



Kun Shan Chun

- Native of China
- Naturalized citizen of the United States
- Federal Bureau of Investigations employee (1997-2016)
- Age 46 at time of sentencing
- Also known as (a/k/a) "Joey Chun"



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CASE STUDY

Crime: Acting as an Agent of a Foreign Power

WHAT HAPPENED

Kun Shan Chun, began working at the FBI's New York Field Office in 1997 as an electronics technician. Chun was granted a Top Secret security clearance and his duties included accessing sensitive and, in some instances, classified information. Chun would eventually receive and respond to requests from Chinese nationals about his work at the FBI.

Chun and some of his relatives had a financial interest in a company in China named Zhuhai Kolion Technology Company Ltd. ("Kolion"). Chun was asked to perform research and consulting tasks in the United States, purportedly for the benefit of Kolion, in exchange for financial benefits, including partial compensation for international trips as well as cash payments made to one of Chun's relatives.

Chun disclosed information regarding the FBI's personnel, structure, technological capabilities, surveillance strategies, and certain categories of surveillance targets on multiple occasions. During a trip to Italy and France in 2011, Chun met with a Chinese Official and disclosed, among other things, the identity and potential travel patterns of an FBI Special Agent.

In 2012, the FBI conducted a routine investigation into Chun's Top Secret security clearance. Chun repeatedly lied on forms related to the security clearance investigation to conceal his relationships with Chinese nationals. The FBI also learned that Chun traveled to Hong Kong and China approximately nine times, as well as additional trips to Canada, Thailand, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, but he failed to disclose his anticipated and actual contact with foreign nationals on these trips. He also lied on numerous pre- and post-trip FBI debriefing forms by omitting his contacts with foreign nationals.

INDICATORS

- **Access Attributes** – Chun held a Top Secret security clearance and his duties included accessing sensitive and classified information.
- **Foreign Considerations** – Chun had relationships with Chinese nationals affiliated with a Chinese company, Kolion. Chun frequently traveled to meet these individuals and fail to report it.
- **Security and Compliance Incidents** – Chun failed to self-report his contact with foreign nationals.
- **Technical Activity** – The FBI found a thumb drive containing sensitive FBI information not required for Chun's work from home. Chun had no legitimate reason to have these files at his residence.

IMPACT

- In January 2017, Chun was convicted of acting as an agent of the People's Republic of China ("China") in the U.S.
- He was sentenced to serve 24 months in prison and a \$10,000 fine.
- Among the protected information Chun disclosed were details of the FBI's surveillance infrastructure, including specific information about networks used to store highly sensitive, classified data as well as network details and unique usernames for several FBI employees.

ADDITIONAL INFO

- Chun admitted to an undercover FBI Special Agent (UC) that he wanted to develop a "consulting" relationship between himself, the UC, and his Chinese associates. Chun also expressed a willingness to facilitate the passage of sensitive U.S. Government information from the UC to one or more of his Chinese associates, including individuals associated with the Chinese government.
- Prior to his arrest, FBI agents found a .40 caliber handgun and an AR-15 rifle in Chun's basement, neither of which was registered in New York.
- The FBI also seized a thumb drive that contained three files with sensitive FBI information dating back to approximately 2006 and 2007. Chun's job at the FBI did not require him to work from home, and there is no legitimate reason for him to have these files at his residence. One file was marked with a security header that read "FBI sensitive information for official use only." The second file contained information on how FBI employees could access raw intelligence information, including network details and unique usernames for 10 FBI employees. The third file contained a spreadsheet dated June 2, 2006, which included names and telephone numbers of FBI personnel with jobs similar to Chun's position. It also contained telephone numbers for lines that Electronics Technicians such as Chun would use to configure or troubleshoot network issues within the FBI's New York Office.

Questions to consider:

- What approaches might a foreign adversary use to recruit insiders?
- How can you safeguard against recruitment efforts by foreign agents?

Resources for further exploration:

- [Foreign Collection Methods: Indicators and Countermeasures](https://www.cdse.edu/Portals/124/Documents/jobaids/ci/foreign-collection-methods.pdf?ver=c-2lkn8Q5gzlrExKJxyxLQ%3d%3d)
(<https://www.cdse.edu/Portals/124/Documents/jobaids/ci/foreign-collection-methods.pdf?ver=c-2lkn8Q5gzlrExKJxyxLQ%3d%3d>)
- [Foreign Intelligence Entity \(Fie\) Targeting And Recruitment](https://www.cdse.edu/Portals/124/Documents/jobaids/foreign-intelligence-entity-targeting-recruitment-methodology.pdf?ver=GfH1VcoaQz7FqtcnQ86LTg%3d%3d)
(<https://www.cdse.edu/Portals/124/Documents/jobaids/foreign-intelligence-entity-targeting-recruitment-methodology.pdf?ver=GfH1VcoaQz7FqtcnQ86LTg%3d%3d>)
- [CI Foreign Travel Briefing Clo22.16](https://www.cdse.edu/Training/eLearning/Clo22/)
(<https://www.cdse.edu/Training/eLearning/Clo22/>)

IF YOU SEE SOMETHING, SAY SOMETHING!

Contact the appropriate POC to report any observed potential risk indicators:

Name: _____ Agency/Department: _____
Title: Supervisor/Security Officer/ITP Senior Official/ITP Manager