

INSIDER THREAT AND EXTREMIST ACTIVITY WITHIN THE DOD

DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AGENCY

CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY
EXCELLENCE (CDSE)





OBJECTIVES

- ❑ Define key terms found in DODI 1325.06
- ❑ Define Domestic Violent Extremism and associated ideological themes
- ❑ Explain the stages of Violent Extremist Behavior and types of Associated Activities
- ❑ Describe the role of Disinformation, Misinformation, and Social Engineering in Violent Extremism
- ❑ Review cases of extremism in active duty and former military service members
- ❑ Present data on extremists with U.S. military backgrounds
- ❑ State Prevention and Reporting requirements under DODI 1325.06
- ❑ List Adverse Information Reporting requirements for the DOD cleared personnel



BACKGROUND

- ❑ In February 2021, SECDEF Lloyd J. Austin III directed a Department-wide stand down to educate DOD personnel on the threat posed by extremist activity.

- ❑ In April 2021, Secretary Austin issued a second memorandum to implement immediate actions and directed the establishment of the Countering Extremist Activity Working Group (CEAWG) to implement these urgent steps and develop additional recommendations.

- ❑ Review and update DOD Instruction 1325.06, *Handling Protest, Extremist, and Criminal Gang Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces* to **clarify the definition of prohibited extremist activity.**

- ❑ DODI 1325.06, Change Effective December 20, 2021



UPDATES TO DOD INSTRUCTION 1325.06



DEFINITION OF EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

“The revised instruction prohibits active participation in extremist activities and clearly defines what is meant by the term **extremist activities**.”

- Advocating or engaging in unlawful force or violence, or other illegal means
- To achieve goals that are political, religious, discriminatory, or ideological
- Supporting terrorism within the United States or abroad
- Overthrow of the U.S. Government or any political subdivision
- Advocating DOD personnel, including contractors or U.S. Coast Guard members, to violate U.S. laws
- Widespread unlawful discrimination based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex (including pregnancy), gender identity, or sexual orientation



ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

The term “active participation” means the following, except where such activity is within the scope of an official duty (e.g., intelligence or law enforcement operations):

- Advocating or engaging in the use or threat of unlawful force
- Advocating for or providing material support
- Knowingly communicating information
- Recruiting or training
- Fundraising
- Leadership role
- Actively demonstrating
- Attending a Meeting



ADVOCACY

When made with the intent to promote or endorse extremist or criminal gang activities, affirmative statements or actions taken to encourage action, promote an organization, or further the spread of information regarding extremist activities.

Advocacy may occur through oral, written, electronic, or nonverbal communication, including the display of images or symbols.





LIKING



The use of the “like” function on social media platforms, generally to signal endorsement or support of the “liked” content.

Liking includes the use of emojis or reactions that signal endorsement or support, or platform specific actions such as “favoriting,” when also implying endorsement.

Liking, in the context of the communication concerned, must imply or state endorsement, agreement, or promoting of the content.



LITERATURE



Printed materials, leaflets, circulars, or other written materials, including electronic or cyber content.



MATERIAL SUPPORT OR RESOURCES

Any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (one or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.





DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM

UNCLASSIFIED



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

(U) Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021

01 March 2021



Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Homeland Security

Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on
Domestic Terrorism

Submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate

May 2021



DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM

- ❑ **Domestic violent extremists (DVEs)** who are motivated by a range of ideologies and galvanized by recent political and societal events in the United States pose an elevated threat to the homeland in 2021.

- ❑ **Lone offenders** or small cells of DVEs adhering to a diverse set of violent extremist ideologies are more likely to carry out violent attacks in the homeland than organizations that allegedly advocate a DVE ideology.

- ❑ **Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs)** and militia violent extremists (MVEs) **present the most lethal DVE threats**, with RMVEs most likely to conduct mass-casualty attacks against civilians and MVEs typically targeting law enforcement and government personnel and facilities.



DVE IDEOLOGICAL THEMES



Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists (RMVEs)

DVEs with ideological agendas derived from bias, often related to race or ethnicity, held by the actor against others, including a given population group.



Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremists

DVEs seeking to end or mitigate perceived cruelty, harm, or exploitation of animals or perceived exploitation or destruction of natural resources and the environment.



DVE IDEOLOGICAL THEMES



Anti-Government/Anti-Authority Violent Extremists

DVEs with ideological agendas derived from anti-government or anti-authority sentiment, including opposition to perceived economic, social, or racial hierarchies or perceived government overreach, negligence, or illegitimacy.

Examples:

- Militia Violent Extremists
- Anarchist Violent Extremists
- Sovereign Citizen Violent Extremists



DVE IDEOLOGICAL THEMES



Abortion-Related Violent Extremists

DVEs with ideological agendas in support of pro-life or pro-choice beliefs.



All Other Domestic Terrorism Threats

DVEs with ideological agendas that are not otherwise defined under one of the other domestic terrorism threat categories, including a combination of personal grievances and beliefs with potential bias related to religion, gender, or sexual orientation.



VIOLENT EXTREMISM BEHAVIOR STAGES

Mobilization

Physical or virtual actions suggesting an attack or violent extremist travel may be **imminent** (days/hours before an attack or violent extremist travel)

Preparation

Physical or virtual actions suggesting an attack or violent extremist travel may occur in the near term (weeks before an attack or violent extremist travel)

Motivation

Physical or virtual actions that build, solidify, or communicate violent ideological beliefs; these indicators do not necessarily suggest an impending attack or violent extremist travel

Caveat: Some of the indicators may be lawful or constitutionally protected and should not serve as the sole basis for any investigative activity. A risk factor may be insignificant on its own and no one factor appears to be more significant than another.




VIOLENT EXTREMISM BEHAVIOR TYPES



Financial




Ideology



Intent



Tactics



Relationship



Travel

These six behavior types characterize an individual's activities as they relate to Mobilization, Preparation, and Motivation stages.



DISINFORMATION AND MISINFORMATION

Disinformation is manufactured information that is deliberately created or disseminated with the intent to cause harm. It is not necessarily false information. Even true information can be presented in misleading ways.

- ❑ Foreign actors can sow disinformation to steer Domestic Violent Extremism ideology and intent.
- ❑ Foreign actors can spend a lot of money to make disinformation seem like entertainment or news (e.g., Russian State-controlled television network RT)

Misinformation is false information shared without the intent to mislead. People share misinformation believing the information to be true when it is not.

A **Disinformation Campaign** occurs when a person, group of people, or entity (threat actor) coordinate to distribute false or misleading information while concealing the true objectives of the campaign.

“Adversaries of the United States have taken advantage of dis- and misinformation campaigns to weaken public trust in all our institutions, undermine public health (both during and before the COVID-19 pandemic), and create friction or confusion during U.S. military and diplomatic engagements abroad.” – United States Cyberspace Solarium White Paper #6, Dec 2021



SOCIAL MEDIA

- ❑ Tools and technologies that allow users to share communications, postings or information, or participate in social networking. Users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as videos).
- ❑ Today around seven-in-ten Americans use social media to connect with one another, engage with news content, share information, and entertain themselves. (*Pew Research Social Media Factsheet, April 2021*)
- ❑ DVEs exploit a variety of popular social media platforms, smaller websites with targeted audiences, and encrypted chat applications to recruit new adherents, plan and rally support for in-person actions, and disseminate materials that contribute to radicalization and mobilization to violence.

Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy enables commanders to punish soldiers for social media posts that support extremist groups.

- Military personnel must reject participation in extremist organizations and associated cyber activities.
- Soldiers are prohibited from engaging in cyber-related activities in support of extremist organizations or criminal gangs.



**SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT
DIRECTIVE 5**

**COLLECTION, USE, AND RETENTION
OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE SOCIAL MEDIA INFORMATION IN
PERSONNEL SECURITY BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS AND
ADJUDICATIONS**

(EFFECTIVE: 12 MAY 2016)



CONSPIRACY THEORY LEADING TO VIOLENCE

Edgar Welch

- ❑ On December 4, 2016, Edgar Welch entered a restaurant in Washington, DC, and fired multiple rounds with an AR-15 assault rifle.
- ❑ Motivated, in part, by unfounded rumors that a child sex-trafficking ring, known as “Pizzagate” was being conducted in hidden rooms at the restaurant.
- ❑ Indicated that he had been researching “Pizzagate” and that it made him “sick.” He read news reports and watched videos on the internet.
- ❑ Texted an acquaintance asking about Army buddies nearby.
- ❑ Pleaded guilty to Interstate transport of a firearm and ammunition and assault with a dangerous weapon.



Sentenced to 24 months and 48 months prison terms, concurrently on two counts



EXTREMISM CASES ASSOCIATED WITH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL




MASS-CASUALTY ATTACK

- ❑ The Oklahoma City Bombing, April 19, 1995: 168 killed, including 19 children, with several hundred more injured.
- ❑ Timothy McVeigh, a decorated U.S. Army veteran, believed the government was attacking Americans' personal rights and freedoms.
- ❑ His hatred of the Federal Government intensified in 1993 after an armed standoff in Waco, Texas, resulting in the deaths of 76 people.
- ❑ Terry Nichols was an Army buddy of McVeigh. He was known for anti-Government sentiments and helped McVeigh buy and steal materials for bomb-making and helped mix the ingredients.
- ❑ Michael Fortier was an Army buddy of McVeigh. To finance the plot, Fortier sold the guns that McVeigh and Nichols had stolen.



Timothy McVeigh



Terry Nichols




Michael Fortier



KILLING FELLOW SOLDIERS

U.S. Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan

- ❑ In Nov 5, 2009, Hasan shot and killed 13 unarmed personnel at Fort Hood, Texas.
- ❑ Hasan was an Army psychiatrist.
- ❑ Communicated with radical Islamic cleric Anwar Nasser al-Awlaki, a subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation, who was later killed in a U.S. strike in Yemen.
- ❑ Hasan's radical views alarmed his colleagues. On several occasions, he presented sympathetic views towards radical Islam and wrote papers defending Osama bin Laden
- ❑ During his medical residency and post-residency fellowship, Hasan demonstrated evidence of violent extremism.






THREAT AGAINST RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY

U.S. Army Reserve Maj. Russel Thomas Langford

- ❑ Was assigned to the G-33 Mobilization Section of the U.S. Army Reserve Command on Fort Bragg.
- ❑ Threatened and pointed a firearm at members of a mosque in North Carolina, threatened to kill, and referred to the mosque members in derogatory anti-Muslim terms.
- ❑ Admitted that he acted intentionally to threaten the mosque's members and obstruct their free exercise of religion.
- ❑ Diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder
- ❑ The incident put fear in local mosque members while they exercised their freedom of religion.




Sentenced to 10 months home confinement



THREAT AGAINST MEDIA AND GOVERNMENT

U.S. Coast Guard Lt. Christopher Hasson

- Self-identified as a “White Nationalist” for over 30 years in writings advocating for “focused violence” in order to establish a white homeland.
- Read the manifestos of mass murderers such as Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik and Unabomber Ted Kaczynski.
- Conducted Internet searches and developed lists of potential targets, including media personalities and current and former elected officials.
- Misused U.S. Government automated information system.
- Sentenced on four federal charges, including unlawful possession of unregistered silencers, firearm silencers unidentified by serial number, possession of firearms by an addict.




Sentenced to 160 months in prison on 4 federal counts



COMMUNICATING BOMB-MAKING INSTRUCTIONS

Pvt. First Class Jarret Smith

- ❑ Was stationed in Fort Bliss, Texas
- ❑ Disseminated guidance to others on how to construct Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on his Facebook account
- ❑ Spoke to others via social media about his desire to travel to Ukraine to fight with a violent, far-right paramilitary group.
- ❑ Court documents show that Smith “gave information out freely to people who may use it for harm, for the glory of Quayinism, and his religion of anti-kosmik Satanism.
- ❑ Pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing information related to explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction.



Sentenced to 30 months in federal prison and three years supervised release



MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS

Steven Domingo

- Domingo was a former U.S. Army Infantryman.
- Expressed desire to seek violent retribution for attacks against Muslims in internet posts and forums.
- Decided to bomb a white supremacist rally in April 2019 in Long Beach, California.
- Inquired about a bomb-maker and purchased hundreds of nails to be used as shrapnel for the bombs.
- Received what he thought were two live bombs.
- Testified that he intended to commit mass murder. Domingo was convicted of providing material support to terrorists and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction.




Sentenced to 25 years in prison.



THREATENING PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF POWER

Leonard Gruppo

- ❑ U.S. Army veteran (LTC) Leonard Gruppo participated in the January 6, 2021, attack on the United States Capitol.
- ❑ Traveled from New Mexico to Washington D.C.
- ❑ Deliberately ignored instructions from law enforcement officers.
- ❑ Pleaded guilty to one count of Parading, Demonstrating, or Picketing in the Capitol Building and was ordered to pay restitution of \$500 to the Architect of the Capitol.
- ❑ The Capitol attack threatened the peaceful transfer of power after the 2020 Presidential election, injured more than one hundred law enforcement officers, and resulted in more than a million dollars' worth of property damage.





Profiles of Individual
Radicalization In the
United States (PIRUS)



APPLIED RESEARCH LABORATORY FOR
**INTELLIGENCE
AND SECURITY**

RESEARCH BRIEF | Extremism in the Ranks and After


Data from the University of Maryland National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)



DATA AND TRENDS

OVERVIEW OF THE CASES


U.S. Extremists with Military Backgrounds, 1990-2021 (n = 458)





DATA AND TRENDS

**United States Extremists with Military Backgrounds:
Branch and Status at Time of Offense/Arrest, 1990-2021**






DATA AND TRENDS

IDEOLOGICAL AND GROUP AFFILIATIONS

Ideological Affiliations of U.S. Extremists with Military Backgrounds, 1990-2021



Note: subjects can be coded for up to three ideological affiliations.




DATA AND TRENDS



CAPITOL BREACH

Branch Affiliations and Status of Capitol Offenders



Note: subjects were coded for up to three branch affiliations.



DODI 1325.06 PREVENTION AND REPORTING



PREVENTION

- ❑ Commanders should remain alert for signs of future extremist activities.

- ❑ Commanders should intervene early, primarily through counseling, when observing such signs even though the signs may not rise to the level of active participation or threaten good order and discipline, but only suggest such potential.

- ❑ The goal of early intervention is to minimize the risk of future extremist activities. In these situations, commanders will educate the service member regarding the potential adverse effects of their actions.



PREVENTION

(1) For example, commanders may advise Service members that extremist activities are inconsistent with the military's goals, beliefs, and values, as well as the oaths of office and enlistment. Additionally, commanders may advise Service members that active participation in extremist activities:

Will be considered in evaluating duty performance, selection in leadership positions, or military educational opportunities; Will result in reporting to appropriate agency, law enforcement, and/or counterintelligence authorities; Possible revocation of clearance and separation; May result in reassignment, reclassification, or bar to reenlistment actions, as appropriate.

(2) Commanders should consider all available resources to assist Service members showing signs of potential involvement in extremist activities, such as command-directed mental health evaluations, financial counseling sessions, etc.



REPORTING

(1) Upon a credible report or suspicion of extremist activities, commanders will notify the appropriate:

- (a) Military Criminal Investigative Organization(s).
- (b) Counterintelligence organization(s), as appropriate.
- (c) Command security manager, if the military member possesses a security clearance.
- (d) Legal office.
- (e) Insider Threat Hub.

(2) Additionally, where appropriate, the commander will ensure substantiated allegations of active participation in extremist activities are recorded in the personnel system of record, IAW DOD Manual 5200.02 and applicable Military Service guidance.



REPORTING

(3) Each Military Department is required to establish a mechanism for commands to report extremist activities by Service members. The Military Departments must track all reported extremist activity, conforming with the requirements of Section 554 of Public Law 116-283.

(4) The Military Departments shall ensure that the policy and procedures on prohibited activities in Paragraphs 8-9 of this enclosure are included in initial active duty training, pre-commissioning training, professional military education, commander training, and other appropriate Service training programs.



ADVERSE INFORMATION REPORTING

Who to Report

- Self
- Coworkers
- Manager
- Supervisor
- Commander

What to Report

- Concerns to national security adjudicative guidelines

When to Report

- Immediately

How to Report

- Report to security personnel, who will prepare an incident report or contact the appropriate authority

13 National Security Adjudicative Guidelines

- | | | |
|---------------------------|--|------------------------------------|
| 1. Allegiance to the U.S. | 5. Personal Conduct | 9. Psychological Conditions |
| 2. Foreign Influence | 6. Financial Considerations | 10. Criminal Conduct |
| 3. Foreign Preference | 7. Alcohol Consumption | 11. Handling Protected Information |
| 4. Sexual Behavior | 8. Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse | 12. Outside Activities |
| | | 13. Use of Information Technology |



SUMMARY

- ❑ Defined key terms found in DODI 1325.06
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- ❑ Reviewed cases of extremism in active duty and former military service members
- ❑ Presented data on extremists with U.S. military backgrounds
- ❑ Stated Prevention and Reporting requirements under DODI 1325.06
- ❑ Listed Adverse Information Reporting requirements for the DOD Cleared personnel



QUESTIONS



RESOURCES FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION

CDSE Job Aid: Insider Threat Potential Risk Indicators (PRI)

(https://www.cdse.edu/Portals/124/Documents/jobaids/insider/INTJ0181-insider-threat-indicators-job-aid.pdf?ver=_HedcDtQk9sSEZItNMLQzA%3d%3d)

CDSE Job Aid: Insider Threat Reporting

(<https://www.cdse.edu/Portals/124/Documents/jobaids/insider/INTJ0174-insider-threat-reporting-proc.pdf>)

CDSE Job Aid: Behavioral Science and Insider Threat

(<https://www.cdse.edu/Portals/124/Documents/jobaids/insider/Behavioral-Science-and-Insider-Threat.pdf>)

CDSE Job Aid: Understanding the Intersection of Cultural Competence and Organizational Risk (<https://www.cdse.edu/Portals/124/Documents/jobaids/insider/Cultural-Competence-and-Insider-Risk.pdf>)



RESOURCES FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION

CDSE Security Short: DOD Prevention Assistance and Response PAR Capabilities

(https://securityawareness.usalearning.gov/cdse/multimedia/shorts/parc/parc/parc/page_0010.html)

CDSE Security Short: HR and Insider Threat

(https://securityawareness.usalearning.gov/cdse/multimedia/shorts/hrinsider/story_html5.html)

CDSE Security Short: Adverse Information Reporting

(https://securityawareness.usalearning.gov/cdse/multimedia/shorts/adverse/story_html5.html)

FBI Monograph: Making Prevention a Reality (<https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/making-prevention-a-reality.pdf>)

United States Secret Service NTAC: Attacks on Federal Government 2001 – 2013: Threat Assessment Considerations, Dec 2015 (<https://www.secretservice.gov/node/2538>)



REFERENCES

Report on Countering Extremist Activity Within the Department of Defense, Dec 2021
(<https://media.defense.gov/2021/Dec/20/2002912573/-1/-1/0/REPORT-ON-COUNTERING-EXTREMIST-ACTIVITY-WITHIN-THE-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE.PDF>)

Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1325.06 - November 27, 2009;
Incorporating Change 2, Effective December 20, 2021
(<https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/132506p.PDF?ver=ckT436s6Q40EVtgLn-Fe7g%3d%3d>)

Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021, ODNI
(<https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2021/item/2194-unclassified-summary-of-assessment-on-domestic-violent-extremism>)

FBI DHS Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism, May 2021 (<https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhs-domestic-terrorism-strategic-report.pdf/view>)



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The 2021 U.S. Violent Extremist Mobilization Indicators booklet

(<https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-newsroom/nctc-resources/item/2272-u-s-violent-extremist-mobilization-indicators-2021>)

CDSE Insider Threat Case Studies

(<https://securityawareness.usalearning.gov/cdse/case-studies/cases.html>)

START Research Brief: Extremism in the Ranks and After

(<https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/extremism-ranks-and-after>)

Pew Research Center: Social Media Fact Sheets, April 7, 2021

(<https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/>)