - annexes and maps of the NDC and its key facilities.

Approach:

As the Physical Security Manager for the NDC, you will use this document as a reference in completing practical activities and exercises.

Facility Profile:

The NDC is a Department of Defense (DOD) Installation which has 4,500 employees and includes a variety of assets: chemical, nuclear, and conventional weapons storage areas. In addition, the NDC hosts several organizations who conduct classified missions for the government and DOD. This involves the storage, processing and protection of classified national security information (NSI). It is paramount to the NDC that the PSP maintains a degree of flexibility, so it can be modified and updated on a regular basis adjusting to changes to the threats and mission. Physical security planning is led by the Director of Law Enforcement and Physical Security (DLEPS), who serves as the NDC Physical Security Officer.

Note:

This is a sample PSP, and does not contain references to component specific regulations. For training purpose, “in accordance with (IAW) governing regulations” is substituted.

Physical Security Plan for the National Defense Center

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Map Reference

Copy No. _____

NATIONAL DEFENSE CENTER

Linthicum, Maryland 21090

Date of Issue

Physical Security Plan

1. Purpose/Executive Summary.

- A. Execute the national security mission of the National Defense Center (NDC) through aggressive security posturing during implementation of elevated Force Protection Condition (FPCON) measures. Institute well planned and implemented physical security measures to protect the critical assets, population and operations of the NDC, ensuring tactical and strategic mission operations continue unimpeded by threats to the operating environment.
- B. The mission of the NDC is to conduct nuclear deterrence as part of the Northern Command strategic nuclear shield. Conduct chemical munitions reconstitution, testing and destruction. Execute national and command Research, Training and Development, Testing and Evaluation of National Security programs in partnership with Industry. Conduct support operations relative to those tactical and strategic missions described previously. The NDC is a Department of Defense (DOD) Installation located 50 miles west of the Washington-Baltimore corridor. There are a number of DOD agencies and components operating at the NDC as well as several contractor corporations and companies. There are major tenant units subordinate under security operations to the NDC commander. These tenants report to and are part of the NDC Commander's security working groups.

2. Responsibilities.

- A. The NDC Commander or designated representative will chair the NDC Force Protection Council. The Deputy Director will chair the Installation Physical Security Council.
 - (a) The NDC Commander (IC) will:
 - 1) Designate and approve restricted areas on the NDC.
 - 2) Designate and categorize the NDC Mission Essential/Vulnerable Areas (MEVA).
 - (b) The NDC Commander will provide support to NDC agency and tenant units in the areas below unless mutually agreed otherwise:
 - 1) Law enforcement patrols, criminal investigative services, physical security, information security, personnel security, industrial security, foreign disclosure, operations security (OPSEC), crime prevention, and GSA Approved Safe and Vault technician support.
 - 2) Installation, response, and maintenance of IDS.
 - 3) Programming, budgeting, and funding for physical security support, including site-surveys, maintenance, and purchase of physical security equipment. Purchase

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of equipment will be at the discretion of the NDC Commander and Director of Security, Training and Operations.

- 4) Monitoring and response to electronic security equipment when not within the tenant activity's capability. Cybersecurity oversight to physical security (NIPRNET, SIPRNET).

B. Director of Security, Training and Operations (DSTO) will:

- 1) Manage and oversee security operations to include recommending budget and resource allocations to the NDC Commander for Installation security projects. Recommend designation of restricted and mission essential vulnerability areas to the NDC Commander. Coordinate annual antiterrorism and physical security risk assessments and make risk management recommendations to the NDC Commander. Coordinate all NDC security programs to ensure asset identification and protection against relevant threats to the operating environment.
- 2) Co-chair the NDC Force Protection and Physical Security Councils. Make recommendations to the NDC Commander regarding threats to the NDC and appropriate security countermeasures.
- 3) Support the Director of Law Enforcement and Physical Security (DLEPS) to integrate physical security requirements into plans and orders where applicable.
- 4) In coordination with the DLEPS and the Director of Resource Management (DRM), provide appropriate resources to fund physical security projects for physical security equipment and maintenance of existing contracts.

C. Director of Resource Management (DRM) will:

- 1) Request and manage all Antiterrorism/Force Protection and Physical Security funds.
- 2) Ensure that the DSTO is informed concerning the disposition of all security related budgeting funds and maintenance contracts.

D. The Director of Law Enforcement and Physical Security (DLEPS) will:

- 1) Serve as NDC Physical Security Officer.
- 2) Establish, implement, and manage the NDC Physical Security Program.
- 3) Develop and implement the NDC Physical Security Plan.
- 4) Develop criteria for the request, purchasing and implementation of physical security equipment and measures on the NDC.
- 5) Identify and manage physical security equipment requirements and programs.
- 6) Advise and assist commanders in planning and implementing agency and tenant physical security plans, programs and measures.
- 7) Advise the DSTO and NDC Commander on all physical security matters impacting the mission of the NDC. Advise the DSTO and NDC Commander of the following physical security programs: NDC asset protective measures, facility security, training, circulation control-exit/entry of personnel and vehicles onto/off the installation and its security areas. NDC barrier plans and clear zones, security lighting, intrusion detection systems (IDSs), Access Control Systems (ACS), Closed Circuit Television systems (CCTV) and crime prevention programs.

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- 8) Manage the DLEPS physical security office organized to evaluate, implement and exercise NDC physical security plans.
 - 9) Oversee physical security inspections, oversight, and surveys on mission essential vulnerable areas and facilities.
 - 10) Oversee implementation of the NDC physical security budget, to include market analysis, purchasing, implementing and maintenance of contracts.
 - 11) Provide guidance to agency and tenant unit commanders by conducting Staff Assist Visits (SAV) and risk management analysis.
 - 12) Manage the equip contract guard force personnel.

E. NDC Physical Security Manager will:

- 1) Manage the NDC Physical Security program for the DLEPS.
- 2) Coordinate and facilitate the Physical Security Council and Force Protection Council.
- 3) Coordinate physical security plans with agency and tenant unit security managers.
- 4) Conduct annual physical security inspections and risk management analysis of all NDC security programs and assets. Complete report and coordinate responses with the DLEPS and agency and tenant unit security managers.
- 5) Author and maintain the NDC physical security plan (PSP).
- 6) Represent the DLEPS on the NDC Threat Working Group. Update physical security plan and coordinate changes with the DLEPS.
- 7) Coordinate physical security measures, to include barrier plans during normal and increased FPCONs.
- 8) Coordinate with DPW and contractors to install and maintain physical security equipment such as; IDS, (CCTV), ACS, barrier systems and other equipment associated with physical security.
- 9) Conduct agency and unit security manager training; maintain a list of current security managers.

F. Director of Public Works (DPW includes Installation Civil Engineering Office) will:

- 1) Attend NDC Force Protection and Physical Security Councils.
- 2) Establish guidance for the design, maintenance, and repair of all physical security equipment, specifically, IDS, ACS, and CCTV.
- 3) Ensure that operation and maintenance funds are programmed to support the IDS program, designed by the Physical Security Officer, in coordination with the Director of Public Works (DPW), Director of Resource Management (DRM), and Director of Information Management.
- 4) Review IDS contractor maintenance documentation for technical adequacy.
- 5) Furnish the Physical Security Officer with an annual IDS forecast.
- 6) Provide for the formal training and certification of personnel participating in the NDC, maintenance, and repair of the IDS.
- 7) Provide a technically qualified engineer on the IDS, to conduct site surveys with the Physical Security Manager for all new IDS NDC requests.
- 8) Ensure that IDS projects are not approved or installed without the coordination and approval of the Physical Security Officer.

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- 9) Provide technical assistance on IDS related issues.
 - 10) Provide resources in support of barrier plan implementation and movement of static barriers during normal and increased FPCONS.
 - 11) Coordinate all proposals for new construction projects with the DLEPS.
 - 12) Support NDC agency and tenant units in maintaining physical security measures such as clear zones, fencing, lighting, power, and barrier materials.
 - 13) Maintain personnel certified as GSA Approved Safe and Vault Technicians.

G. Director of Cybersecurity (DCS) will:

- 1) Provide and maintain dedicated telephone lines and equipment, protected lines for IDS data transmission, automated information systems, networks, and computer lines (secure and unsecure).
- 2) Design the transmission subsystem to provide the maximum possible physical security of the equipment.
- 3) Upon receipt of overall IDS, computer, phone, and network design, plan and program the supporting transmission system in coordination with DPW and the DLEPS.
- 4) Conduct IDS surveys with the DLEPS and DPW.
- 5) Attend Force Protection and Physical Security Councils.

H. NDC Agencies and Tenant Unit Directors will:

- 1) Appoint a Security Manager in writing to coordinate all security issues for the organization and communicate requirements to the DLEPS. Maintain current physical security plans unique to the agency or tenant unit. Plans must be approved by the DLEPS and support the overall NDC PSP.
- 2) Attend NDC Force Protection and Physical Security Council meetings.
- 3) Identify physical security requirements and initiate requests through the DLEPS to DPW for survey and approval.
- 4) Ensure qualified maintenance personnel listed on the access roster provided by DCS and DPW are authorized access to systems.
- 5) Develop and maintain agency and tenant unit physical security plans in conjunction with the NDC physical security plan. Conduct random antiterrorism measures as directed; implement barrier and access control plans IAW the NDC PSP.
- 6) Identify critical information lists, critical assets, restricted areas, and prepare written requests through the DLEPS to the NDC Commander for approval. Coordination of resources will be addressed at the NDC Physical Security Council meetings.
- 7) Ensure that restricted area (i.e., signage, clear zones, or fencing) physical security equipment is maintained in working order and DPW notified immediately when work orders are required.

I. Antiterrorism Officer (ATO) will:

- 1) Manage the NDC or facility antiterrorism (AT) program.

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- 2) Forward to the DLEPS and the NDC Commander a copy of defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist attacks.
- 3) Coordinate physical security measure/security-in-depth plans with the DLEPS and Physical Security Manager. Ensure NDC AT Plans and the NDC PSP is cooperative and combines requirements for force protection and physical security.

3. Policies.

- A. **Area Security.** The NDC is a controlled access Installation. Security of the NDC is accomplished through implementation of the NDC PSP in concert with other NDC security plans (AT Plan, OPSEC Plan etc.). NDC Security Forces (Government employee - Law Enforcement and Security personnel), contract guards, and organization/tenant security program managers will execute the NDC security plans based on the security operating environment and FPCON based on the direction of the NDC Commander. Area security will be conducted based on the NDC PSP through the categorized listing of NDC MEVAs. NDC agency and tenant unit commanders will coordinate and obtain approval to establish other restricted or controlled areas through the DLEPS to the NDC Commander. All NDC Restricted Areas and MEVAs will be designated in writing and approved by the NDC Commander. Once approved, these areas will be identified in the NDC PSP by prioritized category of level of security.
- B. **Category I.** This security category is assigned to NDC assets for which the loss, theft, destruction, misuse or compromise would result in great harm to the strategic capability of the United States. The level of security for these assets must result in the greatest possible deterrence to hostile acts. Defensive measures will ensure a significant probability to detect and defeat a hostile force before it is able to seize, damage, or destroy resources.

CATEGORY I Assets	BLDG #	PROTECTION
Nuclear Storage Area (Exclusion Area) Hardened Structures Electric Substation #3	54 – 56 A-D 68	Fencing/Lighting IDS/CCTV Gates/Access Control 24 hour security
Chemical Storage Area (Exclusion Area) Disintegrators Electric Substation #4	51 – 53 A-D 69	Fencing/Lighting IDS/CCTV Gate/Access Control 24 hour security
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF)	19	IDS/ Access Control CCTV (Exterior entry)
NDC Headquarters and Emergency Operations Center (EOC)	19	24 hour security CCTV Giant Voice/Hotline

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C. **Category II.** This security category is assigned to NDC assets for which loss, theft, destruction, misuse or compromise would cause significant harm to the warfighting capability of the United States. The level of security for these assets must result in significant deterrence against hostile acts. Defensive measures will ensure a significant probability to detect and defeat a hostile force before it is able to seize, damage, or destroy resources.

CATEGORY II Assets	BLDG #	PROTECTION
NDC Special Security Office (SSO)	19	IDS/Access Control
Communication Security (COMSEC) vault	19	IDS/Access Control
COMSEC Repair Vault	22	IDS/Access Control
Director of Law Enforcement and Physical Security office and Primary Security Forces Control Center (SFCC)	21	CCTV and primary monitoring station (redundant connection to EOC and Alt SFCC) Enhanced 911 (e911)/Hotline
Alternate EOC and SFCC (The Alt. EOC and SFCC are considered Cat II Assets, unless activated to a primary role. When acting as the primary, these facilities become Cat I Assets.)	59	24-hour security (when activated) CCTV (alternate monitoring station) e911/Giant Voice/Hotline

D. **Category III.** This security category is assigned to NDC assets which loss, theft, destruction, misuse or compromise would cause significant harm to the warfighting capability of the United States. The level of security for these assets must result in a reasonable degree of deterrence against hostile acts. Defensive measures must be able to delay a hostile force and limit damage to resources.

CATEGORY III Assets	BLDG #	PROTECTION
Data Processing Center	23	IDS/Access Control
Communications Center	22	IDS/Access Control
Electric Substation #1	66	Fencing/Lighting Access Control
Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Storage Area (Above Ground Bunkers (AGB))	AGB A-I 70	IDS/Access Control Fencing/Gates/Lighting 24-hour security
Electric Substation #5	70	Fencing/Lighting Access Control

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E. **Category IV.** This security category is assigned to NDC assets which are considered mission support and do not fall into the categories previously addressed. Their loss, theft, destruction, misuse, or compromise would adversely affect the operational capability of the NDC. These assets are designated as controlled areas and with owner/user personnel primarily responsible for security, unless otherwise documented in the NDC PSP, or through written agreements. This level of security must reduce the opportunity for theft, of or damage to assets.

CATEGORY IV Assets	BLDG #	PROTECTION
Rainey Airfield Operations Veritable Omni Range Tower	43	Access Control/Lighting
Rainey Airfield Special Air Mission “Hangar 44”	44	Access Control/Lighting
Rainey Airfield Active Runway and Taxiway	45	Fencing/Lighting
Rainey Airfield Heli-pad	46	Fencing/Lighting
Electric Substation #2	67	Fencing/Lighting Access Control
NDC Armory (Manned 24-7)	24	IDS/CCTV/Lighting Access Control
Small Arms Storage	32	IDS
Gunsmith shop (Small arms repair)	33	Access Control
Bulk Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) Storage Area	47 – 50	Fencing/Lighting
NDC Motor Pool Operations	41	Lighting
NDC Community Hospital, e911 Dial Center, Hospital Heli-pad	7	CCTV/Access Control 24-hour security
Pharmacy-Controlled substance storage	7	IDS/CCTV/Access Control
Medical Supply Storage Warehouse	35	IDS (Controlled substance vault)
MWD Kennels/Veterinary Clinic Controlled substances storage	60	IDS/Access Control
DLEPS Criminal Investigations Branch	25	IDS/CCTV (Internal)
NDC Post Office (Mail handling room)	12	Access Control
AAFES Storage Warehouse	34	IDS

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CATEGORY IV Assets	BLDG #	PROTECTION
Telephone Exchange (Main switch node)	22	IDS/Access Control
NDC Water Treatment Plant	71	Fencing/Gates/Lighting Access Control
Water Well #1	72	
Water Well #2	73	
Water Well #3	74	
Water Well #4	75	
Water Well #5	76	
NDC Training Facility	14	IDS/CCTV/Lighting/ Access Control/Contract Security Guards
Fire Department Station #1	26	
Fire Department Station #2	58	
Fire Department Station #3	43	
Appropriated and non-appropriated funds handling facilities such as at the AAFES Exchange, Bowling Alley, etc.	8, 13, 15-16	IDS (Cash Cages only)
Commercial funds handling activities such as Banks and Credit Unions	11, 17	IDS (Cash Vaults)
NDC Child Care Center	6	Barrier system
NDC Warehouse Storage Area	28-31 36-39	Fencing/Gate 24-hour contract guards
DPW Equipment Storage Warehouses	61-64	Fencing/Gate
Electric Substation C (State substation)	65	Fencing/Gate
NDC Perimeter Boundary (legal demarcation line)		Fencing, lighting, signage, Access Control

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4. Access Control Measures.

- A. **Control measures.** The NDC Commander has established circulation controls for the NDC based on the assets contained on the installation and the vicinity of those assets to populated areas. Agency and Tenant Unit Directors/Commanders will establish internal controls within the areas of control based on the NDC PSP, AT Plans and Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) guidance. Circulation control of personnel and vehicles in and around those areas will be monitored and controlled by random antiterrorism measures (RAMs) and periodic security checks directed by the DSTO and DLEPS through the NDC Commander.
- B. All agency and tenant unit circulation control plans will be coordinated with the DLEPS through the ATO and Physical Security Manager. These plans will be exercised annually and adjustments made accordingly based on changing assets, threats and vulnerabilities.
- C. Personnel access.
- 1) Personnel access is manned by NDC Security Forces, or Contract Security Guards and control measures are imposed on movement of personnel and material entering or exiting the NDC based on the current FPCON, RAMs or directed security checks.
 - 2) NDC Specific Badge and Identification:
 - a. NDC Security badge systems:
 - i. The badge for NDC is a picture badge (NDC Form 815) with a green background. The badges are made and issued by the Pass and ID Branch of the NDC Director of Law Enforcement and Physical Security Office. Each employee must sign a receipt (NDC Form 2098) for his/her badge and is responsible for safeguarding his/her badge. If any employee loses his/her badge, the loss must be reported to the Pass and ID Branch within one working day of the discovery of the loss. Badges are reissued every two years, if more than one percent of the issued badges are lost or stolen, or if person's physical appearance changes necessitate a new badge.
 - ii. The Chemical Storage Area badge is an Unescorted badge (NDC Form 816) with a red background. The badges are made and issued to the Chemical Storage Area by the Pass and ID Branch of the DLEPS. When employees enter the Chemical Storage Area, they must exchange their NDC badge for one of the Chemical Storage Area Unescorted badges, which they must wear on their front outer garment somewhere between their waist and shoulder, and the front of the badge must be visible to other personnel at all times while in the Chemical Storage Area. When they depart the Chemical Storage Area, employees are required to return their Chemical Storage Area badge in return for their NDC badge. Loss of a Chemical Storage Area badge must be reported to Security Forces immediately upon discovery of the loss.

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- iii. The Nuclear Storage Area badge is an Escorted badge (NDC Form 817) with a blue background. The badges are made and issued to the Nuclear Storage Area by the Pass and ID Branch of the DLEPS. When employees enter the Nuclear Storage Area, they must exchange their NDC badge for one of the Nuclear Storage Area Escorted badges, which they must wear on their front outer garment somewhere between their waist and shoulder and the front of the badge must be visible to other personnel at all times while in the Nuclear Storage Area. When they depart the Nuclear Storage Area, employees are required to return their Nuclear Storage Area badge in return for their NDC badge. Loss of a Nuclear Storage Area badge must be reported to Security Forces immediately upon discovery of the loss.
 - iv. Conventional AA&E Storage Area. NDC or badged tenant organization employees requiring continuous access to the storage area will be identified on organizational Authorized Unescorted Access Rosters. These rosters will be submitted monthly to identify any additions or deletions and be routed through the DLEPS, Director of Logistics (DOL) shipping and receiving, and munitions control centers for approval. Personnel requiring one time access, including transportation personnel, will submit requests through the DLEPS, DOL shipping and receiving, and munitions control center for clearance prior to access being granted. Personnel not previously identified on a current access roster or letter will not be allowed access. During duty hours (0730-1700), all vehicles and personnel entering or leaving the boundaries of the NDC must be under the supervision of munitions personnel. No privately-owned vehicles (POVs) are allowed in the AA&E storage area without the written approval of the NDC Commander. During non-duty hours (1700-0730), only personnel on the authorized unescorted access rosters are authorized access to the storage area.
 - v. Post Office Mail Handling Room. The mail handling room is a controlled area equipped with an IDS system. Only employees of the US Postal Service have access to the room. They have also been issued an NDC Form 815 for Installation Access. Mail enters the facility through the loading dock door and is sorted and distributed to the trucks and internal mail boxes.

D. Material control.

1) Incoming.

- a. Commercial shipments: Commercial shipments by vehicle, rail, or air are controlled by the DOL, shipping and receiving office unless specific directives interdict or direct guidance is provided on a case by case basis by the NDC Commander, DSTO or DLEPS.
- b. Shipments of conventional/classified AA&E will be coordinated in advance with the DOL munitions office. These shipments will be transported on and off of the NDC through Gate #1 only, unless the cargo is to be shipped by air,

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- in which case coordinated shipments will be received at Gate #3. Classified AA&E will be handled in the same manner. Permanent or overnight storage will be in the Conventional AA&E Storage Area, with classified munitions specifically stored in AGB "A." Security Forces will check the bill of lading destination and contact the munitions office. Munitions office personnel will meet the shipment at the gate of entry and escort it to the AA&E Storage Area. Security Forces assistance will be coordinated with the DLEPS and shipments will be stopped and checked at SG3 prior to entry into the area.
- c. Nuclear and Chemical shipments will be coordinated with the NDC Commander and the receiving or shipping agency. Security requirements will be coordinated through the DSTO and DLEPS in advance and shipments will only be authorized through Gate #4 (unless another contingency occurs, then Gate #3 will be used). NDC Security Forces will assist in the security of such shipments by executing Nuclear and Chemical SOPs (Classified). Internal material control is classified and will not be addressed in this plan.
 - d. Hazardous materials: All hazardous materials shipments will be made through Gate #4 (Gate #3 if transported by air after delivery) after close coordination with the DSTO and DLEPS. Security Forces will conduct joint inspection with the delivering agent at Gate #4, where bills of lading will be checked and coordination will occur with the DOL shipping and receiving office.
 - e. Special controls on delivery of supplies and/or material shipments in restricted areas are the responsibility of the owner/user agency and will be closely coordinated with the DLEPS.
 - f. Post Office Mail Room: Incoming mail arrives by USPS transport vehicles through Gate #1 and is delivered directly to the NDC Post Office loading dock.
- 2) Outgoing.
- a. Government property will not be removed from the NDC without prior written authorization from the NDC Commander or those delegated in writing (i.e., agency heads and tenant organization commanders). Individuals authorized in writing will retain a copy of the letter for presentation on demand.
 - b. At the direction of the NDC Commander and through the DSTO and DLEPS, NDC Security Forces and owner/user personnel will conduct random anti-pilferage checks at all NDC, tenant organization facilities and NDC perimeter Gates. The randomization will be distributed by the DLEPS through the NDC Commanders support staff. Reports of anti-pilferage checks will be sent to the DLEPS for inclusion in the NDC Commanders weekly brief and Physical Security Council meeting agenda.
- 3) Nuclear/chemical material.
- a. Removal of nuclear or chemical material from the NDC is prohibited, except for official purposes (i.e., training or transportation to another NDC).
 - b. Transportation and security of sensitive nuclear and chemical materials will be handled IAW governing regulations. Supplementation or alteration of these requirements is prohibited without the written permission of the NDC Commander.

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- c. NDC Security Forces and contract guard personnel will be utilized when one of the following conditions exists:
 - i. Special request by the shipping or transporting organization to secure and safeguard designated sensitive materials and equipment.
 - ii. When the nature of the material or equipment is deemed too sensitive for standard security procedures.
 - iii. When directed by the NDC Commander.
 - 4) Transporting ammunition and explosives:
 - a. Vehicles and drivers reporting to ammunition supply points for issue or turn-in of ammunition will comply with governing regulations. Ammunition shipping and movement by military vehicles on post will be conducted IAW DODM 5100.76, *Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional AA&E*. No transportation of AA&E will occur after duty hours unless expressly authorized by the NDC Commander.
 - b. All shipments will have an approved transportation plan coordinated through the DLEPS, DOL shipping and receiving, and munitions control center. Shipments received will have a completed plan which was coordinated in advance with the DLEPS, DOL shipping and receiving, and munitions control center. All movement drivers will be familiar with the plan, safe haven locations and possess a current DD Form 836 (Special Instructions for Motor Vehicle Drivers).
 - E. Vehicle control.
 - 1) NDC Security Forces will conduct access control at the NDC perimeter gates IAW Annex O. The NDC Commander may authorize anti-pilferage inspections, random antiterrorism measures on in and outbound lanes at his/her discretion to protect NDC property and personnel. Contraband and illegally possessed government property will be seized IAW governing regulations. Personnel refusing a vehicle search will be denied entry to the NDC.
 - 2) State and federal traffic codes apply for vehicle registration and parking of motorized vehicles on NDC property. DD Form 1805s will be issued for all traffic law violations on the NDC, violators will report to the Magistrates Court to contest or report for mandatory hearings for traffic violations.
 - 3) POVs are not authorized in Restricted Areas. The NDC Commander can, under limited and exigent circumstances, such as fires or emergencies, authorize entry to facilitate special situations. POVs will not be authorized in NDC Controlled Areas unless specifically authorized by the NDC Commander in written orders or special circumstances.
 - a. Government Owned Vehicles (GOV). Registered and approved GOVs are authorized in Restricted and Controlled Areas for mission accomplishment. NDC Agencies and Tenant organizations will maintain a list of pre-approved GOVs authorized in each area. Vehicles not on the listing will be removed immediately. The list will be submitted for approval through the DLEPS, DOL to the NDC Commander.
 - b. Emergency Vehicles. Emergency vehicles (i.e., fire, ambulance, and security forces) will be expeditiously processed to avoid delays in gaining access to the NDC and its Restricted and Controlled Areas. Security Forces or contract

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guards at the entry points will count the number of vehicles and personnel entering the area upon exiting vehicles, and personnel will be recounted prior to their departure from the area.

5. NDC Physical Security Measures plan.

A. Protective barriers.

- 1) Facilities at NDC are provided with perimeter barriers of various construction and materials. These barriers will be installed in accordance with the NDC barrier plan. The barriers are used to define the legal demarcation of the installation perimeter and designated Restricted and Controlled areas. Barriers are also used to implement the NDC Antiterrorism measures and during special security circumstances.
- 2) Fencing.
 - a. NDC Perimeter. There is a six (6) foot high chain link fence with a 2-inch diamond mesh pattern and a 3-strand barbed-wire outward-facing top guard that is located on the perimeter of the entire NDC. The chain link material is composed of 9-gauge galvanized steel. The bottom of the fence material reaches within 1-1/2 inches of solid packed earth. A steel reinforcing cable runs along the bottom of the fence material and another similar cable runs along the top of the fencing material.
 - b. NDC Warehouse Storage Area. There is a six (6) foot high chain link fence with a 2-inch diamond mesh pattern with no top guard surrounding the warehouse area. The chain link material is composed of 9-gauge galvanized steel. The bottom of the fence material reaches within 1-1/2 inches of a concrete sill. A steel reinforcing cable runs along the bottom of the fence material and another similar cable runs along the top of the fencing material.
 - c. Conventional AA&E Storage Area. There is a six (6) foot high chain link fence with a 2-inch diamond mesh pattern and a 3-strand barbed-wire outward-facing top guard surrounding the conventional ammunition storage area. The chain link material is composed of 9-gauge galvanized steel. The bottom of the fence material reaches within 1-1/2 inches of a concrete sill. A steel reinforcing cable runs along the bottom of the fence material and another similar cable runs along the top of the fencing material.
 - d. POL Storage Area. There is a six (6) foot high chain link fence with a 2-inch diamond mesh pattern with no top guard surrounding the POL area. The chain link material is composed of 9-gauge galvanized steel. The bottom of the fence material reaches within 1-1/2 inches of solid packed earth. A steel reinforcing cable runs along the bottom of the fence material and another similar cable runs along the top of the fencing material.
 - e. Chemical Storage Area. There are two chain link fences 30 feet apart, each six (6) feet high with a 2-inch diamond mesh pattern and a 3-strand barbed-wire outward-facing top guard surrounding the Chemical Storage Area. The chain link material is composed of 9-gauge galvanized steel. The bottom of the fence material reaches within 1-1/2 inches of a concrete sill. A steel

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- reinforcing cable runs along the bottom of the fence material and another similar cable runs along the top of the fencing material.
- f. Nuclear Storage Area. There are two chain link fences 30 feet apart, each seven (7) feet high with a 2-inch diamond mesh pattern and a 3-strand barbed-wire full “Y” outrigger surrounding the Nuclear Storage Area. The chain link material is composed of 9-gauge galvanized steel. The bottom of the fence material reaches within 1-1/2 inches of a concrete sill. A steel reinforcing cable runs along the bottom of the fence material and another similar cable runs along the top of the fencing material.
- 3) Clear zones.
- a. Clear zones of varying widths are maintained in conjunction with other physical security measures such as fences, barriers etc. NDC clear zones will be utilized to create an area of detection for specific restricted areas on the installation.
 - b. Clear zones are maintained on both sides of barrier systems to create a clear line of sight for Security Forces and employees in detecting the approach and attempted penetration of the barriers. Unless specific guidance is contained in other directives, the width of clear zones will conform to governing regulations when existing natural and man-made features permit. When feasible, clear zones are also maintained on the exterior of any building/structure used for storage of sensitive items, as well as other buildings considered particularly vulnerable to terrorist or criminal threats. When this is not feasible warning signs will be posted not less than 100 feet from the perimeter line based on terrain and visibility from approaches.
 - c. Clear zones will be kept clear of obstructions, such as bushes, weeds, debris, or other material capable of offering concealment or assistance to an intruder attempting to breach the barrier(s). DPW will respond to and maintain physical barriers at the NDC. A standard work request will be submitted when requesting DPW support.
- 4) Signs.
- a. Warning signs will be located and posted IAW this plan.
 - b. NDC signage (verbiage and placement):
 - i. NDC Perimeter: “WARNING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTALLATION. IT IS UNLAWFUL TO ENTER THIS INSTALLATION WITHOUT THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE INSTALLATION COMMANDER. AUTHORITY: Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. 797. PUNISHMENT: Up to one year imprisonment and a \$10,000 fine.” Perimeter warning signs will be placed 100 feet apart beginning at 25 feet from any perimeter access point or breach and at each corner where the fence makes at least a 90 degree angle of turn. Perimeter signs will also be placed on each entry point gate and on each side of an entry point which breaches the perimeter, no further than 25 feet from the entrance point. Signs will be posted at least 5 feet above the bottom of the fence fabric or where it is most visible on approach.

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- ii. NDC Restricted Areas: “WARNING RESTRICTED AREA IT IS UNLAWFUL TO ENTER THIS AREA WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE INSTALLATION COMMANDER. Section 21, Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. 797. While on this Installation, all personnel and property under their control are subject to search. “USE OF DEADLY FORCE AUTHORIZED”. Restricted Area warning signs will be placed 50 feet apart beginning at 25 feet from any perimeter access point or breach and at each corner where the fence makes at least a 90-degree angle of turn. Warning signs will also be placed on each entry point gate and on each side of an entry point which breaches the perimeter, no further than 25 feet from the entrance point. Signs will be posted at least 5 feet above the bottom of the fence fabric or where it is most visible on approach.
 - iii. NDC Controlled Areas: “WARNING CONTROLLED AREA IT IS UNLAWFUL TO ENTER THIS AREA WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE INSTALLATION COMMANDER. Section 21, Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. 797. While on this Installation all personnel and property under their control are subject to search.” Controlled Area warning signs will be placed 50 feet apart beginning at 25 feet from any perimeter access point or breach and at each corner where the fence makes at least a 90 degree angle of turn. Warning signs will also be placed on each entry point gate and on each side of an entry point which breaches the perimeter, no further than 25 feet from the entrance point. Signs will be posted at least 5 feet above the bottom of the fence fabric or where it is most visible on approach. SCIF warning signs will be posted on the exterior entry door 6 feet from the door footing and will include the statement “NO ELECTRONIC DEVICES PERMITTED BEYOND THIS POINT”.
- 5) NDC Gates.
- a. Ordinarily gates at NDC will be manned. Elevated FPCON Levels will dictate security requirements for NDC access points.
 - b. All gates will meet standards established in UFC 4-022-01.
 - c. All gates (when closed) will be secured with appropriate locking devices IAW governing regulations.
 - d. Keys for boundary gates will be maintained by the Director of Law Enforcement and Physical Security.
 - e. Gate post orders:
 - i. Gate 1. Operational 24-hours a day. Manned by two (2) security forces members at all times. During the hours from 0600-0900 and 1500-1800, Monday through Friday, excluding holidays, a third security forces member will assist the other two. All personnel entering the NDC through Gate 1 in a vehicle or walking must show proper identification. This gate is used for commercial truck traffic. (Note: Currently searches are done in a pull off area immediately inside the gate once bills of lading and driver identification are checked by two

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contract security guards from 0600-1800, Monday through Friday and 0600-1600, Saturday.)

The Director of Law Enforcement and Physical Security may amend this requirement at various times and will notify the security force. Section C.2 of the Access Control Measures above lists and illustrates proper identification. Personnel who do not possess the proper identification will be directed to the Visitor's Gatehouse for proper registration and processing.

- ii. Gate 2. Operational from 0600-2000, Monday through Friday; 0600-1800, Saturdays; closed on Sundays and holidays. Manned by two security forces members from 0600-0900 and 1500-1800, Monday through Friday. At other operational times, manned by one military security force member. All personnel entering the NDC through Gate 2 in a vehicle or walking must show proper identification. The Director of Law Enforcement and Physical Security may amend this requirement at various times and will notify the security forces. Section C.2 of the Access Control Measures above lists and illustrates proper identification. Personnel who do not possess the proper identification will be directed to the Visitor's Gatehouse for proper registration and processing.
- iii. Gate 3. Closed. Used once or twice a year. Like the other gates, this gate will be locked with an S&G 833C when it is not in use. On the few occasions when the gate is used, it is manned by either a security forces member or by a contract security guard who remains at the post as long as the gate is open. This gate is not for routine entering and exiting by employees of the NDC.
- iv. Gate 4. Railroad gate. Opened only as needed. When used, it is manned by either a security forces member or a contract security guard who remains at the post as long as the gate is open. And an additional security forces member or contract security guard must monitor the train into secure areas with NDC. This gate is used for railroad traffic only and is not for routine access control.
- v. Gate 5. Closed due to safety (flooding) emergency management.

B. Security lighting standards:

- 1) General. Lighting surveys of all parts of the NDC will be conducted on an annual basis by the DLEPS/Physical Security Manager; will submit a report and recommendations to the DSTO for requirements.
- 2) NDC Perimeter. Presently, there are no security lights along the perimeter of NDC, except for those at the gates. Plans have been formulated to install metal halide lighting along the entire perimeter of the NDC. Stand-by lighting is available through DPW for situational use. All NDC perimeter entry control points have a security lighting package of continuous flood, point and area lights in the immediate vicinity of the gate house. All NDC Gates have a security

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- lighting package IAW UFC standards and have a generator facility at each gate for emergency backup power.
- 3) Nuclear Storage Area. The perimeter has ball park lighting standards every 100 feet and each facility in the area has a security lighting package of flood, point and area lights. All of the storage area's perimeter lights are metal halide. There is a secure generator facility containing an uninterrupted power source for emergency outages which provides continuous back-up power, to include lighting (i.e., when the primary NDC power source is interrupted). This emergency power source is direct-wired to the area's security lighting configuration. The entry control point has a security lighting package of continuous flood, point and area lights in the immediate vicinity of the gate house.
 - 4) Chemical Storage Area. The perimeter has ball park lighting standards every 100 feet and each facility in the area has a security lighting package of flood, point and area lights. All of the storage area's perimeter lights are metal halide. There is a secure generator facility containing an uninterrupted power source for emergency outages which provides continuous back-up power, to include lighting (i.e., when the primary NDC power source is interrupted). This emergency power source is direct-wired to the area's security lighting configuration. The entry control point has a security lighting package of continuous flood, point and area lights in the immediate vicinity of the gate house.
 - 5) Conventional AA&E Storage Area. The perimeter has ball park lighting standards every 100 feet and each AGB containing Security Risk Category II AA&E has a security lighting package of flood, point and area lights. All of the storage area's perimeter lights are metal halide. There is a secure generator facility containing an uninterrupted power source for emergency outages which provides continuous back-up power, to include lighting (i.e., when the primary NDC power source is interrupted). This emergency power source is direct-wired to the area's security lighting configuration. The entry control point has a security lighting package of continuous flood, point and area lights in the immediate vicinity of the gate house.
 - 6) NDC Warehouse Storage Area. The perimeter has ball park lighting standards at each corner of the perimeter. Each facility has a light over the warehouse doors and there are motion detection flood lights on each corner of Bldgs. 32, 33, 34, 35. The entry control point has a security lighting package of continuous flood, point and area lights in the immediate vicinity of the gate house. There is no uninterrupted power source, emergency lighting will be provided by DPW in the form of light-all's, upon request.
 - 7) Rainey Airfield. Rainey airfield has security and aeronautical lighting systems consistent with DOD and FAA requirements. There is a secure generator facility containing an uninterrupted power source for emergency outages which provides continuous back-up power, to include lighting (i.e., when the primary NDC power source is interrupted). This emergency power source is direct-wired to the area's security and airfield operations lighting configuration.
 - 8) POL Storage Area. Each facility in the POL Storage Area has a continuous lighting package of flood and area lighting in a 360-degree configuration. There is

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no uninterrupted power source, emergency lighting will be provided by DPW in the form of portable light-all's, upon request.

- 9) NDC Armory. The NDC Armory, Bldg. 24 has a portable generator housed in the facility to provide back-up power when required. The facility has point lighting on the Armory entrance/exit door and lighting in the arming and cleaning areas of the main armory room. The exterior of the facility has motion-detection initiated flood lights on each corner of the building and area lighting supporting the CCTV system.

C. IDS. Refer to Annex K.

D. Communications Infrastructure.

- 1) General. NDC Cybersecurity programs and equipment are managed and maintained by the NDC DCS Directorate, which includes mobile and hard lined telephonic systems, wireless routing, secure communications systems and infrastructure. The base emergency management communications system which includes Security Forces secure and unencrypted base stations, e911 and emergency Hotlines are installed and maintained by the DCS Directorate. The DLEPS facilitates security requirements through the DCS Director and DSTO to the NDC Commander.
- 2) The NDC Emergency Operations Center operates a 24-hour communications capability and is interconnected to the DLEPS Security Forces Control Center with redundant facilities for both located in Bldg. 59. Primary communications nodes are located in Bldgs. 19, 21, 22 and 23, with redundant capability in Bldg. 59. The EOC also manages the NDC Giant Voice mass communications system.
- 3) The SFCC located in Bldg. 21 maintains 24-hour Security Forces communications systems to include the Main Base Station, primary e911 line and base Hotline. The SFCC also manages and monitors the NDC Closed Circuit Television control panel and the NDC Intrusion Detection Systems alarm monitoring and annunciation station. The base station radio net utilizes clear voice radio transmissions. Each net used is assigned a call sign for tactical identification purposes and can be converted to encrypted communications when required.
- 4) Redundant systems for each of the primary control nodes are contained in Bldg. 59. Finally, under emergency contingent situations the Nuclear Storage Area Security Forces Control desk in Bldg. 56 which has the internal communications infrastructure to operate in a limited capacity as an EOC/SFCC.

E. Security Forces.

- 1) For NDC, all guard orders must be approved by the DLEPS. Guard orders for all posts, both static and roving, are contained in Annex O.
- 2) Composition.
 - a. Security Forces (DOD Law Enforcement and Security Personnel)
 - b. Contract guard forces
 - c. Criminal Investigators

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- d. Hostile Event Reaction Team (HERT) (DOD Law Enforcement and Security Personnel)
- 3) Mission.
- a. The mission of the combined NDC security assets identified in paragraph 2 is to create a secure environment in order for NDC mission operations to continue unabated throughout any threat or increased security posture due to elevated Force Protections Conditions.
 - b. All DOD Law Enforcement and Security personnel hired at the NDC will attend training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center prior to beginning armed duty. Contract guard force personnel will receive local eight week training course delivered by the DLEPS Training Division, which includes firearms training and basic police tactics. All administrative, training, and support requirements will be provided by the DLEPS.
 - c. Mobile patrols will conduct funds escorts for Appropriated, Non-Appropriated funds facilities, and Banks located on NDC property for transfers of \$25,000.00 or more.
 - d. Organization Security Managers: Security managers will attend the Security Manager training course delivered by the DLEPS within 30 days of assuming duties. Security managers will support internal circulation control of their facilities during elevated FPCONs by conducting Random Antiterrorism Measures in support of the NDC PSP. Security managers will train an appropriate number of their organizational personnel to accomplish this support mission and provide an updated list of trained personnel to the Physical Security Manager and NDC ATO monthly.
 - e. Reaction Forces: DLEPS Security Forces (on and off duty) will serve as reaction and back-up forces for the NDC Nuclear Storage Area, Chemical Storage Area and all other resources as determined through the EOC.
 - i. DLEPS Hostile Event Reaction Team (HERT) will be organized and managed by the DLEPS and will be deployed in support of emergency situations requiring an armed reaction to an event on the NDC. HERT Team member may wear Blue or Olive Drab battle dress uniforms when on-duty.
 - ii. HERT teams will support special events and activities requiring additional security oversight as directed by the DLEPS through the NDC Commander.
 - iii. DLEPS Military Working Dog Teams (MWD):
 - a. MWD Teams are utilized for patrol, bomb, and narcotics detection missions and will react to all emergencies and conditions as determined by the DLEPS. One MWD Team will be on-duty 24 hours a day with additional deployment dictated by FPCONs elevation or situational deployment in support of security operations. MWD handlers will wear Olive Drab battle dress uniforms as their standard uniform.
 - b. SOPs for the MWD Teams will be maintained by DLEPS Operations.

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- iv. NDC Contract Guards are not trained to support HERT or Reaction Force operations and will not be used in such circumstances. They will be trained on HERT and Reaction Team tactics to enhance their situational awareness of security capabilities in support of assets they protect. Under emergency circumstances the on-scene commander at an incident scene may utilize Contract Guard Force personnel in outer perimeter security activities and at ECPs to incident cordons.
 - a. The DLEPS Criminal Investigations Branch provides additional criminal investigations and hostage negotiations capabilities in support of HERT and incident response activities.
- 4) Security Forces Weapons and Equipment:
- a. NDC Security Forces mobile patrolman will be armed with a 9mm sidearm (30 rounds), 12 gauge shotgun (12 rounds) and an M4 assault rifle (120 rounds) and associated law enforcement equipment. M4s will be locked in the trunk and utilized as directed in SOPs and special orders. Elevated FPCONs may require M4 to be carried as the primary patrol weapon. MWD patrols will be equipped as described above. NDC Security Forces (mobile and static) will wear Blue battle dress uniforms as their standard on-duty uniform.
 - b. NDC Security Forces static and gate guards will be armed with a 9mm sidearm (30 rounds) and an M4 assault rifle (120 rounds) and associated law enforcement equipment at the post or gate. Gate guards' will lock their M4s in the gatehouse weapons rack upon assuming post. SG1 and 2 personnel will carry the M4 as their primary weapons system and well as their holstered 9mm sidearm. All other static posts will be armed as described in sentence 1 of this paragraph unless otherwise directed or dictated by elevated FPCONs. NDC Security Forces (mobile and static) will wear Blue battle dress uniforms as their standard on-duty uniform.
 - c. Contract Guard Forces will be armed with 9mm side arms (30 rounds) and associated law enforcement equipment. Contract Guards will wear a black law enforcement utility uniform.
 - d. DLEPS Criminal Investigators will be armed (concealed or overtly) with 9mm side arms (30 rounds) and associated law enforcement equipment as necessary. Investigators will openly display badges when conducting operations in which obvious identification of security forces personnel is required. Investigators will dress as appropriate to carry out their duties; no standard uniform is required unless otherwise directed by the DLEPS.
 - e. NDC Mobile Patrols with drive black and white marked "NDC Security Forces" vehicles equipped with light bars, sirens, public address systems and associated law enforcement equipment. Criminal Investigators and Traffic units will drive solid colored (maroon or grey) unmarked vehicles equipped with overt lights, sirens, public address systems and associated law enforcement equipment.
- F. Contingency plans: Fire protection and response are provided by the Fire Department (Bldgs. 26, 43 and 58) augmented by local civil fire authorities. In the event of power

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failure, alternate power sources will be used and guard personnel will be posted at sensitive facilities. Telephonic communication failures will be rectified by Director of Information Management and local power companies, as appropriate. A copy of the crisis management plan is on file at DLEPS and the primary and alternate EOC and SFCC.

- 1) Individual actions. Key personnel receive instructions of proposed actions to be taken during emergencies. Individuals not on duty will don appropriate attire and receive special instructions as necessary. Personnel in an on-duty status will take actions commensurate with their assigned duties in accordance with established local standing operating procedures.

G. Use of air surveillance:

- 1) Use of aircraft to perform air surveillance missions will be at the discretion of the NDC Commander.
- 2) All air operations will be in compliance with current security and safety regulations and directives.

H. Coordinating instructions:

- 1) Upon notification of post closure, off-post movement, traffic accidents, or other emergency situations, the DLEPS will make contact with security/law enforcement officials of the following agencies as appropriate:
 - a. Local Civil Authorities:
 - i. Local county/city police
 - ii. Sheriff's Office
 - iii. State Police (Troops A, B, etc.)
 - b. Federal Agencies:
 - i. Federal Bureau of Investigation
 - ii. U.S. Marshal
 - iii. U.S. Forestry Service
 - iv. Drug Enforcement Administration
 - v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
 - c. Military Agencies:
 - i. Air Force Base, Security Forces Operator
 - ii. Naval Support Activities, Security Office
 - iii. Army
- 2) All activities/facilities will develop an internal Physical Security Plan tailored to their security needs, coordinated with the next higher headquarters, and DLEPS Physical Security Manager.
- 3) DLEPS will conduct a physical security survey of NDC once a year, to include tenant unit plans. The NDC PSP and tenant PSPs will be exercised at least annually (can be exercised in conjunction with the NDC AT Plan).
- 4) In the event of a civil disturbance or other emergency situation, special security measures will be implemented by the DLEPS IAW the NDC PSP and AT Plan. Execution of measures will be directed through the NDC EOC and SFCC.

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ANNEX A, REFERENCES

- DOD 5200.8-R, April 9, 2007, Change 1, 5/27/2009, “DOD Physical Security Program”
- Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” as amended
- DOD Instruction 5200.08, “Security of DOD Installations and Resources and the DOD Physical Security Review Board (PSRB),” December 10, 2005, Change 1 May 19, 2010
- DODM 5200.01, Volumes 1, “DOD Information Security Program: Overview,” Classification, And Declassification, May 4, 2018
- DODM 5200.01, Volumes 2, “DOD Information Security Program: Marking of Classified Information,” March 19, 2013
- DODM 5200.01, Volumes 3, “DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information,” March 19, 2013
- DODM 5200.01, Volumes 4, DOD Information Security Program: Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), May 9, 2018
- Intelligence Community Directive 705, “Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities” May 26, 2010
- DOD Directive O-5210.41, “Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons,” January 22, 2015
- DOD Instruction 5210.65, “Security Standards for Safeguarding Chemical Agents,” January 19, 2016
- DOD Directive 5210.63, “Security of Nuclear Reactors and Special Nuclear Materials,” April 6, 1990
- DODM 5100.76, “Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives,” May 8, 2018
- DOD Directive 5205.07, “Special Access Program (SAP) Policy,” July 1, 2010
- DOD Instruction 5210.84, “Security of DOD Personnel at U.S. Missions Abroad,” October 15, 1996
- Chapter 169, Section 2859, Title 10, United States Code
- DOD Directive 3224.03, “Physical Security Equipment (PSE) Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E),” February 17, 1989
- DODI O-2000.16, Volume 1, “DOD Antiterrorism Program Implementation: DOD AT Standards,” November 17, 2016
- DODI O-2000.16, Volume 2, “DOD Antiterrorism Program Implementation: DOD Force Protection Condition (FPCON) System,” November 17, 2016
- DODI 2000.12, “DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program,” May 8, 2017
- UFC 4-010-01, Unified Facilities Criteria, “DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings,” October 1, 2013
- Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Memorandum, “Department of Defense Unified Facilities Criteria,” dated May 29, 2002
- Military Standard-3007F, “Standard Practice for Unified Facilities Criteria and Unified Facilities Guide Specification,” December 13, 2006
- Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 201-1, “Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors,” March 01, 2006

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- Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 (HSPD-12), “Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors,” August 27, 2004
 - DOD Directive 1000.25, “DOD Personnel Identity Protection (PIP) Program,” July 19, 2004
 - DOD 4500.9R-Part II, “Defense Transportation Regulation,” November 2004
 - DOD Directive 3020.45, “Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Management,” April 21, 2008
 - Title 21, Code of Federal Regulation, Parts 1301.71 through 1301.76
 - Public Law 91-513, “Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970”
 - Military Standard-1388-2A, “DOD Requirement for a Logistic Support Analysis Record,” March 17, 1981
 - DOD Regulation 4145.19-R-1, “Storage and Materials Handling,” September 15, 1979
 - DLA Joint Regulation 4145.11, “Safeguarding of DLA Sensitive Inventory Items, Controlled Substances, and Pilferable Items of Supply,” February 1, 1990

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Map Reference**Copy No.** _____**NorthCom J-2****Place of Issue****Date of Issue****ANNEX B, NDC THREAT STATEMENT**

B-1. (U) PURPOSE: To provide current threat information to the NDC Commander for security planning considerations in protection of NDC personnel and property.

B-2. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

1. (U) Terrorist Threat. As of today's date, the DIA has assessed the terrorist threat level in the United States as SIGNIFICANT. The terrorist threat to the NDC is deemed as SIGNIFICANT. Al-Qaeda (AQ) poses the greatest potential transnational threat to U.S. interests alone and through its relationship with syntax with other transnational and domestic terrorist groups with influence in the Continental United States. However, domestic threat groups influenced by al-Qaeda and other transnational organizations such as "Sons of Islam in the United States (SIUS)" and "Army of the Righteous" have recently increased in size, capability and recruitment while improving their money laundering and financial operations in the U.S. As of today's date, there is no specific targeting information indicating a threat group is in the NDC Operating Environment (OE) or is threatening to target NDC personnel or facilities. However, explosive threats will remain at the forefront.
2. U) Explosive Threats: Although it is possible that the dominant threat mode may change in the future, bombings have historically been a favorite tactic of terrorists. Ingredients for homemade bombs are easily obtained on the open market, as are the techniques for making bombs. Bombings are easy and quick to execute. Finally, the dramatic component of explosions in terms of the sheer destruction they cause creates a media sensation that is highly effective in transmitting the terrorist's message to the public therefore the NDC will keep the following threats to the forefront.
3. U) Vehicle weapon: Vehicle bombs are able to deliver a sufficiently large quantity of explosives to cause potentially devastating structural damage. The current threat is a medium sized vehicle packed with 200 pounds of explosives traveling at 50 miles per hour.
4. U) Hand-delivered weapon: Recent events around the world make it clear that there is an increased likelihood that bombs will be delivered by persons who are willing to sacrifice their own lives. Hand-delivered weapon five to ten pounds lobby, mail room, and retail spaces.
5. (U) Criminal Threat. As of today's date, the FBI assessed crime rates in the NDC area to be HIGH. Street crime is common and usually involves petty theft, fraud, and simple assaults. Violent crime, including narcotics trafficking, rape, and murder, have risen significantly as the

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local economy has faltered. Current off-limits areas include “The Dugout Bar and Grill,” a local establishment that has in the past been accused of mistreating DOD service personnel, as well as, “The Lion’s Den,” a local strip club that is reportedly a headquarters for narcotics gangs.

6. (U) Civil Disturbance Threat. As of today’s date, the FBI assessed the local civil disturbance threat to be LOW. There is no indication of planned demonstrations or civil disobedience. Demonstrations in the past have been small and have occurred in the general vicinity of the main gate. The majority of local protest groups are political in nature including organizations such as “Tree Savers,” “Clean Our Air,” and “Liberty without Taxes.” Their demonstrations are generally peaceful and not necessarily anti-US.
7. (U) Active Shooter Threat. As of today’s date, there is an escalating epidemic of active shooter incidents in both government, civilian and local communities. In a short span and with little or no warning and often with no connection to the location of a shooting an active shooter can cause significant harm to employees, customers, students, and organizations’ operations and reputations. Organizations cannot fully remove such threats, therefore, this threat will remain significant and this command will remain proactive to take action before and after an attack to reduce their risk, hasten recovery/resiliency, and mitigate potential damage.

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Map Reference
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Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date of Issue

ANNEX C, Terrorist Counteraction Plan

Omitted.

Map Reference**Copy No.** _____**Issuing Headquarters****Place of Issue****Date of Issue****ANNEX D, BOMB THREAT PLAN**

D-1. PURPOSE: To outline procedures for the security of personnel and property at NDC during a bomb threat.

D-2. RESPONSIBILITIES:

1. When a bomb threat is received, the form at Appendix 1 is used to record the call. The recipient of the call immediately notifies his/her supervisor, Security Forces Control Center, NDC Hotline, or NDC Emergency Operations Center.
 - a. All employees, service personnel, visitors, or shoppers immediately evacuate the building. The highest-ranking individual who works at the facility will direct the evacuation and will ensure that everyone is outside and at least 300 feet away from the building. Entry into the facility by anyone is prevented until the arrival of law enforcement personnel. During the evacuation, all employees or on-duty personnel visually scan their work areas prior to departure and report any suspicious package or device or anything "out of place." Occupants are told why they are being asked to leave to preclude panic and possible injury.
 - b. Upon notification of a bomb threat the SFCC takes the following action:
 - 1) Dispatches patrols to the facility, reminding the patrolmen not to use sirens or radios within 300 feet of the facility; they will telephone the desk when communication is necessary.
 - 2) Notify the EOC (EOC will make command notifications and ensure a Giant Voice message is released to notify the public to evacuate in a specific direction, or to avoid the scene.
 - 3) Notify the DLEPS and Fire Department who will provide on-scene command.
 - 4) Notify the MWD Kennels.
 - 5) Notify the Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) team.
 - 6) Notify the NDC Community Hospital.
2. SFCC/DLEPS:
 - a. The on-duty Security Forces shift commander acts as on-scene commander until properly relieved.
 - b. Cordons affected area (300 feet around affected are/facility), employs effective personnel and traffic control, and assists with evacuating and securing the affected area.
 - c. Ensures that no one uses radios (vehicle or handheld) or sirens within 150 meters of the facility.
 - d. Organizes and directs all bombs locating activity at the scene. Personnel of the facility are organized into search teams after being made aware of search techniques. Searches are conducted from the outside to the inside and from bottom to top. If possible, all phases of

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the search are conducted simultaneously. Law enforcement personnel will not search for bombs.

1) Outside Area:

- a) The outside search pattern begins at ground level and is conducted to a distance of 25' to 50' from the facility, outward. Particular interest is given to: piles of leaves or refuse, shrubbery, entrances (doors, windows, and fire escapes), manholes, trashcans, and parked vehicles. The EOD personnel searches suspect vehicles.
- b) After the outside search is completed, members of the outside search teams join the inside search teams to enhance and expedite the process.

2) Inside Search:

- a) Search of the inside area starts from the basement and progresses upward to the top floor. Utmost attention is provided public areas such as reception rooms, lobbies, stairwells, custodial closets, and restrooms.
- b) To avoid duplication by other teams, each area is marked as it is searched. One method of marking the area is to tie a piece of string or tape across door openings.
- c) A detailed search of rooms is conducted by dividing it into equal parts according to the number of objects to be searched; the first sweep includes a check of all objects from the floor to waist level including items built into the wall; the second sweep includes all items from waist level to the ceiling including heating ducts and above drop ceilings.
- d) The search of the facility and areas is ended only when the person in charge of the search teams is satisfied that an adequate search has been made. Personnel must be wary of another bomb in the vicinity of the affected area.
- e) Only the person responsible for that facility can issue the order to return into the facility.

3) Communications: Telephones, bullhorns, or whistles are essential to effective communications in a bomb threat incident and may be used during search operations.

3. Emergency Medical Teams will respond to the ECP and stand-by for casualty collection and treatment.
4. The NDC Community Hospital prepares to provide medical support and maintains a level of readiness until the facility has been declared clear.
5. The facility manager or commander is the only person who may declare the facility clear.
6. Ensures information is only released outside the NDC through the Public Affairs Office.
7. EOD personnel assume control of and disperse of any suspected explosive device found by the search team.

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D-3. BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST

CHECKLIST WHEN YOU RECEIVE A BOMB THREAT	
Time and Date Reported	_____
How Reported	_____
Exact Words of Caller	_____
Questions to Ask:	
1. When is the bomb going to explode?	_____
2. Where is the bomb right now?	_____
3. What kind of bomb is it?	_____
4. What does it look like?	_____
5. Why did you place the bomb?	_____
6. From where are you calling?	_____
7. Description of Caller's Voice:	_____
Male: ___ Female: ___ Young: ___ Middle-Age: ___ Old: ___ Accent: ___	
Tone of Voice	_____
Background Noise	_____
Is Voice Familiar _____? If so, who did it sound like?	_____
Other characteristics	_____
Time Caller Hung Up	_____
Remarks	_____
Immediately notify your supervisor, then the law enforcement desk sergeant. Keep this list with you.	

Map Reference**Copy No.** _____**Issuing Headquarters****Place of Issue****Date of Issue****ANNEX E, NATIONAL DEFENSE CENTER CLOSURE PLAN**

E-1. PURPOSE: To outline procedures for the security of personnel and property at NDC during NDC Closure.

E-2. RESPONSIBILITIES:

1. Upon notification of an emergency, mobilization or IC's orders, the post will initiate post closure. This is tentatively accomplished by closing and barricading Gates #1 and 2, and manning these gates with Security Forces personnel.
 - a. Once control of the NDC has been established, DLEPS will:
 - 1) Open or close gates at the direction of the IC.
 - 2) Adjust Access Control Points (ACPs) to inbound, outbound only at the discretion of the IC to relieve traffic congestion.
 - 3) Dedicate ACP inbound lanes for emergency vehicle and essential traffic.
 - b. Set up check points at the discretion of the IC to control entry into the cantonment area, housing areas, or other critical areas on NDC. Additionally, all units/activities on the NDC will supply their own internal security measures for their areas. Primary and supplementary guard posts will be augmented, as required, by NDC Security Forces. Mobile patrols of key areas within the NDC will be established at the discretion of the DLEPS. These areas will normally be limited to those MEVAs identified in this plan and at the discretion of the NDC Commander.
2. Entry/exit through the manned checkpoint(s) will be for the following personnel only after being searched and have proper identification as prescribed below:
 - a. Military personnel (active, reserve component, retired) will be admitted with a valid DD Form 2 or 2A.
 - b. Dependents of military personnel will be admitted with a valid DD Form 1173 (Uniformed Services Identification and Privilege Card) only if they reside on the NDC, or have an emergency.
 - c. Civilian commercial personnel contracted by an authorized agency of NDC will be granted access with a valid identification. All requests for entry will be evaluated on a case by case basis. This identification will be used in conjunction with issuance of a visitors pass. A list of those commercial activities with authorized access will be provided to the DLEPS for consolidation and subsequent dissemination to NDC access points. Drivers of these vehicles will be instructed to place this pass on the lower left side on the dashboard where it can be visible for identification purposes. The drivers will also be informed that they must exit the same gate in which they entered and return the pass. The vehicle pass will only be valid for a time not to exceed 24 hours. All civilian commercial personnel will be logged in/out on the visitors control log.

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- d. Public Affairs personnel will escort press personnel onto the NDC; they will be searched, issued a visitor's pass, and logged in/out on the visitors control log.
 - e. Visitors, vendors (unless previously cleared for entry), etc., should not be allowed entry onto the NDC during base closure for safety and security reasons.
 - f. Any other instances that arise should be brought to the attention of the Director of Law Enforcement and Physical Security.
 - g. All individuals listed above will be informed to keep traffic at a minimum during base closure.
3. Security of Staging and Equipment Holding Areas.
 - a. If rail loading operations are essential during base closure, they will take place at the northeast end of post. Equipment awaiting loading will be placed in the designated staging areas at the railhead and will be guarded on a 24-hour basis through the use of the Posted Interior Guard(s). Roving guard personnel will guard this area; the number will depend on the amount of equipment being stored at the staging area.
 - b. In the event that a Privately Owned Vehicle (POV) storage area must be established, it is the unit's responsibility to secure, process, and guard these vehicles within the unit's motor pool. If the unit does not have adequate storage, these vehicles can be stored at the NDC POV storage area. Storage of POVs at the NDC POV storage area must be pre-approved by DPW.
 4. Other security measures to be considered during base closure.
 - a. Remind personnel, including family members, to be suspicious and inquisitive about strangers, particularly those carrying suitcases, boxes, or containers, be alert for suspicious vehicles on or around the NDC, and be alert for abandoned parcels or suitcases or any unusual activity.
 - b. Secure buildings and storage areas not in regular use. Conduct security checks of these areas periodically with special emphasis placed on MEVAs.
 - c. Keep key personnel on call to assist with base closure.
 - d. Check deliveries and advise family members to check all home deliveries.
 - e. Increase surveillance of all soft targets (schools, clubs, etc.).
 - f. Review and implement security measures for HRP.
 - g. Move vehicles, containers, etc. away from sensitive buildings.
 - h. Inform all personnel of the situation to prevent rumors/unnecessary alarm.
 - i. Inform the local community that the NDC has initiated base closure.
 - j. Remind drivers to lock vehicles and check vehicles before entering.
 5. Base closure procedures should only be used as a last resort. Once implemented, they will be in effect until a determination to discontinue operations is made by the NDC Commander.

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ANNEX F, NATURAL DISASTER PLAN

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ANNEX G, CIVIL DISTURBANCE PLAN

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Map Reference
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ANNEX H, WORK-STOPPAGE PLAN

Omitted.

Map Reference

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ANNEX I, RESOURCE PLAN

I-1. REFERENCE: *Omitted*

I-2. PURPOSE: To recommend priorities to allocate resources (equipment, money, and personnel, etc.) to meet essential physical security needs.

I-3. SCOPE: This appendix is applicable to all personnel assigned to NDC.

I-4. RESPONSIBILITIES:

1. Director of Law Enforcement and Physical Security:
 - a. Working with the FP Council, develop a priority resource allocation plan based upon risk analysis, criticality to the NDC, and current threat.
 - b. Allocation of Force Protection funds will be based on the following priority:
 - 1) Nuclear Storage Area
 - 2) Chemical Storage Area
 - 3) Bldg. 19 SCIF/Classified storage areas
 - 4) Bldg. 19 Emergency Operations Center
 - 5) Bldg. 21 SFCC
 - 6) Bldg. 59 Alternate EOC/SFCC
 - 7) Perimeter barriers and access control points (Commercial Search Area)
 - 8) Electronic Security Systems (IDS/CCTV) – Bldg. 14 NDC Training Center
 - 9) Conventional AA&E Storage Area & Arms Rooms
 - 10) Airfield security (barriers, perimeter controls)
 - 11) Communications and Data Processing Center construction
 - 12) Bldg. 24 Armory upgrade construction
 - 13) POL security lighting project
 - 14) Post Office mail handling room project
 - 15) Pharmacy construction upgrade
 - 16) Bldg. 19. Sally port search area construction project
 - 17) Water drainage project – Gate #5
 - 18) Upgrade access control and final denial systems at gates

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2. DPW:
 - a. Upon request, provide the DLEPS a list of outstanding physical security work requests along with the estimated project cost and input and support during the process of developing a viable physical security projects list.
 3. DRM:
 - a. Apprise the DLEPS of available funds in support of the overall physical security effort and advise on proper utilization of funds.
 4. Tenant Unit Commanders:
 - a. Identify vulnerabilities with the aid of a risk analysis and during the conduct of NDC surveys. Address these vulnerabilities in writing to the DLEPS requesting considerations for allocating force protection funds.
 - b. Develop priorities listing and submit to DLEPS.
 - c. Identify in writing, a Resource Manager to liaison between the DLEPS and Command.
- I-5.** Every effort must be made by all parties involved to ensure the most effective and practical application of our resource dollars.

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ANNEX J, COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

Omitted.

Map Reference**Copy No.** _____**Issuing Headquarters****Place of Issue****Date of Issue****ANNEX K, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)**

K-1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this annex is to prescribe procedures and policies for the effective and economical operation of government owned Intrusion Detection System (IDS) on NDC.

K-2. GENERAL:

1. IDS captures and reports activity with real-time warning that the security of the protected facility has been threatened. The IDS Monitor Station is located at the NDC SFCC, which are manned 24-hours a day. The SFCC monitors and dispatches Security Forces to provide immediate response to all alarm activations until the cause of the alarm is determined and the event is fully investigated.
2. The quality of service provided to the user depends upon the user's adherence to IDS standard operating procedures as much as it does system effectiveness and Security Forces response.

K-3. PROCEDURES:

1. IDS Access Rosters.
 - a. The activity commander must decide which of the personnel working in an activity are going to open and close and/or have authorized unescorted access to the activity. This number should be kept to a minimum.
 - b. Those personnel identified to have access to the IDS must have a Security Screening and Evaluation completed before being placed on the authorized unescorted access roster. Information required is full name, rank/grade, SSAN, and Commander's signature.
 - c. Before personnel are allowed access to the IDS control panel, they must be issued a Personal Identification Codes (PIC). Codes are issued at the IDS Monitor Station Building. Prior to issuance of the PIC, a memorandum must be submitted to the Physical Security Officer that includes the following: full name, rank/grade, SSN, why individual is to have access, activity number and location, work and home telephone number, and Commander's signature.
 - d. Required forms must be completed and attached to the memorandum at the time of submission for the PICs. Anyone with an operational requirement to have unaccompanied access to AA&E facilities must have the command oriented security screening completed prior to being granted access.
 - e. Authorized unescorted access rosters submitted by commanders are the only means that the IDS monitors have for contacting personnel in emergency situations. These rosters are a means of identification when Security Forces respond to various alarms and are also used to notify personnel in the event of a system malfunction. If the unit/activity has a preference as to who is notified or a preferred order in which personnel are notified, they need to inform the Physical Security Manager who provides the lists to the SFCC. All

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- commanders must periodically review their unaccompanied access rosters to ensure the SFCC has current information on file.
- f. To ensure the timeliness of the service provided to the user, activities should ensure that persons removed from their roster for whatever reason are immediately removed from the roster maintained at the SFCC.
2. Opening the activity (ACCESS). Refer to governing regulations.
 3. Closing the activity (SECURE). Refer to governing regulations.
 4. Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
 - a. Purpose: This section provides guidance for the operation of the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) at NDC facilities.
 - b. Scope: The scope of this section is limited to the basic operational procedures necessary to ensure the maximum protection is received from the system resulting in immediate notification of a designated authority should an intrusion attempt be made. It must be emphasized, however, that the best IDS is ineffective if appropriate physical security procedures and responsive reaction personnel are not a part of the overall protection plan.
 - c. Threat: The IDS is designed to detect the semi-skilled intruder who can be expected to attempt entry without sophisticated equipment and detailed planning and may work individually or as a member of a small group. The semi-skilled intruder has been and is expected to continue to be the primary threat to arms rooms. This intruder can be expected to attack locks, doors, windows, vents, walls, floors, and ceilings of the arms room, or he may stay behind to remove arms after the room is secured. He is also expected to resort to armed robbery by confronting armorers and guards.
 - d. Vulnerabilities:
 - 1) Doors - constitute a primary point of intrusion. The intruder can be expected to attempt entry by cutting or breaking the lock and opening the doors, or by breaking through the door.
 - 2) Walls, ceilings, floors - A determined intruder can break through almost any type wall, ceiling, or floor normally found in arms rooms in a matter of seconds or minutes with readily available tools. For example, a man with a ten-pound sledge hammer can batter a man-size hole through either an eight-inch filled concrete block wall or five-inch reinforced concrete wall in less than a minute.
 - 3) Windows - Windows, like doors, are a primary point of intrusion and are the most difficult of all construction features to protect. For example, a man with a two-pound hammer can clean out a wire-reinforced glass window in a metal frame in less than a minute.
 - 4) Apertures - An opening of 96 square inches (minimum dimensions of six inches) or larger, in walls, ceilings, floors, or doors must be considered as a possible point of entry.
 - 5) Personnel - Armed guards may be robbed of their weapons while armorers and Charge of Quarters may be used by an intruder to gain access to weapons.
 5. System Operating Procedures:
 - a. Systems Administrator/Assistant Systems Administrator:
 - 1) Handles the responsibilities for the overall day to day operation of the Intrusion Detection System.
 - 2) Assigns Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) and PICs to authorized personnel.

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- 3) Coordinates with the DLEPS, DPW, DIA and activities to maintain systems and components.
- b. Unit Commanders/Directors (includes Tenant Units) and/or Facility Managers:
 - 1) Designate personnel to have unescorted access to the facility.
 - 2) Conduct local background checks for personnel authorized to receive, store, or issue arms, ammunition, and explosives, and for personnel authorized to issue or control keys to AA&E facilities. Local background checks will be recorded and documented appropriately. For Nuclear facilities, personnel will be certified through the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
 - 3) Submit authorized unescorted access roster, quarterly, of designated personnel to the systems administrator/assistant systems administrator for the assignment of PICs. The roster will be in memorandum format and contain the following information: last name, first name, middle initial, full Social Security Number, rank or grade, home and work telephone numbers, building, module and zone number where system is located.
 - 4) Submit a copy of the required documentation for each individual on the access roster for AA&E storage areas to Physical Security Manager. Individuals on the previous roster and not listed on the current roster will have their PICs removed from the system.
 - c. Operators: Central Alarm Monitoring Station (CAMS) clerks
 - 1) Provide continuous monitoring of workstation.
 - 2) Advise the SFCC of all alarms.
 - 3) Document and assist users in conducting required IDS testing.
 - d. DLEPS SFCC Controllers: Dispatch response forces (Security Forces) to alarms. Coordinate response of all emergency responders and provide updates to the DLEPS as necessary.
 - e. Users: (Individuals on the unit or facility unaccompanied access roster).
 - 1) Report to the Physical Security Manager during the hours of 0800-0900 on normal duty days to receive PIC numbers.
 - 2) Properly access and secure the IDS system within their activity or facility.
 - 3) Conduct required tests of the IDS system. The SFCC and CAMS will be notified prior to conduct of testing. Test procedures are explained in the NDC IDS testing SOP.

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L-1. GENERAL: HRP are those who are more likely to be targeted by terrorists and criminal because of their grade, assignment, symbolic value, and political position. The IC procedures established below will be used at the NDC to provide security for HRP residing, working on or visiting the NDC. In addition, visiting dignitaries will be provided with HRP security as required.

L-2. RESPONSIBILITIES:

1. Physical Security Manager:
 - a. Coordinate with the DLEPS to conduct vulnerability assessments in HRP living and working areas. Conduct specific assessments in advance of visiting HRPs to the NDC.
 - b. A copy of the vulnerability assessment will be provided the DLEPS and DSTO with the original maintained in the Physical Security Managers security container.
 - c. Provide protective service support IAW governing regulations as required.
2. DLEPS:
 - a. Provide HERT support as required.
 - b. Provide security for visiting HRPs as required.
 - c. Secure helipads upon arrival/departure of HRP/visiting dignitaries.
 - d. Upon request from the command group, provide MWD support for security sweeps of HRP living and working areas.
 - e. Conduct quarterly testing of IDS and duress alarm installed in Distinguished Visitor Quarters (DVQ) and HRP offices or homes. Provide an in-depth briefing to all HRP, visiting dignitaries and family members on the IDS and duress alarm.
 - f. Conduct risk analysis each time there is a change in HRP.
 - g. Coordinate and schedule defensive driver training for primary HRP drivers.
3. Intelligence Branch: Conduct monthly personal threat briefings as required by changes in threats.
4. NDC Public Affairs/Protocol Officer:
 - a. Provide updated rosters of visiting dignitaries to the DLEPS.
 - b. Coordinate Protective Services requirements with the DLEPS.

L-3. Personnel responsible for the safety and well-being of HRP will become familiar with counter-terrorism measures as outlined in governing regulations, and through briefings from the NDC Antiterrorism Officer.

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M-1. Motor Pools: NDC Motor Pools will be protected based on a risk management analysis of the threat and vulnerabilities to the motor pool assets. Provided adequate fencing and lighting are in place, motor pools at the NDC will be protected as prescribed for Category IV assets. Commanders will refer to governing regulations to determine the required physical protective measures and security procedures. The completed risk management analysis will be maintained at the evaluated facility and will be subject to inspection during physical security inspections.

M-2. POV Storage: Governing regulations state that privately owned vehicles may be stored in unit motor pools at the discretion of the NDC Commander during deployment exercises. The following procedures will be followed:

1. Request for storage of POVs in unit motor pools will be forwarded to DLEPS. Commanders will refer to the appropriate regulation when preparing requests. Request will include:
 - a. Requesting unit and location of the motor pool.
 - b. Time period during which POVs will be stored in motor pool.
 - c. Number of POVs to be stored.
 - d. Complete vehicle description and owner's information.
 - e. Commanders signed approval letter.
2. POVs will be inventoried before being placed in the motor pool by the owner and unit representative. Any pre-existing damage to the vehicle will be recorded and affixed to the inventory documents. POVs will not be used as a storage "closet" for other valuables.
3. Parts/accessories that are easily removed and stolen (e.g., grill covers) will be removed and placed in the trunk or interior of the car.
4. Security Forces will check the POV storage areas once per shift, no less than three times daily, for signs of tampering, damage, or theft.
5. POVs will be re-inventoried before being released to the owner. The owner will sign a statement that relieves the unit of responsibility once the property is reclaimed.
6. Keys to POVs stored in the motor pool will be controlled IAW governing regulations.

M-3. Fuel Tankers: Fuel tankers, loaded or empty, will be parked in accordance with governing regulations. Fuel Tankers will be secured by either installed commercial locking devices or by immobilizing the steering wheel as prescribed IAW governing regulations.

1. Fuel tankers, when parked in populated areas or immediately adjacent to an operational building or structure, will be secured IAW governing regulations and the current FPCON.
2. In the event of emergencies, such as fires or security incidents, the on duty motor pool guard will have access Fuel Tanker keys for trucks parked in the motor pool. This will enable the guard and on duty motor pool personnel in evacuating Fuel Tankers from the accident/incident area.

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3. Keys to tactical vehicles will not be retained, with the exception of mission essential vehicles as determined by the owning commander.

M-4. Contractor Vehicles: Contractor vehicles are not authorized in motor pools unless they are required to perform a specific service, and the vehicle has been configured with the tools, equipment, and machinery needed to perform the service.

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ANNEX N, CONTINGENCY PLANS

Omitted.

Map Reference**Copy No.** _____**Issuing Headquarters****Place of Issue****Date of Issue****ANNEX O, POST ORDERS**

Special Orders for the NDC include both mobile and stationary guards. For gate post orders, see C.2 of Access Control Measures. To locate the Key to Post Orders for the maps, see Annex R/Map 1 Legend.

O-1. Special Orders for Mobile Patrol R1:

Post R1 is a mobile patrol. The area of coverage for this patrol is the cantonment area. (See Map 1 in Annex P).

1. This is a permanent 24-hour patrol manned by two NDC Security Forces members.
2. Duties for the post include:
 - a. Patrolman must visually check all security lights to ensure they are working properly during hours of darkness. Any malfunctioning lights must be reported to the law enforcement desk for maintenance action.
 - b. Patrolman should not enter any building in the patrol area except during emergencies or when investigating an incident.
 - c. During non-duty hours (1800-0600) the patrolman will conduct exterior building checks of specified buildings as directed by the DLEPS. Patrolman will physically check the security of doors by turning the access handle and pulling on the door. The frequency of building checks will depend on the Category of asset. Category I and II assets will be checked once a shift during non-duty hours or when the building is unoccupied.

O-2. Special Orders for Mobile Patrols R2-R5:

Posts R2-R5 are mobile patrols. Patrol areas for each patrol are listed below: (See Map 1 in Annex P).

1. These are permanent 24-hour patrols manned by two NDC Security Forces members.
2. Duties for the post include the following:
 - a. Patrolman must visually check all security lights to ensure they are working properly during hours of reduced visibility. Any malfunctioning lights must be reported to the law enforcement desk for maintenance action.
 - b. Patrolman should not enter any building in the patrol area except during emergencies or when investigating an incident.
 - c. During non-duty hours the patrolman will conduct exterior building checks of specified buildings as directed by the DLEPS. Patrolman will physically check the security of doors by turning the access handle and pulling on the door. The frequency of building checks will depend on the Category of asset. Category I and II assets will be checked once a shift during non-duty hours or when the building is unoccupied.
3. Mobile Patrol Zones are as follows:

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- a. R2: From Electric Substation C up to the main railroad line entry at Gate #4. From the NDC eastern perimeter to the road West of water well #4, North to the NDC water treatment plant and West to water well #5, including the perimeter of the Nuclear Storage Area. The patrol zone also includes the Conventional AA&E and the DPW Warehouse Storage areas South to the eastern perimeter of the cantonment area and southern NDC perimeter boundary.
 - b. R3: From Gate #1 in the South to the northern NDC perimeter boundary in the North. Bordered on the east by the North/South access road and western edge of the Conventional AA&E storage area to the western perimeter of the NDC Motor Pool and POL Storage areas. This patrol zone includes supporting R1 in the Cantonment area, the NDC Motor Pool, POL Storage Area, NDC Warehouse Storage Area and the perimeters of the Chemical and Nuclear Storage areas.
 - c. R4: From Gate #1 in the South to the Rainey Airfield access road and Electric Substation in the North. The eastern boundary is the main road bisecting the Cantonment area that runs North and South to the NDC perimeter boundary in the West including the southern end of Rainey Airfield and Gate #3. The patrol zone includes the western half of the Cantonment area, Gate #2, the NDC Motor Pool, western half of the POL Storage area and both Rainey Airfield Heli-pads.
 - d. R5: From the NDC northern perimeter boundary south to the southern edge of the NDC Motor Pool area. The eastern boundary is the East edge of the Chemical Storage Area perimeter extending West to Gate #3 and the western NDC perimeter boundary. The patrol zone includes the NDC Motor Pool, NDC Warehouse Storage Area (when dispatched), Chemical Storage Area, Nuclear Storage Area (when dispatched), POL Storage Area and all of Rainey Airfield.

O-3. Special Orders for Stationary Guard Post SG1:

1. Stationary Guard Post 1 is a static post. The post is located at the entry control point to the Nuclear Storage Area (See Map 1 and 8).
2. The post is manned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The post will be manned by three NDC Security Forces members from 0730-1700, Monday through Friday. During non-duty hours, weekends and holidays, the post will be manned by two Security Forces members.
3. Duties for the post include the following:
 - a. POVs are not authorized for any reason in the NSA.
 - b. Personnel access is not authorized in the NSA unless authorized in writing by the NDC Commander.
 - c. Vehicles entering the area must come to a complete stop in front of the outer vehicle entrapment area gate. One security forces guard will exit the entrapment area and check all personnel identification and NDC 815. The guard will signal the entry controller who will open the outer gate, leaving the inner gate closed (NOTE: Both gates will never be open at the same time). The guard will re-enter the pedestrian entrapment area. Once the outer gate is closed, the driver and passenger(s) will be directed out of the vehicle and into the pedestrian entrapment area through the interior turnstile. The guards will enter the vehicle entrapment area to conduct a sweep (examination of the vehicle for contraband) of the vehicle. The driver and passenger(s) will then remain in the pedestrian entrapment area as their identification is checked against the entry authority listing. Once

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cleared by the entry controller, the driver and passenger(s) will exchange their NDC 815 for an NDC 817. Once the vehicle is cleared the driver and passenger(s) will re-enter the vehicle entrapment area through the interior pedestrian entrapment area turnstile and return to the vehicle. The entry controller will then open the interior vehicle entrapment area gate and the driver will be directed to proceed into the NSA. Once the vehicle is clear of the interior gate the entry controller will close gate. When the gate is closed the two guards in the vehicle entrapment area will sweep the area for any contraband and do the same in the pedestrian entrapment area. The same procedures will be followed for pedestrian entrance/exit, except the pedestrian turnstiles and entrapment area will be exclusively used.

O-4. Special Orders for Guard Post SG2:

1. Guard Post SG2 is a static guard post. The post is located at entry control point to the Chemical Storage Area (See Map 1 and 7).
2. The post is manned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and will be manned by three NDC Security Forces members.
3. Duties for the post are identical to the duties designated for the Nuclear Storage Area.
 - a. POVs are not authorized in the AA&E Storage Area.
 - b. Personnel access is not authorized in the CSA unless authorized in writing by the NDC Commander.

O-5. Special Orders for Guard Post SG3:

1. Guard Post SG3 is a static guard post. The post is located at the entry control point to the Conventional AA&E Storage Area (See Map 1 and 9).
2. The post is manned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and will be manned by two NDC security forces members.
3. Duties for the post include the following:
 - a. POVs are not authorized in the AA&E Storage Area.
 - b. Personnel access is not authorized in the AA&E Storage Area unless authorized in writing by the NDC Commander.

O-6. Special Orders for Guard Post SG4:

1. Guard Post SG4 is a static guard post. The post is located at the entry control point into the warehouse area.
2. This post is manned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week by two contract security guards from 0600-2000, Monday through Saturday, excluding holidays. During non-duty hours, Sunday and holidays, SG4 will be manned by one contract security guard.
3. Duties for the post include the following:
 - a. The vehicle gate will remain closed at all times unless an emergency or operational contingency arises that necessitates it remain open.
 - b. POVs are not authorized in the warehouse area.
 - c. All commercial and government vehicles will be processed into the area at the entry control point. Commercial vehicles will have their bills of lading checked before authorizing entry.

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- d. All pedestrian traffic entering and exiting the warehouse area will be through the entry control point. Government employees who are authorized to be in the warehouse area will have a pink picture badge (NDC Form 818). Contractor employees who are authorized to be in the area will have a yellow picture badge (NDC Form 819). The guard will physically check each employee's badge to ensure the person entering the area is authorized. If an employee's badge is found to be invalid, the guard will detain the person and contact the NDC law enforcement desk for further instructions. Employees without badges or visitors will be checked against an entry authority list signed by the Commander. If authorized entry by the entry authority list, visitors will be escorted at all times by an employee with an NDC 818 or 819.
 - e. All property issued from the warehouse area will be documented on the NDC Form 5629, NDC Property Receipt.

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ANNEX P, DESIGNATED RESTRICTED AREAS

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ANNEX Q, NDC MISSION ESSENTIAL OR VULNERABLE AREAS (MEVAs)

Omitted.

ANNEX R, the National Defense Center Maps

The following maps and indexes can be found in this annex:

- NDC Map 1: NDC Installation Overview
- NDC Map 2: Cantonment Area
- NDC Map 3: NDC Warehouse Storage Area
- NDC Map 4: NDC Motor Pool
- NDC Map 5: Rainey Airfield
- NDC Map 6: POL Storage Area
- NDC Map 7: Chemical Storage Area
- NDC Map 8: Nuclear Storage Area
- NDC Map 9: Conventional AA&E Storage Area
- NDC Map 10: DPW Warehouse Storage Area

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Map Reference

Copy No. _____

Issuing Headquarters

Place of Issue

Date of Issue

ANNEX S, CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS PLAN (COOP)

Omitted.

List of Acronyms

AA&E	Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives
ACS	Access Control Systems
ADP	Automated Data Processing
AIS	Automated Information Systems
AT	Antiterrorism
ATO	Antiterrorism Officer
BRF	Back Up Response Force
CIB	Criminal Investigation Branch
CI	Counterintelligence
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
COMSEC	Communication Security
COOP	Continuity of Operations Plan
DCS	Director of Cybersecurity
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DLEPS	Director of Law Enforcement and Physical Security
DOL	Director of Logistics
DOC	Director of Contracting
DSTO	Director of Security, Training and Operations
DPW	Director of Public Works
DRM	Director of Resource Management
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
FPCON	Force Protection Condition
G1	Gate (w/numerical post designator/matches NDC Gate designators)
GOV	Government Owned Vehicle
Hotline	Connects directly to Director of Law Enforcement and Physical Security Office/Law Enforcement Desk by picking up the receiver
HRP	High Risk Personnel
IC	NDC Commander
IDS	Intrusion Detection Systems
JAG	Judge Advocate General
MEVA	Mission Essential/Vulnerable Areas
MWD	Military Working Dog team (Handler and Dog)
NAC	National Agency Check
NDC	National Defense Center
OE	Operating Environment
OPSEC	Operation Security
PIC	Personal Identification Cipher
POC	Point of Contact
POL	Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants
POV	Privately Owned Vehicle
PSP	Physical Security Plan
RAM	Random Antiterrorism Measures

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R1-5	Roving Patrol (w/numerical patrol zone number)
SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SAV	Staff Assistance Visit
SFCC	Security Forces Control Center
SF	Security Forces
SG	Static Guard Post
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
HERT	Hostile Event Reaction Team
SSO	Special Security Office
UFC	Unified Facility Criteria

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